Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, Esquire, CBE, having been created Baron Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, of Nash in the County of Shropshire, for life--Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Lane of Horsell and the Baroness Seccombe.

Language Teaching

Lord Watson of Richmond: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	Whether they accept the recommendation of the Nuffield Languages Inquiry that languages should have the same status as literacy, numeracy and information communication technology as a key skill and whether they will consequently make a commitment to early language training for all children.

Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, the Government will respond fully to the Nuffield report in due course. Already we are piloting approaches to language teaching in primary schools and we have asked the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) to consider the potential to extend that in the longer term.

Lord Watson of Richmond: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that Answer, but it stops short of the commitment for which the Nuffield inquiry makes such a powerful case. Is Her Majesty's Government aware that, by not making that commitment, they will seriously disadvantage Britain's competitiveness in the future in a multi-lingual world and that they will disadvantage pupils in state schools as opposed to those in private schools? I presume that that is not their intention. It is much easier to learn languages when one is young, so why not allow everyone that opportunity?

Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, I accept that there is much to be said for starting to learn languages at an early age. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Richmond, is jumping the gun in saying that the Government are making no commitments in this area. The Government are considering the recommendations of the Nuffield inquiry. As I said, the Government will reply to all the recommendations in due course. Meanwhile, a growing number of primary schools--between 25 and 30 per cent--are able to offer a modern language as an option. That may not satisfy the noble Lord, but it is an improvement on the situation in the past. The QCA is looking at the matter and, when it has reported, I shall let the noble Lord know the outcome.

Lord Quirk: My Lords, does the Minister agree that the build-up over the past four or five years of specialist language colleges has been an outstanding success? They now total almost 100. Have they not shown that in this country we can have a good take-up for languages, enthusiastic learning and a good language spread, including languages beyond French to German, Italian, Spanish and other languages? Would it not be timely to take up the Nuffield recommendation and match secondary schools with specialist primary schools so that parents with a serious commitment to wanting their children to learn foreign languages can be confident that there will be a smooth and progressive transition to the secondary level in a way that was denied during earlier initiatives of this kind?

Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Quirk, has said about the success of specialist language schools so far. Across the country they teach some 20 languages, thus allowing greater choice. They also allow languages such as Japanese and Mandarin to be taught in our secondary schools. I accept what he says about the need for a smoother transition for those primary school children who have had the chance to learn a modern language so that they can take forward what they have learned into their secondary schools. His suggestion that specialist schools should work with the primary schools in their areas to achieve that smooth progression is one that is being examined. I hope that it will be taken forward.

Lord Jenkin of Roding: My Lords, the Nuffield report is splendid and the authors are to be congratulated. However, the shortage of language teachers is most worrying. The report states:
	"The shortage of teachers, which is now acute and damaging the quality of provision in schools and colleges, is creating a vicious circle of inadequate supply".
	In those circumstances, is it not absurd that university departments that train teachers of modern languages are threatened with closure?

Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, there has been a long-term problem in relation to the recruiting of modern language teachers, as there certainly was during the period when the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, was himself a Cabinet Minister. The Government are attempting to address this difficult area. We are providing PGCE students, who are trained to be modern language teachers, with a £6,000 quasi salary. We hope that that will encourage more young people with language degrees to enter teaching, because at present many do not. We are also providing an extra £4,000 to teachers of shortage subjects, after their induction period, when they first start teaching. In relation to maths and science teachers, that has been very successful and we hope that there will be similar success as regards language teachers.
	I do not know to what the noble Lord refers when he says that departments that train teachers in modern languages are being closed. There has been some reduction in the number of students taking a modern language as a single-subject honours degree, but there has been a big increase in the number of students who combine a modern language with another subject.

Baroness David: My Lords, is it not a fact that many students can now start a language when they reach university? I totally appreciate the advantage of starting to learn a language when one is young. However, there is now the opportunity at university to start a degree from scratch in a language such as Russian, to graduate and hopefully to take up the teaching of it afterwards.

Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely right. There is now a much more imaginative approach in higher education to the teaching of modern languages which allows students who have some potential in this area to start a language from scratch. Through intensive training--often a four-year course with one year spent abroad--students can reach good degree-level standards in that subject, and that is to be encouraged.

Lord Geddes: My Lords, does the Minister agree that there is another side to this very valuable coin? I refer to the encouragement of the teaching of English to the speakers of other languages.

Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, I entirely agree that encouraging people to learn English is another side of this coin and one from which British exporters can certainly benefit.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the French and German Governments are discussing closer bilateral co-operation in teaching each other's languages? Now that Britain is at the heart of Europe, according to the Prime Minister, have the British Government considered making bilateral arrangements with the Spanish, French and German Governments? We used to have good foreign language assistants in British schools in much larger numbers. If such a scheme could be expanded again, it would help primary and secondary schools considerably.

Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, discussions of a bilateral nature are taking place with the governments of those countries to extend provision of that kind. I am afraid that demand from those countries for students from the UK to work as language teaching assistants is bigger than the demand in the opposite direction.

World Water Forum

Lord Bradshaw: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What steps they are taking to co-ordinate United Kingdom interests at the third World Water Forum to be held in Japan in 2003.

Baroness Amos: My Lords, the United Kingdom's interests for the second World Water Forum were co-ordinated through a cross-departmental group comprising the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions. The Secretary of State for International Development led the delegation, which included representation from the private sector, civil society and professional associations. We plan to consult widely on co-ordination of United Kingdom interests for the 2003 forum.

Lord Bradshaw: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for that reply, though it falls a long way short of what is needed. I hope she will agree that water is an exceptionally important industry throughout the world. At the World Water Forum, which took place in the Hague with 4,500 delegates, the British participants found each other by looking through the list of attendees. The French, German and Japanese delegations were all properly co-ordinated. Can the Minister assure us that we will immediately look for a lead agency in government to take this matter in hand so that British industry is properly represented at the Water Forum in 2003?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, as I made clear in my original Answer, we take co-ordination extremely seriously. We want to ensure that industry, civil society, the professional associations and government departments are represented on our delegation. At the Hague conference we wanted to ensure that the poverty and development focus was clear in terms of what was discussed at that forum. I agree that water is exceptionally important. We take our responsibilities in that area extremely seriously and will be co-ordinating at an early stage to get the best out of the 2003 forum.

The Earl of Selborne: My Lords, as one of the 4,500 delegates at the World Water Forum in the Hague, can I make a plea that when arrangements are being made for the third Water Forum, that the Office of Science and Technology be included among the departments so that British science, technology and engineering can be adequately represented?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, I take the noble Lord's point. As I said in my original Answer, a cross-departmental working group attended the last forum. The actual delegation comprised the Department for International Development, the FCO and the Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, but other departments were consulted before we went to the forum. I entirely agree that we need to ensure that science has a clear role in our preparations for 2003.

Baroness Whitaker: My Lords, given that 40 per cent of the population do not have access to adequate sanitation, can my noble friend say what the Government are doing to address that aspect of the water problem?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, we have made some progress in relation to access to safe water in that the numbers of people throughout the world who do not have such access has gone down to 1 billion. As my noble friend said, some 2.4 billion people--40 per cent of the world's population--do not have access to adequate sanitation. The Department for International Development is investing £50 million into a combination of water and sanitation projects. That figure will be increased to around £360 million in the coming years.

Lord Ezra: My Lords, is it not unfortunate that, following the conference in March of this year referred to by my noble friend Lord Bradshaw, the non-governmental organisations jointly issued a statement totally disagreeing with the ministerial statement? Does not that underline my noble friend's point that there should be proper co-ordination? Cannot the UK lead the way by bringing NGOs as well as other bodies into their co-ordination plans in readiness not only for the next world forum in 2003, but also for the next water conference in Germany in 2002?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, noble Lords will be aware that working in partnership not only with the NGOs but with business, with governments and with international financial institutions is a key part of the strategy of the Department for International Development. We worked closely with NGOs in preparing for the water forum. However, we live in a democracy and it is important that, where NGOs disagree with government, they have the right to say so. We have consultations with NGOs and others who are involved with development through our policy forums. That is to ensure that NGOs understand our agenda and, as far as possible, we understand theirs. It does not mean that the agendas will always be the same.

Lord Grenfell: My Lords, given that an important and early beneficiary of public sector investments in water supply in developing countries is often the private sector, particularly the multinationals, does the Minister agree that the Government should place special emphasis in the forum on encouraging more private sector investment in water supply in developing countries, possibly through public-private partnerships?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, that is an approach which the department has taken extremely seriously. We recognise the significant potential contribution of public-private partnerships to improve access to sustainable water and sanitation services for poor people. In fact, we have worked with other governments to access the potential contribution of the private sector. We have also worked with the World Bank and the government of Japan, and launched a public-private infrastructure advisory facility to assist developing countries to establish appropriate enabling environments for partnerships with the private sector.

Peruvian Elections and Democracy

Lord Avebury: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	Whether they intend to review the Anglo-Peruvian agreement made in July 1998 between the Prime Minister and President Fujimori, in the light of the Peruvian presidential election.

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, the Anglo-Peruvian agreement signed in July 1998 is reviewed on an annual basis. We are deeply concerned at the conduct of the recent presidential elections, which fell far short of internationally accepted standards. We shall discuss our reaction with our European partners when we meet after the Organisation of American States' investigative mission returns from Peru at the end of June.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, as well as the preliminary report of the OAS, were not reports by the EU delegation which attended the first round of the presidential elections, by FIDH, and by Electoral Reform Services and so forth uniformly critical? Does the noble Baroness agree that it is impossible to have an agreement which calls for collaboration in promoting democracy if there is no democracy to promote? Will she ensure that, in the current considerations of our relationship with Peru, Sr. Toledo, the leader of the opposition, is consulted? Does she know whether he had anything to say during his recent visit to Spain about what the EU can do to help?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, we played a key role in the EU in drawing attention to the inadequacies of the system and calling for free and fair elections in Peru. The noble Lord will be well aware that there was a British delegation observing the first round of presidential elections, which consisted of my right honourable friend Mr Tom Clarke and the honourable Member, Mr William Ross. They reported extremely critically on the proceedings during the first round.
	We support the OAS mission that is visiting Peru at present. It is a very high level delegation, led by the OAS general-secretary Cesar Gaviria and the chair of the Organisation of American States General Assembly, Mr Lloyd Axworthy, who is also the Canadian Foreign Minister. We shall discuss reaction with our EU partners in the light of that mission's recommendations on its return. We wish to ensure that whatever action we take will help to protect the democratic rights of the Peruvian people.

Baroness Hooper: My Lords, does the noble Baroness agree that, while awaiting the outcome of these reports, the best way to help the people of Peru and to reinforce the democratic principle is to maintain contact and co-operation at all levels as well as insisting on the utmost openness and transparency in all processes and procedures whether they be political, social or commercial? In view of the many efforts by chambers of commerce, trade organisations and my own organisation, the Hispanic and Luso Brazilian Council of Canning House, to improve and increase trade and investment in Peru, can the noble Baroness reassure the House that the Government, especially the new British Trade International, will continue to support these efforts?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, the whole House knows of the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Hooper, in affairs of Latin America, especially in her role as president of Canning House. I can assure the noble Baroness and the House that our aim in whatever we do in Peru is to further bilateral relationships with NGOs and civil society in all its forms.

Lord Brennan: My Lords, I declare an interest as one of the patrons of the Peru Support Group. Is my noble friend aware of the particular concern of many people that a consequence of this election is a potential risk to the human rights situation in Peru? With that concern in mind, will she confirm two aspects of the Anglo-Peruvian agreement: first, that this Government will continue to give unremitting support to Dr Santistevan, properly called in Spanish, "the defender of the people of Peru"--in our language, the ombudsman; and, secondly, that they will continue to finance the tremendous initiative of the BBC, the British Council and the Institute of Defence Lawyers in Peru whereby human rights and civic education programmes are broadcast throughout the nation on over 70 different radio stations?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: Yes, my Lords. I can assure my noble friend that the UK has already contributed a great deal to both those projects and that it will continue to do so. Since March 1998, this country has contributed more than £141,000 from the FCO's Human Rights Project Fund to assist the work of the Ad Hoc Commission on Human Rights and the Ombudsman's Office. The FCO's project fund has also provided £144,000 for a two-year project, which commenced in April 1999, supported by a Peruvian NGO and the British Council, to produce and broadcast twice-weekly radio programmes on human rights via the most popular radio station in Peru.

Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, is the Minister aware that not only did I visit Peru as a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union delegation last year, but I also visited the country 10 years previously, just before President Fujimori came to power? It is amazing to see the remarkable change that has taken place in the country during that time. Is the Minister also aware that 10 years previously our NGO, Plan International, was forced to leave Peru because it was impossible for NGOs to work there to help alleviate poverty? Is the Minister further aware that a great deal has been done by the present administration to reduce poverty in the poorest parts of Peru?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: Yes, my Lords. I am very well aware that, at the beginning of his period of office and in his first five-year term, President Fujimori had to deal with a country that had been greatly weakened by terrorism and bad government--a situation that he inherited. The noble Baroness is quite right in that respect. Great strides have since been made in the country. Unfortunately, the present problem is the validity and the correctness of the last election. The noble Baroness is absolutely right to say that Peru has made giant strides in all the fields that she mentioned.

Zimbabwe

Lord Blaker: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What changes they propose in policy towards Zimbabwe in the light of the result of the election there.

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, the House is well aware of the background against which parliamentary elections were held in Zimbabwe over the weekend. We admire the dignity and courage of the people of Zimbabwe in turning out to exercise their democratic rights in the face of violence and intimidation. The result is a clear message that the people want change. We hope that ZANU(PF) will respond positively to the offer from the opposition to discuss how they can work together for the people of Zimbabwe. If ZANU(PF) is willing to make a fresh start, Britain will be willing to respond.

Lord Blaker: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that statement, with which I believe all noble Lords will agree. Can she add praise to the congratulations that she expressed on the courage of the MDC in particular, 35 supporters of which were killed during the election campaign? Will she also congratulate the statesmanlike position taken by Mr Tsvangirai, the leader of the MDC?
	In so far as action taken by other countries in this fraught and unstable situation can be helpful, does the noble Baroness agree that there is much to be said for action being taken internationally by the Commonwealth, the European Union and the United Nations rather than by the United Kingdom alone, which seems to provoke rather prickly reactions? I do not ask the noble Baroness to tell the House about the Government's plans, but can she assure us that they have plans in place?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: Yes, my Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Blaker, is absolutely right. I believe we all agree that the way forward is through concerted international action. The fact that a Commonwealth mission and a European Union mission led the 400-strong team of international observers which played a role in helping through the process in Zimbabwe during the elections over the weekend has shown that this is the way forward. We are awaiting the final report from the EU mission, which was led by Pierre Schori, who has already appeared on the media and publicised an interim report. We are also waiting for the final report from the Commonwealth mission led by General Abubakar. They have both done a very good job. We await to hear the results and to see political developments in Zimbabwe. We are prepared to help in any process that will aid the economic, political and democratic future of Zimbabwe.

Lord Redesdale: My Lords, I too respect Mr Tsvangirai for the position he has taken and for the restraint he has shown in interviews after the election when tempers are high. However, does the Minister agree that economic crisis is looming in Zimbabwe? Although ZANU(PF) may have won the elections, change will almost certainly be brought about by the economic situation. I hope that the Minister will ensure that Britain takes a leading role in doing nothing to precipitate an economic crisis which would affect the people of Zimbabwe far more than the ruling party.

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, we have kept in touch with Morgan Tsvangirai. As noble Lords are aware, the Movement for Democratic Change will contest the outcome of a number of seats, perhaps 22 of them. That may include the seat which Mr Tsvangirai failed to win. The noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, is right to mention the economic problems which face Zimbabwe. I refer to the following frightening statistics: 80 per cent inflation; 50 per cent unemployment; and interest rates of 70 per cent. It is absolutely vital that the economy of Zimbabwe is helped. It is also important that the new government of Zimbabwe, working with the Parliament, should not discourage any foreign investment on which Zimbabwe's prosperity depends.

Lord Clarke of Hampstead: My Lords--

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords--

Lord Williams of Mostyn: My Lords, it is the turn of the Conservative Front Bench.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, without pressing the noble Baroness on the detail, and recognising that these are early days, I ask her whether she recalls that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said the other day that he would mount an international campaign to put pressure on President Mugabe to implement the will of the people. Can the noble Baroness give us an idea of his allies in that campaign, which seems to me to be utterly the right way forward? What rapid international action can we take to save the entire economy from sliding into the chaos which the noble Baroness has already indicated lies ahead? On a more specific point, can she say something about the British military advisers to the army of Zimbabwe, of which President Mugabe is the commander? Is it planned to leave them in place or to withdraw them?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, the noble Lord asks a series of questions. As I have already said, we shall work in conjunction with both our European Union partners and the Commonwealth. Both those organisations will have a great role to play to try to help Zimbabwe along the path that we would all like it to follow. Noble Lords will understand that I am trying to choose my words extremely carefully as we do not wish to sound too critical or to anticipate problems that we hope will not arise if things develop according to the comments in the televised statesmanlike public address that President Mugabe gave yesterday.
	The noble Lord asked a specific question about the British military training team in Harare and the advisers. There are five military advisers providing peacekeeping training to the Southern African Development Community region. Three other advisers are involved in peacekeeping training in support of UN priorities. As the noble Lord knows, they are in Harare. The British military advisory training team is based there but it focuses on regional peacekeeping training within the whole development community. The courses are held across southern Africa and at the moment we have no specific plans to change things.

Business

Lord Carter: My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Sainsbury of Turville will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement which is being made in another place on the post office network.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
	Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.--(Lord Bassam of Brighton.)

Lord Cope of Berkeley: My Lords, before we start the Committee proceedings, I wish to record that the Government have written to me and to other Members of your Lordships' House setting out a vast series of most important changes which rewrite important parts of the Bill. I am glad that the Government have recognised the need for this major rewrite. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and to the Chief Whip for their letters, which have been fairly widely distributed, although I do not think that they were placed in the Library.
	Some of these important amendments concerning Part III appeared yesterday. We shall discuss them later today, although admittedly at short notice. However, other changes were promised at earlier stages of the Committee but we have not yet seen the actual amendments. It is clear that, for example, the definition of "communications data" and the matters which flow from it will be of the first importance, will be exceptionally complex and will have consequences in a number of clauses. They may well amount to a rewrite of that part of the Bill.
	In those circumstances, we may seek the recommittal of that part of the Bill in accordance with the Companion to the Standing Orders, which suggests that procedure for amendments tabled at a late stage which require detailed examination. The Companion states:
	"Decision on such amendments may then be reached on recommitment, reserving to the Report stage its proper function as an opportunity to review and perfect the bill as amended in Committee".
	Obviously such a request would be considered by the usual channels. However, I thought that it might be useful to mention that possibility now.

Lord McNally: My Lords, further to that comment, perhaps the Chief Whip rather than the Minister should respond to those concerns. We are almost now dealing with a House of Lords Bill, so dramatically is the Bill being rewritten as we proceed. I repeat: if ever there was a case for pre-legislative scrutiny, this Bill is it. I hope that in future, when Bills of great technicality are brought before the House, outside expertise will be brought in at an early stage, rather than having to have that expertise brought to bear on the Home Office before concessions are made, as in this case.
	I do not wish to appear churlish. Having pressed changes on the Home Office, we do not object to the fact that changes to the Bill are now being made. However, it is now extremely difficult, midway through the Committee stage, to make a judgment on the balance of the Bill. It would be helpful to know how the Report stage will be handled.
	I address my next question to either the Minister or the Chief Whip: will we see the code of conduct before Report stage? The rewriting that has been promised as the Committee stage has proceeded and the code of conduct will give us a much more complete picture of the Bill.
	To try to legislate both for civil liberties and for one of the most important new 21st century industries in the rather heated atmosphere of July, with all the pressures that that entails, and with a Bill which involves considerable secondary legislation and delegated powers, is not the way to do business. It is not just a case of the Opposition opposing this process; there are some sensible lessons to be learned with regard to how we have reached this position and how it should be avoided in the future.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I shall try to deal with the points in turn. I am a great fan of pre-legislative scrutiny. I take to heart the comments that have been made in that regard. It is an important and valid point. I thank both noble Lords who have spoken. However, I ask the rhetorical question: how would they have felt if we had not made any changes? We have moved a long way on the Bill. We said at the outset that we would do precisely that and that this was a listening and a consultative process. We said that we would take on board reasonable criticisms, as far as we could do so, and engage actively with industry interests.
	What I can say to both noble Lords is that we are still committed to the timetable of producing by the Report stage the draft codes of practice. We want to be as helpful as we can be in enabling industry interests to have the maximum opportunity to look at those because clearly they have a bearing on future debates. I hope that that clarifies that point.
	As to recommittal, that is a question to be considered in the usual way by the usual channels. I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions. I think that that presages a helpful dialogue over the amendments we have tabled. We will try to give as much advance information on the precise nature of other amendments that are to be brought forward at the Report stage. But, as I have said, this is all about listening. We are trying to listen. We have taken on board many comments and criticisms. We want to improve the quality of this legislation, as we do with all other pieces of legislation.

On Question, Motion agreed to.
	House in Committee accordingly.
	[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]
	Clause 25 [Conduct to which Part II applies]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 99A:
	Page 27, line 11, leave out ("For the purposes of this Part surveillance is directed") and insert ("Subject to subsection (5A), surveillance is directed for the purposes of this Part").

Lord Bach: In moving Amendment No. 99A I should like to speak to government Amendments Nos. 102A, 110 and 137. There are other amendments in this group. If it is acceptable to the Committee I propose to listen to what is said when those amendments are moved, if they are moved, and then reply to them when I speak again.
	We have listened closely to the representations that have been made in relation to Parts I and III of the Bill. The Committee will agree that we have tried to meet those concerns where possible and given clear reasons where we think amendments were not acceptable. I am therefore turning, with some relief, to Part II which is, we think, genuinely welcomed by everyone. These are important provisions which will safeguard the use of these valuable investigative techniques by law enforcement authorities, by the intelligence services and by many public authorities carrying out statutory enforcement functions.
	As part of the development of policy, we have been able to identify all those public authorities currently using covert investigative techniques. The provisions of the Bill will introduce control and national standards for activity which is currently unregulated. They will also ensure that authorisations for action are given only on grounds compatible with the Human Rights Act. That activity is being authorised at the same level across Whitehall and other public sectors and there is effective and independent oversight of the use of these techniques.
	After those few introductory words regarding Part II, perhaps I may turn to the government amendments. These amendments generally address a wide range of issues concerning the definitions of surveillance and covert sources. I have already mentioned that a beneficial side effect of this legislation has been to identify all those public authorities carrying out covert surveillance activities. We have tabled an amendment proposing that these authorities be identified in a schedule to the Bill. However, we are still becoming aware of activities on which the Bill will impact. One such activity is the use of covert surveillance by the BBC in order to detect licence evasion.
	As currently drafted, it could be argued that this activity is intrusive surveillance. It is covert surveillance involving primarily residential premises, and equipment is deployed outside the premises which produces a picture of the same quality and detail as might be expected to be obtained from a device inside the premises. However, it cannot be said that such activity infringes on a person's privacy in the same way as a bugging device or hidden camera impinges on their privacy. It would not, for example, provide details of that individual's private or family life, except perhaps for his taste in television programmes. All that it would provide would be details of the television programme being watched by a person, the same as is being broadcast into millions of other homes.
	We have therefore decided to exclude this specific activity from the definitions of intrusive and directed surveillance. However, this does not mean to say that we do not believe this activity does not constitute some invasion of privacy or that it should not be put on a statutory basis.
	The provisions in Clause 44 of the Bill allow the Secretary of State, by order, to add to the types of covert surveillance identified in the Bill. The issue of TV licence evasion detecting equipment is a candidate for an order under this clause. This activity is a rather distinctive type of surveillance that does not fit easily with the existing provisions in Part II of the Bill. Bringing forward an order specifying it as a new type of surveillance would be a way of making it subject to statutory controls. I beg to move.

Lord Boston of Faversham: As Amendment No. 103 is grouped with this amendment, I must point out to the Committee that if that amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendments Nos. 104 to 106.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: We have two amendments in this group. Perhaps I may say to the Minister that the government amendment brought forward in response to consultation and pressure could almost be covered by the phrase "minor and technical amendments", a phrase used by Mr Charles Clarke about the Bill when it left the Commons. When asked what amendments he expected would be made in the House of Lords he said that some minor and technical amendments might be made. As I say, I think that this amendment just about comes under that description. However, many of the amendments which we shall discuss later do not. As I said a few moments ago, I am glad about the recognition of a need for a rewrite and for that matter the recognition by noble Lords of the importance of the Bill.
	Our Amendment No. 102 is grouped with Amendment No. 99A. The amendment draws attention to Clause 25(2)(b), which states:
	"For the purposes of this Part surveillance is directed ... in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person (whether or not one specifically identified for the purposes of the investigation or operation)".
	We recognise that in picking up private information about one individual who is the suspect--let us call him the probable criminal--other information about those adjacent to him, in his family or whatever, is likely to be collected at the same time, even if it is not directly relevant to the operation being conducted. But that information is not really the information which those carrying out the surveillance should be going for. I think that we should consider that. Furthermore, the clause appears to permit fishing expeditions against people who are not suspected of any crime, terrorism and so on. Therefore, I thought it worth probing what exactly is intended by the words in the amendment.
	The Minister mentioned the BBC in connection with licence evasion. We have read in the Sunday Telegraph about how the BBC was involved in covert and intrusive surveillance of a residential home, which led to a programme which has been severely criticised not only by the Sunday Telegraph but also by the police. I do not want to become involved in the rights and wrongs of the actual programme concerned, but it is clear that this was covert, intrusive surveillance by the BBC. There were concealed cameras in residential premises for the exact purpose of filming people within that home. That practice, of course, is by no means unique.
	If the Bill is passed in its present form, it would be helpful if we could be told about the future legal position in connection with covert intrusive surveillance for the purposes of collecting private information by the BBC or any other news media. However, the main purpose of my remarks is to illustrate the reason why we have tabled Amendment No. 102.
	I have also tabled Amendment No. 112A, which has been included in this grouping. At Clause 25(7) the Bill sets out provisions covering a "covert human intelligence source"--more usually known as a "grass". The clause defines such a person and provides for how such a relationship is to be governed. All that is fine. However, my amendment draws attention to the kind of circumstance where someone discloses information that he has obtained in a similar fashion, but has done so,
	"to avoid the commission of a criminal offence by another person under any other enactment".
	We are not discussing a person established as a grass by the police, but rather a person who decides to grass on someone else in order to avoid the commission of an offence. The amendment seeks to explore the exact position of such a person. Clearly, these people can be of great value to the police and no one would wish to discourage them or place legal impediments in their way. I hope that the Bill does not do that, but I thought it best to inquire about the effects of the Bill while we are debating it in Committee.

Lord McNally: Following on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cope, in the past I have worked, in a purely voluntary capacity, with the Alliance Against Counterfeiting and Copyright Theft, a body of commercial organisations that uses various surveillance techniques to track down those involved in offences of counterfeiting and breach of copyright on CDs and so forth. That body is concerned that it might be caught within the ambit of the Bill. It may be that the Minister has a ready response on this point. If not, the issue may need to be brought back on Report in the form of a probing amendment.
	Rather like the example given by the Minister of the television detector van, concern has been growing that other activities that were previously thought of as proper and legitimate might now be "hoovered up" by the powers contained in the Bill.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: On behalf of my colleagues on these Benches, I shall speak to an inordinately long list of amendments contained in this grouping: Amendments Nos. 100, 101, 103, 104, 107, 108, 111, 112, 116, 119 and 138. That constitutes a Herculean, if not an impossible, task. Difficult though the job of organising amendments can be, I wonder why so many amendments have been strung together into one grouping. They cover a wide variety of highly important issues.
	The broad intention behind the first two-thirds of these amendments is to ensure a higher level of distinction between, and a greater level of protection against, certain kinds of surveillance. Under the Bill, "directed" surveillance and the use of what are termed "covert intelligence sources" require the lesser control of self-authorisation from a designated person within the agency undertaking the action. "Intrusive" surveillance, which is defined in Clause 25, requires approval from a High Court judge acting as a commissioner.
	I do not expect noble Lords have been able to study all the amendments in detail. It would weary the Committee were I to plod through them one by one, especially since we face a long day ahead. However, the general endeavour is, first, to probe what is an extraordinarily complex clause. I wonder whether the good noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Bach, have lulled themselves to sleep trying to comprehend the many subsections contained in Clause 25. The clause has a certain "Alice in Wonderland" quality. "Through the Looking Glass" would not be a bad way of putting it. With these amendments we are trying to ensure that more surveillance has to be dealt with under the category of "intrusive" surveillance, so giving a greater degree of protection for the citizen, something which we believe it is essential to provide in this measure.
	Perhaps I may refer briefly to the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights. I am sure that the Committee will ultimately be bored stiff--if it is not already--by constant reference to that convention. However, the convention lies at the heart of the Bill. Furthermore, it will come into effect through our own Human Rights Act on 1st October this year. We believe that the Bill as it stands and Clause 25 in particular fail to acknowledge that the European Court in Strasbourg has made it clear that Article 8 privacy rights can be engaged outside residential premises and private vehicles. Noble Lords will recollect that the definition in the Bill of "intrusive" surveillance is that which is undertaken in or outside residential premises or private vehicles. We believe that that is far too narrow a definition in terms of necessary protection of the public and in terms of the European convention.
	For example, in the case of Niemietz v. Republic of Germany, the court held that a person is also entitled to a degree of privacy in professional and business relationships. I am sure that it is already apparent that if Clause 25 is left unamended, in particular subsection (3), it will be possible to carry out surveillance in a doctor's surgery, an MP's office, a restaurant, a public place, the workplace or a vehicle. None of those areas will be protected by the need for independent authorisation under the Bill as it stands. We feel that that is wrong. Furthermore, it is likely that the Bill will fall foul of the European convention and, in particular, will not meet the precedent set by the Niemietz case. Perhaps I may add that long ago, in 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that privacy rights protect people rather than places. We do not seem to have taken that on board.
	I should also tell the Committee that the Data Protection Commissioner has recommended that the definition of "intrusive" surveillance should be widened to include any premises or location where the individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy. The same opinion has been expressed by the Irish Law Reform Committee and many others.
	I turn very briefly to some of the individual amendments. Amendment No. 103 inserts the phrase in Clause 25(3) that any surveillance which,
	"interferes with any person's privacy in circumstances where that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy",
	should be seen as an important and guiding principle.
	In Amendment No. 107 we seek to add to Clause 25(3) a new paragraph which states:
	"Surveillance may be intrusive for the purposes of this Part irrespective of whether permission is obtained from a person able to give permission in respect of relevant premises to the conduct taking place on or in relation to those premises".
	That is excepted from "intrusive" surveillance by the Bill as it stands.
	Importantly, too, in Amendment No. 103 we seek to delete the major part of subsection (3), to which I have referred. We believe that that will avoid the rather ludicrous distinction between one type of vehicle and another, or one type of premises and another.
	Given this immense grouping, perhaps I may deal briefly with the issue that I touched on at the beginning of my remarks; namely, covert human intelligence sources. That is dealt with--

Lord Williams of Elvel: Will the noble Lord tell me whether the Liberal Democrats were party to the grouping about which he has complained? It is the normal procedure for groupings lists to be agreed. Also, I am not quite sure which noble Lord is speaking from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench.

Lord McNally: That is a good point, but the noble Lord has held high office in this place and he knows how much negotiation can go on--particularly when the Government have given us one last day in Committee and have virtually rewritten the Bill on the hoof. My noble friend makes a small point; the noble Lord makes a debating point. We accept the groupings list; we are working to it, and we can also complain about it.

Lord Williams of Elvel: I am sorry to intervene again, but the practice has been clearly set out by Government Whips. It is that groupings are agreed, and once they have been agreed they may be degrouped, but nevertheless Members cannot complain about the grouping. Secondly, as I say, I am not sure who is speaking for the Liberal Democrat Front Bench.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I shall continue. I may have over-egged my pudding. I was not party to these groupings. All I can say is that I believe that the task that I have, without prolonging what I have to say and confusing the Committee, is unreasonable. That may be a lesson that we on these Benches also need to learn.
	Perhaps I may turn to the second part of this string of amendments; namely, Amendments Nos. 111, 112, 116, 119 and 138. They all deal with the question of informers and undercover agents. The broad purpose of the amendments is an attempt to draw a distinction between a police officer who is an informant and a criminal who is an informant. In brief, we believe that it is important that a distinction should be drawn and that the second class of informant should come under a higher test as regards the authorisation needed. That is why we state in Amendment No. 119 that,
	"An Authorisation for the conduct and use of a covert human intelligence source whose conduct falls within section 25(7)(d) shall be governed by the same procedures as apply to the authorisation of conduct for the carrying out of intrusive surveillance".
	The human intelligence source falling within (d) is included in proposed Amendment No. 112; namely, an informer who,
	"engages in a course of action which, without authority, could have led to his arrest and prosecution".
	I should add that the European Court in Strasbourg, in Kopp v Switzerland, severely criticised the practice of internal executive authorisation without supervision by an independent judge in relation to surveillance activities. It is, therefore, at least questionable whether self-authorisation within one of the agencies set up under the Bill would be considered a sufficient safeguard in relation to the activities of participating informers and undercover officers in serious crime cases.
	Perhaps I may refer also to the case of Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal--I am grateful to Justice for supplying me with these authorities. That case places additional weight on the need for independent authorisation and supervision of undercover operations if the exercise is not to breach the European convention. It may, therefore, in accordance with this string of amendments, be necessary to draw that distinction whereby the use of participating informers and undercover officers in cases where there could be criminal activity requires prior authorisation by a judge. I shall rest my case on these amendments at that rather inadequate and brief explanation.

Viscount Goschen: I welcome the assurance given by the Minister in his opening remarks that his officials will be drawing up a list of agencies to which the provisions of this part of the Bill apply. It may be for the convenience of the Committee in our understanding of the amendments if the Minister could give an overall broad view of what type of agencies those will be. For example, the BBC was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Cope in two different instances: detection of TV licence evasion, and undercover television documentary programmes--which may also be made by agencies other than publicly owned ones; namely, independent television companies. So in order to aid our understanding of this complex set of amendments, and indeed complex part of the Bill, will the Minister give an overview of what type of agencies are being authorised; and if they are not mentioned in this section of the Bill, does it mean that any conduct of this nature would be illegal?

Lord Monson: I have only just looked at this group of amendments and have not had a chance to study them in detail. However, it seems to me at first glance that Amendment No. 103 tabled by the Liberal Democrats is a particularly good one. If that could be agreed to, we should save a great deal of time.

Lord Bach: I can agree with the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, to the extent that Clause 25 is complicated. But it is not the first complicated clause that Members of the Committee have had to consider, nor, I dare say, will it be the last. The noble Lord knows as well as I that the point made by my noble friend Lord Williams of Elvel is absolutely right. If there were objections by his party to this grouping--which, I concede, is extensive-- they should have been taken at another time. We are faced with the grouping now and, like the noble Lord, I shall do my best to answer the questions raised and deal with the amendments proposed.
	Perhaps I may turn immediately to the question raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, as to who is covered by this part of the Bill. The answer is short. It is public authorities, in the broadest sense of the word, which are covered. Organisations which are not public authorities are not covered.
	That takes me straight to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McNally--who I know cannot be in his place at this moment--about the alliance against counterfeiting, whose exact name I cannot remember. That body is not a public authority and, therefore, could not be authorised to carry out surveillance under Part II. It is not a bad example. However, if it is decided that organisations are public authorities for this purpose, the schedule can be amended.

Lord Lucas: Will the noble Lord expand a little on the consequences of that decision for an institution such as the campaign against copyright theft, or people making investigative television programmes? Does the Human Rights Act mean that these people will now be liable for prosecution for entering and infringing people's privacy; or will they just trundle on much as they have done previously, without any adverse consequences?

Lord Bach: I want to be very careful in what I say, because we were taken by surprise by the mention by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, of the body in question. Our first view is that it is not a public authority. If we are wrong, what I am about to say does not apply, because it would be a public authority and thus covered by Part II.
	This is the first time such surveillance, whether done privately or publicly, has been regulated. This is so to the extent that named public authorities will have the power to do this under close regulation. The status of private organisations that conduct themselves in such a way needs careful consideration. To adopt a phrase used not long ago, I am not prepared to speak off the hoof on that aspect. I should like to consider what the noble Lord said about it and perhaps write to him. I do not want to commit the Government to saying what the Bill provides about those organisations that are not public authorities and are therefore not covered by Part II. On the face of it, they would seem at the very least not to be acting in the context of the Bill.
	I turn to the other amendments, hoping to be forgiven if, in the main, I deal with them in numerical order. The first four amendments, Nos. 100, 101, 103 and 104, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, address the fundamental concepts in Part II. We appreciate the concern to protect the privacy of individuals but we do not believe that the amendments adequately consider the practicalities. Their result might be to extend the stringent requirements attached to the authorisation of intrusive surveillance to a much wider range of activities presently covered under the provisions for directed surveillance. They would also lead to a great deal of confusion and uncertainty for the operational practitioners about what constitutes directed or intrusive surveillance.
	There is no problem in identifying in advance operations involving residential premises or private vehicles. However, the same cannot be said about mobile surveillance, which makes up the majority of operations. It may well involve cases in which an individual considers that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy, even though that expectation would vary from one person to another. This would mean, for example, that the police would have to know before each covert surveillance operation began where their target was likely to go and whether he would find himself in circumstances in which he, or another, might have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
	Generally speaking, the police and other operatives would not have that information and therefore could not make the judgment. They would not know, for example, at the start of the day whether their target would spend the day dealing in drugs, meeting criminal associates to plan an armed robbery or meeting a friend, going for a drink or a meal and then visiting the home of another friend. To expect the police and others carrying out surveillance to make a decision beforehand on the expectation of privacy of the target and his associates is unreasonable and impractical.
	The level of intrusion is proportionate to the seriousness of the offence or other activity being investigated. Therefore, we have restricted the use of intrusive surveillance so that it can be carried out only on the grounds of serious crime and in the interests of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. However, the definition in the noble Lord's amendments would incorporate a significant number of other activities undertaken by other public bodies. These range from investigating tax evasion and benefit fraud to health inspections of restaurants.
	No central records are kept of the number of covert surveillance operations carried out each year. Estimates by the police suggest that they alone undertake more than 60,000 operations. In addition, operations are carried out by Customs, the security and intelligence agencies and many government departments and local authorities. Those activities are covered within the provisions of the Bill but are not classed as intrusive surveillance. To expect a greater number of such cases to require prior approval would bring these statutory functions to a standstill, significantly restricting the activities of the police and others. We need clear guidelines that operatives can easily follow, setting the specific circumstances and locations where people have a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy. People generally have the greatest expectation of privacy in their homes and in their private vehicles when going about their everyday lives.
	We have also responded to the special protection given by Article 8 to a person's home. These are the instances in which we have restricted action to serious cases and to which we have given the highest level of protection. There are other situations in which we think that a person's right under Article 8 also needs to be carefully weighed against the purpose for which surveillance is required. These are dealt with as directed surveillance, but we think that the most intrusive categories need to be fenced off, kept separate and made subject to the most stringent safeguards.
	I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, will see that there are practical difficulties in what I know were probing amendments to see where we stood and that in due course he will withdraw them.
	I turn to Amendment No. 102, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, which might restrict what can be authorised as part of directed surveillance. The words in brackets in Clause 25(2)(b), which he seeks to remove, provide for authorisations in circumstances in which either the suspect has not been identified or the operation under consideration might reasonably be expected to infringe the privacy of people other than the main target. If it is proportionate to the offence under investigation, such surveillance should be capable of being authorised. Surveillance of a known drug smuggler may well involve an invasion of his wife's privacy too. The Bill allows for that, in regulated circumstances and subject to oversight. Another example is that the police might be aware of organised drug dealing in which an exchange of drugs and money takes place but not know the names of those involved. They might well, and justifiably I would argue, carry out surveillance and follow persons who attended the meeting.
	Amendment No. 107, again a Liberal Democrat amendment, would make it clear that the consent of the owner of the property to surveillance is irrelevant for the purposes of the Bill. We have no argument with the intent of the amendment, but it is unnecessary. If a property owner--for example, a prison governor acting on behalf of the Prison Service--allows access to plant a device in a prison cell, that should of course be authorised at the highest levels, regardless of that consent. The Bill provides for that. It is a specific gap in the Police Act 1997 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 which the Bill fills in anticipation of the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998. The 1994-97 Acts focus on interference with property, which can be circumvented with the collusion of the property owner. The Human Rights Act brings a focus on interference with privacy, which cannot be circumvented in the same way.
	Amendments Nos. 108 and 138, again spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, would remove from the category of directed surveillance interception with one-party consent. We understand the objection to the provisions but we brought them forward after some thought. The important point is that interception with one-party consent will require the same level of authorisation as directed surveillance. We do not deny that the privacy of the third party in such a call is invaded, so such an activity needs to be authorised and subject to oversight. But, plainly, a kidnap situation in which anxious relatives receive phone calls from the kidnapper or the situation of a victim receiving malicious phone calls are different from listening in to a call between two drug smugglers. That is recognised by the lower level of authorisations required. It is important to keep this flexibility.
	I turn to Amendments Nos. 111, 112, 116 and 119, all in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. They seek to engineer an extra category of covert sources. This would be the category of agents or informants who as part of their tasks themselves become involved in the criminal activity. For these cases the amendments propose the highest levels of authority, such as those required to authorise intrusive surveillance.
	These are important but not simple matters; nor are they ones that can be, or should be, addressed in this legislation. This legislation is concerned with intrusion into privacy. Part II of the Bill in particular focuses on situations in which privacy can be invaded for legitimate purposes. It sets out the checks and oversight required for occasions when privacy is invaded in this way. It does all of this to ensure compatibility with convention rights, as will be required when the Human Rights Act comes into force in only a few months' time.
	The tasking of covert sources is part of the authorisation process set out in the Bill. If an informant or agent is to be used to derive private information, the use of that source should be authorised. The authorisation granted under this Bill will not include giving immunity from prosecution for criminal activities undertaken by the covert source. That must remain a matter for the prosecution authorities and courts on an individual basis, as now. Additionally, the purpose of an authorisation is not to give legal cover to potential criminal activities but to give a lawful basis to conduct in such a way as to make it ECHR-compliant. Therefore, we believe that the higher levels of scrutiny suggested in these amendments are not needed.
	I turn finally to Amendment No. 112A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley. The amendment seeks to bring anyone who provides information covertly about crime within the definition of a covert source. We have, quite properly, excluded from the terms of this Bill ordinary members of the public who, out of a sense of civic duty, come forward with information to the police about suspected criminal activity. There are many public contact numbers, such as that for Crimestoppers, which encourage people to come forward with information. Such persons may have obtained the information by chance. They do not want to be subsequently involved, or form any long-term relationship, in order to obtain or disclose further information. They are not being tasked by the police or others to establish or maintain a covert relationship for this purpose.
	If we were required to treat all such persons as covert sources, with the requirements in relation to record-keeping and handling, we believe that it would bring the total number of covert sources in this country to many hundreds of thousands. It would also create a massive and unnecessary administrative burden; and it might quickly discourage members of the public from providing the police with vital information and bring to an end that source of information. We cannot countenance that. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord--I understand that he raises this issue to hear the view of the Government--to withdraw his amendment in due course.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 100 to 102 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 102A:
	Page 27, line 21, leave out ("and (5)") and insert ("to (5A)").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 103 and 104 not moved.]

Lord Bach: I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
	House resumed.

Post Office Network

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement on modernising the Post Office network which is being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The Statement is as follows:
	"Post offices are a vital part of the fabric of our country. They serve 28 million people every week, performing a vital role in local communities, whether they be rural or urban. But the Post Office also faces challenges. Its traditional work needs to respond to the changing requirements of customers, to changes in society and to the opportunities arising from new technology.
	"Last October the Prime Minister asked the Performance and Innovation Unit to draw up a strategy for the future of the Post Office network. The Performance and Innovation Unit's Report is being published today. Copies have been placed in the Library of the House and will be available from the Vote Office. The Government accept all of the report's 24 recommendations. Working with the Post Office and the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters, we shall implement the measures proposed in full and back them with financial support. We shall set aside ring-fenced funding as part of the spending review.
	"The Post Office is the largest retail network in Europe. More than nine out of 10 people live within a mile of a post office, but for too long the Post Office network has been a neglected national resource. Now is the time to harness its full potential and to develop in totally new areas. The PIU report identifies three such areas where developments should take place, made possible by investment in a modern on-line computer system for every post office, to which the Government are contributing over £500 million: first, to establish a universal bank; second, to provide Internet access and exploit e-commerce; third, to provide an enhanced role in government services.
	"The Government are aware that their decision to move to a system of automated credit transfer between 2003 and 2005 has caused concern, but people were already voting with their feet and choosing to have their benefits paid into their bank accounts. Today I can guarantee that even after the move to ACT, pensions and benefits can still be paid in cash in full at the post office if that is the choice of the individual pensioner or benefit recipient. The universal bank outlined in the PIU report would provide the means of achieving this. It would ensure that all benefit recipients and pensioners, now and in the future, can continue to use post offices to receive their cash. It would be a post office based solution, as called for by the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters.
	"Today in Britain up to 3½ million adults have no bank account. The universal bank would bring these people into the banking mainstream by providing basic banking services. Customers of the universal bank would be able to take out cash at any post office and use cash machines to take out money. They would be able to set up direct debits to pay bills, enabling them to benefit from discounts on gas, electricity, telephone and other bills.
	"The second area is Internet access and the exploitation of e-commerce. By installing Internet terminals in front of the counter and ensuring staff are trained to provide assistance, post offices can help ensure that more people have access to the Internet, and the skills they need to use it. Post offices have an opportunity to market themselves as a convenient local place for people to collect goods that they have ordered on the Internet.
	"The third area is an enhanced role in government services. Post offices have traditionally been places where people can conduct a range of government business, from renewing a car tax disc to getting a fishing licence. That role will be further strengthened with the PIU's recommendation that post offices become one-stop shops--general government practitioners--for advice and information on government services. We shall support pilot projects on this and Internet access.
	"This vision of the 21st century is one which applies to all post offices, but the PIU report also identified the particular needs of the network in urban areas and rural communities. The rural post office network has been slowly contracting over the past 20 years. This Government are committed to ensuring that the rural post office network is maintained. The importance of rural post offices cannot be underestimated. Often, they are the last remaining local shop, providing a vital service and also acting as a focal point for the community. The maintenance of such services is, above all, a tribute to the invaluable role of sub-postmasters and mistresses who often provide to their communities much more than is required or expected of them. This Government have already made provision in the Postal Services Bill for the Government to provide financial assistance to post offices.
	"In order to protect rural post offices, the Government will place a formal requirement on the Post Office to maintain the rural network, and to prevent any avoidable closures of rural post offices. An unavoidable closure would be when no-one is prepared to take over from a departing sub-postmaster or where an associated retail business is no longer commercially viable. The PIU recommended that this requirement to maintain the rural network should apply--in the first instance--for a period of six years. We accept this recommendation. During this period the Postal Services Commission together with the Consumer Council for Postal Services will monitor the network. The commission will report annually to me on the rural network.
	"Presently the Post Office defines a rural post office as one which covers 6,300 inhabitants; 7,500 post offices are currently covered by this definition. However, the Countryside Agency defines a rural post office as one serving a settlement of 10,000 or fewer people. Around 10,000 post offices would come within this definition. I am pleased to inform the House that for the purpose of the policy of protection from avoidable closures we shall be applying the wider definition and therefore cover nearly 10,000 post offices. It is not just in rural areas that post offices play an important community role. We want to maintain convenient access and improve the quality of post offices, in our towns and cities as well as the countryside.
	"But--under pressure from changes in the pattern of retailing--the quality of many post offices and associated retail business has declined in urban areas over the years. The best way to address this is for the Post Office, working closely with the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters, to build bigger and more extensive offices, reversing years of under-investment. As recommended by the PIU, we will encourage them to do so.
	"Post offices in deprived neighbourhoods and estates have a particularly important role, often providing the basis for the only local shop. Our aim is to ensure that people in these areas, where there are few other facilities, continue to have access to high quality post offices, preferably co-located with good shops. To support this we will set up a new fund to improve the quality of post offices in deprived urban areas, better serving the needs of the local community. Uses of the fund would include installing security measures and modernising the premises.
	"These proposals provide a significant package for guaranteeing access to post offices and enabling post offices to provide new services which meet the changing needs of customers. The Post Office will need urgently to develop its plans for taking forward these opportunities. I have asked them to provide these plans by September.
	"By providing financial support for these initiatives, the Government are backing a viable, sustainable future for the post office network. But the Post Office itself also needs to respond to the challenges. The PIU report shows that much more needs to be done to maximise the commercial potential of the network, to improve efficiency, and to raise the quality of post offices. The vision set out in the PIU report--which we support--is closely in line with that of the General Secretary of the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters, with whom we have been in close dialogue. The package announced today complements the measures in the Postal Services Bill, to protect consumers and enable the post office to modernise. Post offices, and their customers, in all areas will benefit from the wide range of opportunities offered by a modern on-line computer system in every post office and proposals to establish the Universal Bank, Internet learning and access points and General Government Practitioners.
	"Customers in all urban areas should benefit from bigger, more extensive post offices, offering a wider range of services. Those in rural areas will also benefit from the requirement to maintain the rural network. Those in inner cities and estates will benefit from measures to ensure post offices provide good local shops which serve the community.
	"This announcement will ensure that people across the country--in rural communities, in our cities and towns--have convenient access to a post office providing quality services. It will offer the opportunities the Post Office needs to face the future with confidence, and to build a network which can thrive rather than just survive in the 21st century. I commend it to the House."
	My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

Baroness Buscombe: My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. Perhaps I may say how very much better it would have been if the Statement had been made yesterday before the lengthy discussions on related issues under the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Bill. Does the noble Lord realise that many Peers would not have been kept at a late hour in this House debating the important issue of rural post offices--being totally in the dark so far as concerns the Government's intentions--if the report had been laid before the House? Did he ever consider that point? Is not this one more conspicuous example of this Government's unacceptable contempt for Parliament?
	I must ask the noble Lord directly: was the PIU report in his hand yesterday? If so, why did the Minister not offer this Statement yesterday? Did his noble friend Lady Hollis ask him to make the report available to the House? If not, why not? If the noble Baroness did so, why did the noble Lord's department not agree to do so?
	Will the Minister tell the House whether there are any aspects of this Statement which could lead to primary legislation? If so, does he accept that we should be ready on our side to consider delaying the Third Reading of the Postal Services Bill in order to accommodate agreed amendments, if that would help rural post offices?
	I turn to the detail of the Statement. We welcome the fact that the Government have at long last put together a package for sub-post offices. Sub-postmasters have waited for more than a year, unable to plan and invest for the future. Post office closures have escalated during the past year. This year 500 have closed. Sub-postmasters have demonstrated their deep-seated concern in many ways--for example, by holding a rally in April, which was attended by more than 2,000 sub-postmasters, and through submitting a petition containing more than 3 million signatures to the Prime Minister at No. 10 Downing Street.
	Would not it have been better for the Government to have waited to announce their future intentions until they had developed a practical workable strategy for the future of the Post Office before making half-hearted announcements last year? Those announcements will lead to the loss of £400 million income from sub-post offices, have caused much uncertainty and concern and have led to the appalling number of post office closures.
	We welcome the Government's determination to maintain a minimum network. But can we have clarification of what that network will really mean? We note their commitment to maintain the rural network. The Minister states:
	"I am pleased to inform the House that for the purpose of the policy of protection from avoidable closures we shall be applying the wider definition and therefore cover nearly 10,000 post offices".
	Currently there are 18,500 post offices. Does it mean that 8,500 post offices will be at risk? How will those which will be maintained, and which the Government guarantee will not close, be funded? How will that £400 million loss be recouped through the services that they will provide, a matter referred to in the Statement? For example, where will the banking charges fall to cover the 3.5 million potential new customers for the universal bank? Will they fall upon the customer, the post office, the bank or the taxpayer?
	The Statement raises many more issues. Is it the Minister's intention to allow parcels to be handled by commercial freight and parcel carriers other than Parcel Force? Is that how he will recoup the £400 million of revenue lost to post offices? What about the subsidies? On these Benches, we understand that the Post Office does not want subsidies. In the debate in this House at Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Dearing, said,
	"There is no security in subsidy".--[Official Report, 2/5/00; col. 958.]
	Has the Minister made an analysis of the potential distortion for competition here?
	This is a very important point. It raises important questions with regard to competition with other small local businesses which it was thought the Government are also seeking to support.
	In responding to the Minister's Statement, I have asked a number of questions. I make no apology for that. This is a crucially important issue and we on these Benches would be failing in our duty if we did not press the Minister for a full reply.

Lord Razzall: My Lord, it will not come as a surprise to noble Lords to realise that the tone of the response from these Benches will be slightly different from that of the Conservative Opposition. I must say that when listening to the Conservative Opposition on this subject it always amazes me that they never actually mention that it was the Conservative government's decision to introduce automated credit transfer which caused this problem in the first place. However, that is obviously a matter upon which they will reflect.
	I am sure noble Lords will appreciate that this is a massive victory for those who have been campaigning in favour of the sub-post office network over the past year or two. When this campaign started there was relatively little recognition from the Government that there was a problem. The campaign, led throughout the country by people involved in the sub-post offices and the political parties, has today brought the beginnings of a result. One wonders why that is.
	The Prime Minister is often fond of teasing the Liberal Democrats that its policy at the last election to put 1p on income tax to fund education was the longest P in history. I believe that in this particular case the Prime Minister has found that post office closures and pensions are the two disastrous Ps in electoral terms over the past year or so, at least until he met the Women's Institute. I believe we must recognise and welcome the significant shift in government policy that the Statement represents.
	I am sure the Minister will not be surprised if, having welcomed the Statement, I probe him a little on one or two of the fundamental points of detail.
	First, the critical issue that is missing, and missing from all government pronouncements, is how much money is going to be put into it and will that money be guaranteed? No doubt the Minister's answer will be somewhat analogous to Mr Byers's response on the radio this morning when he said, "More than you expect". I believe this House deserves a response and an undertaking from the Minister on behalf of the Government that satisfactory financial resources will be found in the Comprehensive Spending Review to maintain the commitments set out in the document, and that that commitment will be given for the whole period until 2006. We require a guarantee that whatever financial requirements are set out in this report the money will be made available. If the Minister can, he should take the opportunity to make that undertaking today.
	My second point is particularly important as regards the continuation of rural post offices. I have noticed a slight discrepancy between the Statement and the report of the Performance and Innovation Unit. The Statement indicates that the Government will ensure that the finances are available to maintain the rural sub-post office network unless a closure is unavoidable. In the Statement an "unavoidable closure" is defined as one where no one is prepared to take over from a departing sub-postmaster--an obvious requirement--but it goes on,
	"or where an associated retail business is no longer commercially viable".
	Those words do not appear on page 86 of the Performance and Innovation Unit report which indicates that the Post Office would be required to maintain post offices in rural areas except where it was impossible to find replacements for departing sub-postmasters. Nowhere can I see in the Performance and Innovation Unit report any reference to the second requirement regarding the associated retail business no longer being commercially viable.
	It may seem a small point of language but it is actually a fundamental point of principle. In a large number of rural sub-post offices there may well be an associated retail business which is not commercially viable but which the community may want to retain and which somebody may be prepared to take over from the retiring sub-postmaster. Therefore the Minister needs to indicate whether he accepts what the Statement says. The Prime Minister's letter states that the Government accept all the recommendations of the report and that the words that have crept into the Statement about the associated retail business are a gloss which is not accepted by them. In other words, the Government will agree to subsidise sub-post offices where necessary, provided that there is somebody prepared to take over from the departing sub-postmaster, whether or not there is a failure of the related commercial business.
	My next point relates to urban closures. There is an assumption that only rural post offices are involved. It is quite clear to those of us who go around the country that it is just as much an issue for urban post offices. I know the unit's report indicates, and the Government have accepted, that a fund would be set up to provide a subsidy to urban post offices where necessary. But the Minister ought to give an undertaking that the Government regard the problems of urban sub-post offices with exactly the same concern as they do those of rural post offices. Members of the House who canvassed in the Tottenham by-election recently will recognise the problems of urban post offices.
	My next point is one of timing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, indicated, post offices are closing as we speak. I am concerned that the consultation mechanism regarding rural post offices will not be completed, according to the unit's report, until approximately the autumn of 2001. I believe the Minister does need to give an undertaking that steps will be taken to accelerate the subsidy if necessary to stop the urgent and very dramatic problems that are occurring as more and more post offices close.
	Clearly, the Government think that this Statement will give confidence to rural sub-postmasters and therefore that the closure programme will stop. But the Minister ought to indicate that the programme will be accelerated if the Statement and what flows from it does not staunch the closures that are currently occurring.
	Finally, on a small point of detail but a big point of principle, we on these Benches welcome the desire to turn the sub-post offices into--dare I say?--Internet cafes. The rural sub-post office can become the Internet cafe of the future. There is one small technical point of which I am sure the Government are aware. In order for that to happen, effective ISDN lines into those post offices are required. Noble Lords who live near rural sub-post offices will be aware that it is virtually impossible to get an ISDN line into those offices or into one's house. If the Government are going to implement the proposal, they will have to give an undertaking to solve the problem of ISDN lines going into rural areas.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, perhaps I may first make clear to the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, that I did not have the report in my hands last night. If I had, I would have made it available and commented on it. The first time I saw it was when it came off the presses this morning.
	Perhaps I may also make clear that it is extremely important to get these measures right and we asked for the PIU report because we wanted to get them right. The task of producing a report on such a complicated issue in eight months was extremely difficult, but it has been well done.
	I find it extraordinary that the party of a government who presided over the closure of 3,000 post offices during 18 years--in 1992 alone, they presided over the closure of 478 post offices--should come here and say that we should have acted with greater urgency. That smacks of a hypocritical approach. If the issue is so urgent, it was urgent when they were in power and they should have done something about it.
	The noble Baroness criticised the timing. We first had to clear up the incredible mess that had been made of the computerisation of the post offices. It was started by the previous government and was done extremely badly. It was three years behind schedule and was costing a great deal of money. We first had to correct that system; we have now moved on to deal with the viability of the post offices.
	We are not giving a guarantee about the other 8,000 post offices. We believe that the major problem with the rural post offices results from the declining population in those areas. We want post offices in urban areas to remain on a commercial basis. We are providing them with financial assistance on the basis that it will give them time to develop new services. We want to try to keep them on a commercial basis, but we recognise that there will be problems while they make the changes. We want to help them do that. That is exactly the right course. It retains the commercial basis while taking a position on access and social justice. That combination lies behind these processes.
	What alternative has been suggested? It is that nothing is done and that we maintain old systems, which the previous government realised should be changed, and wait while the lifeblood of the Post Office flows away. I cannot believe that any government could see that as a responsible approach to the system.
	The proposals will cost a considerable sum of money. It is significant in terms of total government finances and therefore it will form part of the spending review. It will be part of the 2000 spending review and that will be the appropriate time to give details.
	The noble Lord, Lord Razzall, queried the position of shops attached to post offices. That is covered on page 85 of the PIU report. The distinction is that we are considering giving financial support to the Post Office and its services. An open-ended commitment covering shops attached to or containing post offices is a different consideration.
	I turn to the differences between urban and rural post offices. The problems are different. The decline in the rural population is creating a major problem, while urban areas have suffered from a long period of under-investment. We are setting up a fund to correct that situation and to enable post offices to go forward on a commercial footing. I believe that the policy meets the needs of rural communities and of deprived urban communities. It does so, not by looking backwards and trying to preserve the systems and views of the past, but by looking forward and trying to create new businesses and opportunities which will make post offices viable. They will be able to continue to provide valuable services to rural communities.

Lord Boardman: My Lords, I welcome any proposal put forward to help post offices, to stop their decline and, it is to be hoped, to reverse it. However, it would have been helpful if the Statement had been made before last night's debate. Indeed, today's Statement appears to be almost a response to last night's attacks.
	I shall not attempt to go through the Statement, but I want to make one general point. It appears to be a knee-jerk reaction to the criticisms made and needs to be considered in detail. However, I was struck in particular by the security angle. I am concerned about the number of post offices which will be equipped to provide the degree of security necessary to safeguard the amounts of cash which they must handle. Village post offices are vulnerable as it is, but for large parts of the day only one person is left in charge. The security aspect will need careful consideration and no doubt will receive that from the Government.
	The Statement raises the question of whether the large number of rural post offices, often in small cottages, will be capable of providing the security required to provide the service that is contemplated. I hope that a satisfactory answer will be forthcoming. However, I welcome any proposals to help the Post Office, but I shall await more detail in due course.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, while it may be felt that the report is a response to last night's debate, the record will show that it was requested eight months ago. It has not been cooked up overnight! I believe that we are approaching the problem reasonably by saying that this is a serious issue which requires serious consideration. We came forward with the report as soon as possible.
	I agree with the noble Lord as regards security. It is an extremely important issue in deprived urban areas and we shall use the modernisation fund in dealing with it.

Lord Clarke of Hampstead: My Lords, I declare my interest as a former Post Office worker and former official of the Union of Post Office Workers. Having done so on a number of occasions, it will come as no surprise to your Lordships' House. Although I am an outspoken critic of the Government's overall plans for the future of the Post Office, which we shall discuss tomorrow, it would be churlish not to welcome the general thrust of today's Statement. However, a couple of elements are missing.
	The first is the lack of reference to Crown offices in any form or detail. They are a valuable part of the network, providing Post Office workers who offer back-up services, training and reserve forces for emergencies when postmasters are in need of them. The Crown offices deserve a mention in the Government's overall vision.
	Secondly, as I have not seen the PIU report I should like to know more about the universal bank. Will it be a copy of the highly successful National Giro Bank which was created by the Post Office and sold off by the previous administration at a knock-down price? At the time of its sale, it was successful and efficient and there was a long waiting list of people who wanted to open accounts. The Scotsman was the only newspaper to tell the truth about the whole charade of selling off the bank. It is a disgrace which will haunt the previous administration for many years to come.
	I do not believe that the report was brought forward to today because of last night's performance; I believe that it was done because of tomorrow's performance. It is pre-empting what we are to discuss tomorrow, and I find that a little unsatisfactory. However, I feel that some mention should be made of the Crown office network and the work done by its managers and staff. I believe also that more information should be made available about the universal bank. It would do the Government great credit if they were to start again and create another national Girobank which served the public and was socially useful and efficient.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, I am glad that my noble friend welcomes the general thrust of the report before we return to our discussions tomorrow. The report covers the Crown offices but there is no change in government policy in relation to them. We are still committed to maintaining 15 per cent of the business which goes through the Crown offices.
	The services which will be offered by the universal bank are covered, I believe, on page 73 of the PIU report. They are not exactly the same as those of the Girobank because the situation is slightly different. However, I believe that it is an important initiative which could have enormous social benefits if, over the years, it brings more people into the banking system.
	I do not believe that noble Lords can have it both ways. We were asked whether we could possibly bring the matter forward before the Postal Services Bill had been through the House, although it should be said that that Bill concerns the public status of the Post Office and not the network. We tried to meet the commitment to the House to bring the matter forward, but it is a trifle harsh for noble Lords then to say that we did so only because of the debate the following day.

Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: My Lords, perhaps I may ask the Minister three brief questions. First, will customers be charged for banking services? I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, asked that question and I do not seem to remember that she received an answer. Secondly, at present certain services, such as the sale of car tax discs, are provided only by Crown post offices. Will those services be extended to all post offices? Thirdly, what will happen to small rural post offices in shops where space prohibits any degree of expansion?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, if the explanation was not clear, I shall repeat it. We have made clear on a number of occasions that benefits can be collected in cash and there will be no charge. People will receive benefits exactly as they did previously. There will be no difference. If people ask for more bank services or if we wish to extend them, that is obviously a different question.
	With regard to Crown services, so far as I know there is no proposal to extend the services which currently are provided only by Crown offices to sub-post offices. I believe that that is due to the fact that if the full range of Crown office services were to be provided in a rural post office, there would be too many with which to deal and operation would become difficult. I believe that those were the two main questions asked.

Earl Russell: My Lords, a Frenchman once fell off the top of the Eiffel Tower and, when half-way down, was heard to murmur, "Good, if it lasts". I hope that the Minister understands why I welcome the Statement in that spirit.
	It may be said that if the issue were urgent people would have taken it up earlier. Perhaps I may make it clear that that does not apply to these Benches. I have been trying to remember when I was first alerted to the matter by my honourable friend Mr Kirkwood. I believe that it was in the Parliament before last, and that is not exactly a case of "Archie-come-lately".
	I am concerned especially with the social security issues involved. I welcome warmly the provision for people to receive benefits at the post office in cash. However, as benefit provision has very little spare fat, I should like to ask whether they can do so without paying bank charges, which many of them are not in a position to do.
	In addition, as some benefit income, such as housing benefit, is necessarily on occasion irregular, will the Minister and his noble friend Lady Hollis of Heigham consult each other about the rather more long-term problem regarding whether people on benefit might be able to receive small amounts of credit on rather more generous terms than those they receive at present from loan sharks?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, I am happy to exonerate the Liberal Democrats from any suggestion that they have not always been keen to make this proposal, although I suspect that the noble Earl's comment was not aimed at me but at the other Benches.
	So far as bank charges are concerned, I repeat that people will be able to receive benefits in cash without paying bank charges. That is fundamental to the issue. However, I believe that it should be made absolutely clear that a credit facility is not being provided and, indeed, people will not be able to get into debt with the universal bank. That point is clear and important and should be understood.

Lord Lipsey: My Lords, will my noble friend join with me in congratulating the PIU on the open and innovative way in which it conducted the inquiry and on the splendid report it produced? Will he also take to heart the very wise words of the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, that there is no security in subsidy and, in particular, that if there is one thing worse than explicit subsidy it is hidden subsidy provided by distorting the social security system? That is a rotten way to go about this very important task. Therefore, will he agree that the measures in the PIU report, including the provision of funds to encourage shops to invest so that they have a long-term future, represent the true way forward; that is, not allowing the tail of social security to wag the dog of keeping rural post offices prosperous?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, I believe that the PIU report is excellent because it considers commercial issues and commercial viability while taking account very strongly of the social issues. I believe that it is that mix which makes the report so impressive.
	I agree totally that there is no security in subsidy. That is why the matter is structured very carefully. It concerns the provision of support to sub-postmasters while they obtain extra business to develop their operations. It combines financial assistance with an attempt to return to viability. I agree totally with my noble friend that a hidden subsidy, particularly one based on over-paying for services while keeping those services inefficient, seems to be the worst conceivable way of providing assistance. If financial assistance of some kind is to be provided, it should be on a basis which leads to a viable system.
	The idea of keeping antiquated systems is one to which people seem to return again and again. They believe that keeping old systems which everyone knows are long out of date is a way of keeping the service viable. It is not, because, first, people will vote with their feet and, secondly, it is a way of hiding financial assistance, which means that the matter is not being addressed properly.

Lord Skelmersdale: My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on circulating to some Members of the House as early as he decently could a copy of the PIU report, especially to noble Lords who, like me, are interested in the Postal Services Bill, which we shall debate tomorrow. However, I did not hear the Minister's answer to my noble friend's question. Is there anything in the PIU report which will necessitate a government amendment either to the Bill or, indeed, to the draft licence, which he has also circulated to Members of the House who are interested in that Bill?
	I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Hampstead, that the Post Office Girobank was spectacularly successful as a bank, but unfortunately it did not act as the bank to ease low-income families into the banking system, as the PIU suggests that a universal bank should do. If it had succeeded in that, we would not find that more than 15 per cent of adults do not have a current account.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, there will be no change to primary legislation as a result of the announcement. That is why we drew up Clause 103. We are ahead of the game, even if only slightly. I am afraid that I cannot tell the noble Lord whether it will make any difference to the draft licences, but I shall certainly write to him with the information.

Lord Ezra: My Lords, having regularly asked questions about the Post Office and its services over the years, I welcome the proposals and look forward to reading the detail with great interest. What are the financial implications? I realise that the Minister cannot tell us about the amount of government funding until the expenditure review is undertaken. But will the objective of the measures that he has announced be to restore the income that it was estimated would be lost to post offices as a result of the previous proposals to change the payment of benefits?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, I find it difficult to answer that question, because I do not understand the figures about the losses that would occur to sub-postmasters. A sub-postmaster is currently paid 13p for every benefit transaction that he undertakes with the claimant and 17p for every transaction that comes through the banking system. There are no proposals to change that. I do not know where the figures for lost payments come from. The payments that sub-postmasters receive for those services will remain the same.

Lord Hylton: My Lords, I welcome the positive points in the Statement, but I hope the Minister does not think that the population is declining in all rural areas. It is certainly not declining in Somerset and I imagine that there are several other areas where it is rising. Will the postmaster's salary be kept available when the existing incumbent retires, given the length of time that is often needed to find a suitable replacement? Will the Minster also give some thought to places where the village shop has already gone? Sometimes it has been replaced by a community shop manned by volunteers and in other cases there is still a pub or garage available to which a new post office business could be linked.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, the decline in rural population is not a universal phenomenon. If I implied that it was, I was clearly incorrect; but it is an important factor in some areas. The question of payments to sub-postmasters is a matter for negotiation between the Post Office and the sub-postmasters. I cannot give any guarantees. Where there is no sub-post office, there is no intention to make an effort to bring one back, because such a huge number have gone. As I said, 3,000 were lost under the previous government. We are still working on the details of how the financial system will work.

Baroness Byford: My Lords, I hesitate to ask a question, knowing that we are debating the subject tomorrow, but I have two points for the Minister. First, he talked about pilot projects. How many are anticipated and what is their time-scale? Secondly, although he has not been able to answer our questions on funding, we shall want to press him further in tomorrow's debate. He used the word "we". I understand his difficulty, but I do not know whether "we" means the Government, the Post Office, the taxpayer or the local authority. Clarification would be helpful.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, the noble Baroness can certainly press me tomorrow, but the words that I used were the ones that had been agreed for this Statement. I shall not give a different answer. We are talking about a significant sum. The precise amount should be revealed at the time of the spending review. I suspect that I have used the word "we" in a number of different contexts, but it usually means the Government.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill

House again in Committee on Clause 25.

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 105:
	Page 27, line 24, after ("vehicle") insert ("owned or occupied by anyone subject to surveillance").

Lord Lucas: I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 106 and 109. If the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, wants to know how to make small groups, the answer is to ask for them. The Government complain mightily, but they give in eventually.
	There are three minor problems with the wording of the Bill on which I should be grateful for elucidation. Amendment No. 105 relates to subsection (3)(a), which says that surveillance is deemed covert if it
	"involves the presence of an individual, or of any surveillance device, on any residential premises or in any private vehicle".
	That seems to imply that observing someone's activities from a flat with agreement of the occupants--as one has often seen done on television and elsewhere--or using a private vehicle in the street to watch what is going on in the street counts as covert surveillance. That seems very odd, so I suggest inserting the words "owned or occupied" to show that only when the subject's house or vehicle is being observed from outside does surveillance count as covert.
	Amendment No. 106 would delete subsection (3)(b), because I do not believe that merely watching something from outside falls within the ordinary definition of "intrusive". Perhaps the Government do not agree and feel that the entirety of what happens in a house should be sanctified.
	Amendment No. 109 would delete subsection (5), which says that subsection (3)(b) does not apply when,
	"the device is such that it consistently provides information of the same quality and detail as might be expected to be obtained from a device actually present on the premises or in the vehicle".
	I cannot think of any circumstances under which that stipulation would not be satisfied. It must surely be impossible, as long as you draw a line far enough, to gain intelligence from a remote device placed, perhaps, 100 yards away which is as good as that which can be obtained from a device of the best possible quality situated inside the house. By the laws of physics, there must be interference and noise of some sort or another introduced by that distance of, for example, 100 yards which will mean that subsection (5) is always satisfied.
	I should be grateful for some guidance from the Government as to where they think the line should be drawn between "intrusive" and "not intrusive" and how the wording in subsections (3)(b) and (5) work together to make that a line which is understandable to officials in practice. I beg to move.

Lord Monson: I have no firm views on Amendments Nos. 106 or 109. But it seems to me that if the Government do not accept Amendment No. 105, or something very like it, they will be shooting themselves in the foot. As the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, pointed out, if Clause 25 is left unamended, the people doing the surveillance will be caught and that is surely not the Government's intention.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: Had the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, not tabled these amendments, we should have tabled similar amendments. We wish to support them.
	In subsection (5), to which Amendment No. 109 relates, it says that surveillance,
	"is not intrusive unless the device is such that it consistently provides information of the same quality and detail as might be expected to be obtained from a device actually present on the premises".
	That seems to me to be an extraordinarily high test and largely reduces the protection around intrusive surveillance which other parts of the clause are designed to provide.
	I also raise the fact that the Data Protection Commissioner, whose views must surely be given some weight in these matters, responded to the Bill in March of this year by citing the instance of a picture from a long-lens camera. That may not be quite as clear as a picture from a camera placed in the room but it did not necessarily reduce the infringement of privacy.
	Finally, in response to a reply from the noble Lord, Lord Bach, on an earlier amendment moved from these Benches, from a practical standpoint, in terms of working those complex provisions, how is one to know in advance whether the quality and detail of information obtained by a device is or is not of a consistent quality commensurate with information obtained from within the premises?
	All in all, we believe that those provisions are impractical, unworkable and unnecessary and that the Bill would be improved without subsection (5).

Lord Bach: We were a little unclear about the purpose of Amendment No. 105 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. The amendment inserts the words,
	"owned or occupied by anyone subject to surveillance",
	after the word "vehicle". But Clause 45 already defines "private vehicle" as,
	"any vehicle which is used primarily for the private purposes of the person who owns it or of a person otherwise having the right to use it".
	That formulation in Clause 45 is intended to catch the occasions when a vehicle might be in use and being used for private purposes.
	As before, that distinction may not be perfect in terms of pure issues of privacy but we need to give a clear steer as to the circumstances in which an authorisation will be appropriate. The Bill does that and it is compatible with convention rights in that regard.
	Amendments Nos. 106 and 109 would lessen the controls placed on the use of intrusive surveillance. The aim of Part II has been to cover the activities of law enforcement and other agencies and to place the most stringent controls on those activities where a person has the highest expectation of privacy--in his home or his own vehicle.
	To accept these amendments would remove from that category those operations or investigations where the police or others used highly sophisticated equipment--for example, laser microphones--to obtain details of a conversation inside a person's home without installing a device on those premises. We are not prepared to lessen that control which is why we cannot accept the amendments.
	I am asked about the person carrying out the surveillance. He would have lawful authority by virtue of the authorisation itself.

Lord Lucas: In Clause 45 the definition of a "private vehicle" is,
	"any vehicle which is used primarily for the private purposes of the person who owns it",
	and residential premises are similarly defined. So let us suppose that we have a policeman sitting in my flat, watching some drug dealing going on in the street below. Surely, that is caught by the current wording of Clause 25(3)(a) to mean that that is intrusive surveillance, merely because the policeman is sitting in my flat watching someone else because my flat is a convenient place from which to undertake the observation. There is nothing in the definition of "residential premises" or "private vehicle" to say that those must be owned or used by the person who is the subject of the surveillance.
	That is the purpose of Amendment No. 105. Otherwise, any surveillance operation which in any way makes use of residential premises or a private vehicle becomes intrusive. That seems to me to be extremely odd.
	As regards Amendments Nos. 106 and 109, I understand the Government's position to be that the home is sacrosanct. I am quite prepared to work with that position. But then, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury said, subsection (5) is lunatic. There has been reference to a laser microphone. That uses the vibrations in a pane of glass. So the sound quality depends on the way in which a pane of quite thick glass, perhaps even double glazing, responds to sound waves. Under any circumstances, from the absoluteness of physical laws, it has to be worse than having a microphone on the premises. So subsection (5) will always be satisfied, so Clause 25(3)(b) has no effect. What the Government are saying they wish to do is entirely negated.
	If we accept entirely what the Government wish to do, then they must entirely recast subsection (5) in some way to take out that extremely high test.
	Finally, I understand why an Englishman's home is his castle, and we should treat that seriously. But why is there this passion for vehicles? I thought that it was this party which was meant to treat the private car as something special. Is not the party opposite meant to be encouraging the use of public transport? If this law comes into effect, everyone will have to use cars because then they can have a mobile source of privacy. Cars will be taken to the office because people will then be able to dodge out of the office into the car and not be subject to surveillance. That seems very odd.
	I should be grateful for a response on those three points because I do not believe that I have been given a satisfactory answer on anything.

Lord Bach: The noble Lord has raised a difficult point. We want to think further about it, particularly as he was supported by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. Therefore, if the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment, I shall take it away and think about the points he made, particularly in relation to subsections (3)(b) and (5) to see whether or not they are inconsistent. We are grateful to the noble Lord for raising this issue and we shall come back to him on it.

Lord Lucas: A little flattery will get one everywhere! I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 106 to 109 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 110:
	Page 27, line 43, at end insert--
	("(5A) For the purposes of this Part surveillance which--
	(a) is carried out by means of apparatus designed or adapted for the purpose of detecting the installation or use in any residential or other premises of a television receiver (within the meaning of section 1 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949), and
	(b) is carried out from outside those premises exclusively for that purpose,
	is neither directed nor intrusive.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment Nos. 111 to 112A not moved.]
	Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 26 [Lawful surveillance etc.]:

Lord Cope of Berkeley: moved Amendment No. 113:
	Page 29, line 4, leave out subsection (3).

Lord Cope of Berkeley: Amendment No. 113 draws attention to subsection (3) of Clause 26, which says that,
	"The conduct that may be authorised under this Part includes conduct outside the United Kingdom".
	I was slightly surprised that that type of surveillance, to be conducted by the various bodies to which the Committee will turn later, is to be authorised outside the United Kingdom. Presumably such surveillance also has to be lawful in the other country concerned, unless it takes place on the high seas. That is my first point.
	In regard to other countries' surveillance here, I can see nothing in the Bill that would allow the equivalent authorities of other countries--the police and so on--to carry out intrusive surveillance here. From our point of view, that seems to be a good thing, but one would have thought that sauce for the goose would be sauce for the gander. If we are not to permit the police of other countries to carry out surveillance here, except through our police or customs, presumably we should not suggest that our police should conduct them elsewhere, but should seek the co-operation of the police in the country concerned. I would be grateful if the Minister would comment on that. I beg to move.

Lord Bach: We understand the intention of the noble Lord in moving this amendment. I shall explain why the provision is in the Bill and its effect. I shall also try to answer his questions.
	The provision at Clause 26(3) would allow for authorisations under this Bill to be given for the use of surveillance or covert sources where some or all of the activity was to take place outside the UK. That can be seen to be directly relevant in the case of an intelligence agency with a remit to operate abroad, but it may also be relevant in some other areas such as drugs investigations by the police and customs.
	There are geographical limits to the authorisation of intrusive surveillance. Those are set out, principally in respect of police forces, at Clause 31 of this Bill. In respect of authorisations that can have application abroad, the effect of the authorisations would be to provide reassurance to UK courts that a particular activity was, first, in accord with ECHR principles; secondly, authorised at a sufficiently high level; and, thirdly, subject to independent oversight, should evidence subsequently be brought before a court or should a Human Rights Act challenge based on that activity be made in our courts.
	Without such a provision, evidence--when produced in a court in the UK--may be vulnerable to the charge that it had not been authorised in accordance with the law as required by Article 8 of the convention.
	The provision does not grant a general licence to operate abroad. If the force or agency in question has no remit to act overseas, this Bill will not give it one. Indeed, for most such operations, the authorisation would cover an operation in which foreign authorities were in the lead, or at least involved. This provision would merely serve to protect any evidence arising from such operations when brought before a UK court. This is clearly desirable in helping to convict major and international criminals.
	The noble Lord, Lord Cope, asks about other countries carrying out surveillance here. Foreign law enforcement agencies would obtain authorisation through organisations here; they would not act here without consultation and without the approval of the relevant agency based in the UK.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: I am grateful for that explanation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 26 agreed to.
	Clause 27 [Authorisation of directed surveillance]:

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: moved Amendment No. 114:
	Page 29, line 32, leave out paragraph (g).

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: The point of Amendment No. 114 is relatively simple to explain. Clauses 27 and 28 of the Bill provide the circumstances in which authorisation can be given, on the one hand, for direct surveillance and, on the other hand, for covert human intelligence. As the Minister said earlier, it is part of the protection supposedly provided to citizens by this Bill and its extraordinarily wide powers, that that authorisation procedure is clearly defined and battened down.
	The Committee will have noticed that, according to both clauses, authorisation can be given only where it is necessary on grounds specified in subsection (3) of Clause 27. That subsection is in the widest terms and includes national security, preventing crime, preventing disorder, in connection with economic well-being, public safety, public health, collecting tax and so on. The final paragraph, (g), states that the Secretary of State can, by order, specify other grounds on which these key authorisations can be given.
	I believe that Members of the Committee agree this is a difficult Bill, an important Bill, and one in which, more than normal, we must be vigilant in protecting basic freedoms and liberties--not, I emphasise, that the Government are trying to put one over on citizens, but it is common ground that the denseness and complexity of the drafting of this legislation require us to be vigilant.
	I draw to the attention of the Committee the 18th report of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation, published earlier this month. It states particular concern for the subsections that Amendments Nos. 114 and 117 address. The report states:
	"The Committee is of the opinion that the defining of the purposes for which an investigatory power may be used is a vital part of placing restrictions on the exercise of those powers and does not consider it to be appropriate to delegate to the Secretary of State what appears to be an unlimited power to specify other purposes".
	It goes on to say:
	"It appears, therefore, that the apparently unlimited powers in"--
	these clauses--
	"may be intended to allow no more than the addition of the protection of morals and the rights and freedoms of others to the purposes set out in those clauses".
	The Select Committee gathered that from a government memorandum to the Select Committee. The report continues:
	"If this is so, why are the powers not limited in this way?"--
	for example, set out on the face of the Bill--
	"Paragraph 19 of the Memorandum argues that section 6 of the Human Rights Act will apply and that the powers are thus constrained by Article 8(2) 'although that limitation need not appear on the face of the bill'".
	That is a quote from the Government's memorandum. The crucial finale of this matter is as follows:
	"The Committee does not accept that it is appropriate to use wide terms to define a new power and to rely on the Human Rights Act to restrict its scope when it is possible to define it so that it covers only its intended scope".
	I give three cheers for that. I believe this is the first clear example that we have had before us of what I would call thoroughly lazy drafting, where the government of the day are content not to define what is or is not allowed by the government machinery in all its aspects; where they are willing to fall back on a thoroughly weak and inadequate protection by saying, "Don't worry, old chap, just go and look at the Human Rights Act and I am sure you will find a remedy there". That is simply not an answer in a case of this nature. We believe that this is an important provision that the Select Committee perfectly clearly condemns. I invite the Committee to do the same. I beg to move.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: I give one cheer for government Amendments Nos. 115 and 118, which take up part of the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee that any power of this character should be subject to affirmative resolution. As the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said, the actual recommendation of the committee goes much further and, although it is not precisely covered in the Liberal Democrat amendments, the noble Lord has a very good point.

Lord Bach: In replying to the noble Lord's amendments, perhaps I can speak also to the government amendments in this group, Amendments Nos. 203B, 205, 206, 208A to 208C and 115.
	The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, quoted from a report of the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee. But in a later report that committee accepted the Government's reasons for doing what we are doing. It may be therefore that the noble Lord is wrong to rely on the 18th report and should rather look to the 21st report for an explanation of what we are doing and a rejection of what he proposes.
	One of the recommendations of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation was that we should tighten up the arrangements for adding to the grounds on which the various investigative powers can be used. As has already been indicated, we considered that and accepted the weight of the argument. So we tabled the government amendments which ensure that, in respect of each of the powers at issue, any addition to the purposes for which those powers can be used will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
	We have already explained why we do not believe it is necessary to act on the recommendation of the committee that the Bill should explicitly recognise that none of the orders could include purposes which would go beyond those permitted in the convention on human rights. The Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee, in its latest report, accepted our reasons.
	As we have made clear, the powers in this Bill will be limited by the Human Rights Act. As a matter of law, not simply as a practical limitation, the Secretary of State may make no order that is incompatible with the convention. It is our view that to state on the face of the Bill that the convention rights must circumscribe any use of these orders will add nothing to the situation in law. That is an important point; it will be relevant to all legislation in the days post implementation of the Human Rights Act.
	Turning to the Liberal Democrat amendments, any additions to the purposes on the face of the Bill will, as a matter of law, have to fall within the exceptions set out in Article 8(2) of the convention and should be made by means of the affirmative resolution procedure. That has now been accepted by the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee as giving appropriate parliamentary control and this Committee should recognise that when debating these amendments. The 21st report deals with that matter.
	What scope does that leave for adding to the purposes? I need to answer this today as Amendments Nos. 114 and 117 seek to remove the power to add purposes altogether in a fashion beyond that recommended by the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee. The two permitted purposes in Article 8 of the ECHR, which we have not included in the Bill, are,
	"for the protection of morals",
	and,
	"for the rights and freedoms of others".
	That was because we could think of no circumstances where public authorities would want to use covert techniques on those grounds. But we thought it necessary to provide the power to enable the grounds to be extended for those purposes should that prove necessary. We can see a time when it may be necessary to use this enabling power in some limited circumstances which would fall within,
	"rights and freedoms of others".
	Once the HRA is implemented and we have more idea of how it will impact on the activities of public authorities, we may very quickly need to look to adding purposes to the list set out and, if we do want to add purposes, we shall want to limit them as far as possible.
	The Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee suggested that any use of the order-making power might be limited specifically to adding the purposes,
	"for the protection of morals",
	or,
	"for the rights and freedoms of others",
	as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. Those are two quite wide-ranging purposes. If possible, any extension of the powers ought, in our view, to be more specific. Certainly, we should leave that possibility open in the interests of limiting as far as possible the intrusions on privacy.
	Members of the Committee will note that this is the approach we have adopted with some of the purposes already listed in the Bill. They do not follow exactly the wording of the convention rights. Some are tailored specifically to meet the requirements of investigating agencies in the modern age. We believe the purposes described fall within those allowed under Article 8(2) and we have used a formulation to narrow the purposes as far as possible.
	Of course these are important issues and they are inextricably linked with the implementation of the Human Rights Act. We tabled amendments which we feel ought to provide all the reassurance the Committee requires. We do not claim a monopoly of wisdom on the Human Rights Act--we are all feeling our way--but I seek to persuade the Committee that we have done enough in that regard. I hope that, having heard my explanation, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I am grateful for the Minister's response. However, I urge on him the intermediate position which the Select Committee proposed; that is, rather than simply leave it to an affirmative resolution, which would of course be an improvement on the Bill, the Bill should contain on its face the two categories to which reference has been made--morals and purposes. That would be the best way of dealing with this matter. It would not leave a completely unknown category to be added by affirmative resolution in the future.
	As the cliche has it, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. It is not a safe way of legislating for us to assume that the nice, reasonable noble Lords who sit opposite will always be in their places. That compromise would therefore be the best compromise. One hopes that the Government will consider it. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 115:
	Page 29, line 41, at end insert--
	("(5) The Secretary of State shall not make an order under subsection (3)(g) unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 27, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 28 [Authorisation of covert human intelligence sources]:
	[Amendments Nos. 116, 116A and 117 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 118:
	Page 31, line 8, at end insert--
	("(5A) The Secretary of State shall not make an order under subsection (3)(g) unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 119:
	Page 31, line 21, at end insert--
	("( ) An authorisation for the conduct and use of a covert human intelligence source whose conduct falls within section 25(7)(d) shall be governed by the same procedures as apply to the authorisation of conduct for the carrying out of intrusive surveillance.").

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: Perhaps I may say a word on this amendment because I was rather caught on the hop before the break for the Statement.
	Many of the points made by the Minister in responding to this and the other amendments in the group will bear scrutiny when we see Hansard. I hope I shall be able to communicate with the Minister before Report stage because we are all striving to make the best of this Bill. For the moment I shall leave it at that, except to say this. The Minister said that in relation to this group of amendments he did not think the provisions were for this legislation. I do not know on what possible basis that can be so, given that the Bill provides precisely for the arrangements vis-a-vis informers.

[Amendment No. 119 not moved.]
	Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 29 [Persons entitled to grant authorisations under ss. 27 and 28]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 120:
	Page 31, line 43, leave out subsection (4) and insert--
	("(4) A public authority is a relevant public authority for the purposes of this section--
	(a) in relation to section 27 if it is specified in Part I or II of Schedule (Relevant public authorities); and
	(b) in relation to section 28 if it is specified in Part I of that Schedule.
	(4A) The Secretary of State may by order amend Schedule (Relevant public authorities) by--
	(a) adding a public authority to Part I or II of that Schedule;
	(b) removing a public authority from that Schedule;
	(c) moving a public authority from one Part of that Schedule to the other;
	(d) making any change consequential on any change in the name of a public authority specified in that Schedule.
	(4B) The Secretary of State shall not make an order under subsection (4A) containing any provision for--
	(a) adding any public authority to Part I or II of that Schedule, or
	(b) moving any public authority from Part II to Part I of that Schedule,
	unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.").

Lord Bach: In moving this amendment on behalf of my noble friend, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 121, 159 and 207. There was much discussion in another place about the naming on the face of the Bill of those public authorities using Part II powers. This issue was also raised by the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee. We have listened to the arguments put forward and our response is the schedule provided by this group of amendments. The schedule is divided into two parts. Part I lists all those public authorities empowered to authorise directed surveillance and the use and/or conduct of covert sources. Part II lists those authorities empowered only to authorise directed surveillance.
	The schedule differs markedly from early versions of the list of public authorities using these powers. First, it names only the public authorities and does not go into details about which agencies within each department will be using these powers. That is because the public authority is the statutory body, not its constituent parts. However, we are intending to narrow down the different agencies within a public authority that can authorise activity under Part II of the Bill. This will be achieved by means of the order produced under Clause 29, which will specify precisely the individuals holding such offices, ranks or positions within the relevant public authority who can authorise activity. For example, the order might specify a senior immigration officer within the Immigration Service of the Home Office as able to authorise the conduct or use of a covert source.
	Secondly, changes and additions have also been made to the list. The first provisional list was published during the Committee stage in another place. We made it clear then that the list was being developed and that there would be changes. Since that time we have found that a greater number of public authorities use Part II powers than we had first thought. This has been one of the benefits of the whole exercise. We now have a much clearer picture of the range and types of activity that are going on in public authorities, but we are still learning about public authorities whose activities had not previously come to our attention. This learning process is likely to go on for some time. That is why it may be necessary to add further public authorities as a result of case law developed from judgments on the definition of what is a "public authority" once the Human Rights Act (the HRA) comes into force. That is why the amendments provide for the Secretary of State, by order, to add or remove public authorities from the schedule or to move an authority from one part of the schedule to the other.
	Any addition, or movement from Part II to Part I of the schedule, will first need to be approved by Parliament. Of course, that does not mean to say that we have rejected out of hand the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee that we should remove the power to add public authorities to the schedule. We have taken careful note of the committee's view, as detailed in its 21st Report, that we should be able to produce an exhaustive list of public authorities now and that it should be for Parliament to decide by means of primary legislation whether any additional existing public authorities should be added to the schedule. Any order adding a body to the schedule would now be subject to parliamentary approval through the affirmative resolution procedure.
	However, there is something between us and the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee on the issue. We should like to give the matter further thought. Indeed, we propose that a meeting should take place between the chairman of that very distinguished committee and my noble friend the Minister who sits beside me. On that basis, I beg to move Amendment No. 120.

Viscount Astor: We are grateful to the Minister for his explanation of the amendments. However, before I ask him a number of questions in that respect, I have before me the text of Clause 29 where subsection (4)(d) refers to,
	"any of the intelligence services".
	The reference to other public authorities in the clause is very definitive; for example, there is reference to the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the National Crime Squad and the Ministry of Defence, and so on. Therefore, when the Minister responds, can he tell me whether the phrase,
	"any of the intelligence services",
	is a definitive or legal term? Now that the intelligence services publish booklets stating who and where they are and, indeed, are subject to parliamentary scrutiny, I wonder why the Bill does not set out the intelligence services involved. It seems to me that that leaves the matter open to debate as regards what is and what is not an intelligence service. As they are now subject to Parliament, would it not be better to define them as such?

Lord Bach: Perhaps I may deal with that point now. As I understand it, Clause 72 defines "intelligence services". Yes, indeed, the definition is to be found at lines 8 and 9 on page 77. I hope that that answers the noble Viscount's question.

Viscount Astor: I am extremely grateful to the Minister for pointing that out. I am glad that, like me, it took him a little time to find the actual wording.
	I turn now to the amendments. I have a number of questions about the list, the first of which is general and relates to a matter that was touched on earlier. We are adding local authorities and various other bodies to this list, but I am rather concerned about how this will work. Presumably, some local authorities will not have the resources to do this on their own. Will local authorities be allowed to use private contractors for this purpose; for example, will they be able to use private detective agencies? Alternatively, will this have to be done by employees? Can such activities be contracted out? If that is the case--I do not know whether it is--how will this be organised to ensure that those concerned keep within the rules that apply to such activity?
	I note that the schedule in Amendment No. 159 includes a reference to the National Assembly for Wales. As far as I understand it, the reason for its inclusion is because the Assembly is an executive body, as opposed to the Scottish Parliament, which is a Parliament. The amendment simply refers to "The National Assembly for Wales". Can the Minister say whether that implies that the Assembly could have a wider remit when it comes to using these powers than, say, the Department of Health or the Home Office, which are confined within a rather narrow remit? It is purely a probing question, but I should be grateful to receive an answer from the Minister.
	Further, under "Other bodies" in the schedule set out under Amendment No. 159, one sees that the Food Standards Agency and the Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce have been included in the list. I am not quite sure why those bodies are there. I understand that there may, perhaps, be a reason for including the FSA because the Bill talks about the economic well-being of the country and, indeed, about protecting public health. I should be interested to know how the agency will use its powers. Similarly, I am rather puzzled as to why the Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce has been included in the list. It seems to me that we are opening up farmers in this country to some kind of intrusive--or even unintrusive--surveillance. I do not know how this will work. I believe that the Government need to explain why these bodies have been included in the list.
	Looking further down the list in the schedule, one finds reference to the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain. I am not aware that that is either a public body or a quango. I should be grateful if the Minister could explain why the society has been included. I may be wrong and it may indeed be a public body; but, if it is not, I do not understand how it will be subject to any form of control. That seems to me to raise some interesting questions.
	I have asked specific questions about the listings, but I have a more general question about local authorities. As the Minister said, I understand that the Government will be looking to see how this works in the future. However, it would be helpful to know just how many local authorities will actually sign up to start with--for example, will it be a small number and, if so, how quickly do the Government think it will grow? It would be most informative to know what evidence the Government have in that respect.

Lord Lucas: I hope that in the course of his inquiries the Minister will ask the Department for Education and Employment whether it ought to be on the list. During my time as an education spokesman several enterprising frauds of Nigerian origin that obtained money from university grants when they should not have done so were investigated. Presumably the whole matter of the repayment of student loans will at some stage require some kind of checking up on the financial status or whereabouts of former students.

Lord Desai: What about the drugs czar? Is the drugs czar independent of the Home Office? Is he a separate agent? I can think of many other examples but that of the drugs czar worries me because he should be included in the list.

Viscount Goschen: Perhaps czars could comprise another category to be defined at a later time.
	I welcome the Minister's attempt in these government amendments to try to be more specific in regard to what kind of agencies will fall under the provisions of the Bill. My intervention relates to points that I raised at an earlier stage of today's proceedings.
	The Minister was good enough to say that the Bill regulates for the first time the use of surveillance, be it covert or intrusive, and that previously a number of these activities were not regulated in any way. If the schedule applies only to public bodies--there has been much discussion about those public bodies--will the Minister clarify what is its effect on those bodies that are not covered by it? Can they continue as before? Are they in a more advantageous or a less advantageous situation than those bodies which are classified as public? That relates to the point made so ably by my noble friend Lord Astor; namely, whether a public body is able to find a loophole here. Can they use a non-public body to perform their work for them?
	I have a final question on the amendment we are discussing although the noble Lord may say that it applies to another part of the Bill and that we may pre-empt the clause stand part debate. What happens to information that is obtained using covert or intrusive surveillance? I am sure that the noble Lord will point out the relevant provision in the Bill. Are there definitive restrictions on the use to which such information may be put? Earlier my noble friend Lord Cope spoke of the BBC carrying out investigative surveillance. One has often seen on television film shot by the customs agency, for example, in pursuance of an investigation. That may involve covert surveillance. Will it continue to be appropriate for such material to be used for public entertainment, as has occurred in the past, or are there additional restrictions in the Bill to cover such eventualities?

Lord Bach: These government amendments have elicited many questions from Members of the Committee, all of which deserve an answer. The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, asked again how bodies that are not public authorities are affected by the Bill. He deserves a fuller response than he obtained on the previous occasion he raised that matter.
	Clause 71 states, in terms, that nothing is made unlawful by Part II of the Bill. This part of the Bill is designed solely to allow only public authorities to comply with the Human Rights Act, which deals with public authorities and not with private individuals. It places a duty on public authorities to act in accordance with the Human Rights Act. The authorities that are affected are listed in Amendment No. 159. It is a matter for individual organisations to take a view as to whether they are public authorities. If they believe that they are, they can be added to the list by order.
	Bodies that are not public authorities are not affected in any way by the Bill or by the Human Rights Act. Their position in law will be exactly as it was before the Bill becomes law. In other words, their position remains unchanged. If their activities are caught by the criminal law, so be it. However, if their activities are not unlawful, that will continue to be the case.

Viscount Goschen: I am grateful to the Minister for those helpful comments, which have certainly assisted my understanding of the Bill. However, I referred to a private detective agency being able to pursue an activity that is lawful under the criminal law. A public authority, however, would be subject to all kinds of restrictions in pursuing that activity. Could the public authority contract out that work?

Lord Bach: I do not believe that a public authority could contract out fully because, in the end, it would remain liable and it would be caught by the provisions of the Bill; in other words, it would have to act in accordance with the Human Rights Act.
	The noble Viscount, Lord Astor, queried some of the names on the list. The National Assembly for Wales is in the same position as any other public authority mentioned in Amendment No. 159. The noble Viscount referred to three bodies and asked why they were included in the list. At the risk of speaking for longer than I had intended, I should explain why that is the case. The noble Viscount may not be aware--I was certainly not aware of this--that the Food Standards Agency is responsible for the enforcement of meat hygiene and related controls in licensed slaughterhouses. Surveillance is used to target individuals or premises, such as purchases at markets or activity at premises; for example, deliveries to farms where illegal activity is suspected to be taking place. The Food Standards Agency needs to be able to undertake such investigations to carry out its function as an enforcement authority for meat hygiene.
	The Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce has an anti-fraud unit which uses surveillance to monitor milk quotas. Under the CAP, the UK is permitted to produce a specified quantity of milk a year. If that quantity is exceeded, a levy is raised. Therefore, all producers and purchasers of milk are meant to be registered and have their own quota. If that quota is exceeded, they become liable to levy. There is a market in black market milk where farmers produce milk and sell it to dairies without declaring it to the intervention board as they are meant to. It follows that surveillance operations are conducted where farms have been observed to ascertain whether milk tankers have collected milk.
	The noble Viscount mentioned the Royal Pharmaceutical Society, which is considered to be a public authority and is therefore included in the list. That society has the power to enforce various sections of the Medicines Act 1968 and the Poisons Act 1972. It uses covert surveillance to ensure that there is no breach of the Medicines Act or the Poisons Act by pharmacists or businesses registered with them. As I say, it appears that not only have the Government learned more about public authorities but we are now sharing this information with the Committee. More bodies may need to be added to the schedule in due course. I believe that I have answered most of the questions that have been asked.

Lord McNally: Reference has been made several times to where a private body carries out the functions of a public body. That happens in a number of areas; for instance, where there are private security firms operating side by side with police forces. Where that happens, will the private body be expected to observe the standards of the public body concerned? Does the public body set the standards in observation of legislation?

Lord Bach: The answer that I have received is that if the situation is as the noble Lord, Lord McNally, describes, it would in effect make the private body a public authority for the purposes of any surveillance or covert action that it may be taking. I think that that is quite a reassuring answer in the context of the Bill.

Viscount Goschen: I am sorry to press the Minister further. Perhaps he will address the point that I raised about the uses to which information and televisual data gained by covert surveillance can be put.

Viscount Astor: While the Minister is considering that question perhaps I may thank him for his helpful explanation and ask him one simple question. I do not need an answer today, but perhaps he will write to me between now and Report stage. I am grateful for the explanation that the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain is a public body. I must say that I was unaware of that. If it is a public body, it would be interesting to know to whom it is responsible. Is it responsible to a government department, to Ministers or to Parliament? Perhaps the Minister will write to me before the next stage and explain that. When we are adding all these public bodies, it would be useful to know where their responsibilities lie and to whom they are answerable.

Lord Bach: I shall certainly write to the noble Viscount setting out how the society becomes a public authority. I am conscious of the question, which has now been asked twice, as to what use will be made of the information that is gained from surveillance. I must be very careful how I respond to the noble Viscount. Obviously in certain instances it can be used to make out a case against a criminal, a spy or a terrorist. However, what the noble Viscount wants to know is whether it can be used, for example, in a television documentary in order to make a point about wrong-doing. It is quite clear that the authorisations that are granted will have to be granted on specific terms, and of course the more intrusive the surveillance the more specific the terms have to be. To answer the noble Viscount's question fully it will be necessary for me to take proper advice and then to write to him with the use to which it can be put.

Lord Lucas: If the Minister intends to write to noble Lords, I think that it certainly would be helpful to have some enlargement on the nature of public authority. I have looked up "public authority" in the Human Rights Act. Under the Act, a public authority is,
	"any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature",
	but not if the nature of the Act is private. I find that a fairly confusing definition. I should be grateful for something which translated that into ordinary commonplace English so that we can understand the scope of the Bill in practice.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 121:
	Page 32, line 18, leave out from ("authority") to second ("by") in line 19 and insert ("added to Schedule (Relevant public authorities) by an order made under subsection (4A)").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 29, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 30 [Authorisation of intrusive surveillance]:
	[Amendment Nos. 121A to 123 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 123A:
	Page 33, line 32, at end insert--
	("( ) the chief constable of every police force maintained under or by virtue of section 1 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (police forces for areas in Scotland);").

Lord Bach: In moving this amendment I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 124A, 124B, 124C, 127A, 136A, 136B, 138A, 194A, 194B, 195, 195A, 203A, 211B and 230.
	As the Committee knows, a separate Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Bill has been introduced in the Scottish Parliament to cover the devolved activities of public authorities in Scotland. Although we hope the provisions in both Bills will be similar, so as not to impede joint cross-border operations, we also need to provide cover for devolved activity authorised in Scotland which crosses the Border and continues in another part of the UK, and for activity authorised in the rest of the UK which crosses the Border into Scotland. These government amendments, which we have discussed and which have been agreed with the Scottish Executive, provide that cover.
	We already have provisions in Part II of the Bill which extend the Bill to Scotland in respect of reserved functions and public authorities with reserved functions. But we now extend all of Part II to Scotland, subject to the proviso that, in certain cases, an authorisation cannot be granted under the Bill where all the conduct is likely to take place in Scotland. That is covered by the Scottish equivalent of the Bill. These amendments ensure that conduct authorised by public authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland which cross the Border into Scotland will be lawful. They also extend the provisions of the Bill to provide lawful authority for a limited period of time for the activities of Scottish police forces and other public authorities with devolved functions in Scotland, where the conduct is authorised under the Scottish Bill and the activity crosses the Border out of Scotland into other parts of the UK.
	Members of the Committee may think that this removes the need for a separate Scottish Bill. However, that is not the case. The amendments provide that an authority should not be obtained under the Bill if the conduct is all likely to take place in Scotland.
	Lawful authorisation for conduct obtained under the Scottish legislation will continue if circumstances arise which take the conduct outside Scotland. Such an authorisation will continue to have lawful authority on each occasion that such circumstances arise and will last for three weeks, beginning with the time when the circumstances arose.
	An authorisation for directed surveillance obtained by a Scottish police force under the Scottish Bill will continue to give lawful authority, if circumstances arise which mean that officers from that force need to pursue their target across the Border into England. The lawful authority will continue for three weeks on every occasion when circumstances arise which necessitate crossing of the Border. I beg to move.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: I wish to raise a point with regard to the overlap between the Scottish and the Welsh legislation. I understand that the Scottish Parliament has changed the wording of the Scottish Act a little. For example, Clause 30(2) of the Bill says that the Secretary of State cannot grant an authorisation under the Scottish legislation for intrusive surveillance unless he is satisfied that the authorisation is necessary, not that he just believes that it is. There is a slightly higher test in Scotland. Presumably, therefore, under Amendment No. 123A, the Scots will need to fulfil a lower test in England than in Scotland.

Lord Lucas: In this context, perhaps I may ask out of interest whether the phrase,
	"in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom",
	would come into force if someone was planning to move a large operation from Scotland to England, or is that ruled out by that phrase?

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord McNally: moved Amendment No. 124:
	Page 33, line 46, at end insert--
	("(7) No authorisation shall take effect until such time (if any) as--
	(a) the grant of the authorisation has been approved by an ordinary Surveillance Commissioner; and
	(b) written notice of the Commissioner's decision to approve the grant of the authorisation has been given to the person who granted the authorisation.").

Lord McNally: The amendments in this grouping make a common point; that is, to establish whether the powers vested here are--to use a word favoured by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam--proportionate. The clause covers authorisations for intrusive surveillance. The aim behind the amendments is to ensure that such authorisations are proportionate and that they bring all surveillance under the oversight of the surveillance commissioner.
	All noble Lords concerned with the Bill know that a great deal of briefing has been submitted. One piece sent from the Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties Group (UK) caught my eye because it summed up very well the thinking that lies behind these amendments. The group sets out five hurdles that should be cleared before the powers are used.
	First, that the action will provide a
	"clear net benefit for society. That is, the benefits are clear and are achievable by the measures proposed, without a detrimental impact on the rights of honest citizens ... and one that is widely accepted as tolerable in the light of the gains secured".
	Secondly,
	"That the measures proposed discriminate effectively between criminals and honest, law-abiding citizens. Therefore, they should be balanced and should not, in an impetuous desire to counter crime, expose all honest Internet users to ... risks".
	Thirdly,
	"That of all the options available they are the best in the sense that they are the most effective in countering criminals".
	Fourthly,
	"They should be based on clearly defined policy objectives which citizens understand and which command widespread public support".
	Fifthly,
	"They should be enforceable, transparent and accountable".
	Those principles could easily apply to other parts of the Bill, but I believe that they apply particularly well to Clause 30. In essence these amendments are an exercise in wing-clipping. It is intended that the Minister should respond wherever he feels that those wings should not be clipped. I beg to move.

Lord Bach: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for his brief introduction to this series of amendments. It is clear that they probe whether the Government's approach to the important issues surrounding intrusive surveillance is absolutely right. Perhaps I may deal with each amendment in turn.
	Amendment No. 124 seems to have two aims. With regard to police and customs activities, it seeks to rule out the situation in which, in urgent cases, intrusive surveillance authorisations can take effect without the prior approval of the surveillance commissioner. Perhaps this arises through some genuine concern over the safeguards in the existing system in the Police Act 1997. I am sure that the noble Lord will accept an assurance that he need not worry. I can reassure him on this point.
	The Chief Surveillance Commissioner has set up a system for giving approval to authorisations under Part III of the Police Act 1997 which means that there is a commissioner on duty at all times. The procedure is supported by secure communications, which means that a response can be obtained from a commissioner within a very few hours. From when the Office of Surveillance Commissioners started operation in February 1999 to April of this year--a period of some 15 months--only 12 cases had been dealt with under the urgency procedure; that is, an authorisation normally requiring prior approval of a commissioner has taken effect immediately without awaiting that approval because of the urgency involved. Those 12 cases were taken from a total of around 311 prior approval cases. The same system will be put in place to deal with intrusive authorisations for police and customs activities under these provisions. I think that that should go some way to providing evidence that the system will not be abused.
	The amendment would also impose a requirement on Secretary of State authorisations. They would not take effect until a surveillance commissioner had approved the grant of authorisation and written notice of the commissioner's decision had been given. We do not believe that that would be appropriate; rather, this is a skilful way employed by the noble Lord to raise again the issue of judicial warranting which we discussed during earlier debates in Committee. The surveillance commissioners have no locus in the activities of the security and intelligence agencies. We made our position clear on judicial involvement in the issue of warrants by the Secretary of State during discussions on Part I of the Bill.
	Authorisation for intrusive surveillance by the security and intelligence agencies or the Ministry of Defence will occur in extremely sensitive cases. We believe that it is a key part of the line of accountability from the agencies and department to the Secretary of State. The involvement by the executive has historically reflected the highest levels of scrutiny. Any alternative means of authorising such operations would need to show that they would lead to an improvement on a system which has proved to be remarkably effective over many years. The place for judicial influence in this process is in the oversight role provided by the Intelligence and Security Service Commissioners.
	I shall turn now to Amendment No. 125. The amendment allows the surveillance commissioners to add conditions to grants of approval. It should be remembered that the role of the surveillance commissioner is one of review. It is his function to review every authorisation for intrusive surveillance to satisfy himself that the decision was reasonable and that it met the criteria; that is, that it concerned serious crime; that it was proportionate; and that the action it sought to achieve could not be achieved by other means.
	If the surveillance commissioner agrees that the decision was reasonably made, he will approve it. If he does not believe that the decision was reasonable, he will cancel or quash the authorisation. We do not believe that it is his role to second-guess the authorising officer or to impose extra conditions on the authorisation. Authorisations are fundamentally operational decisions, best left to those most qualified to take them. It will be the authorising officer who, at the end of the day, is accountable for that decision and will have to justify it, if necessary, in court. However, nothing can prevent the authorising officer himself from attaching conditions or limitations on who, how, when, where or what kind of surveillance may be undertaken.
	Amendments Nos. 127 and 132 would require the surveillance commissioner to give prior approval to Security Service intrusive surveillance authorisations which were granted on serious crime grounds. We believe that they are moving in a similar direction to the amendments that we have just discussed. For the same reasons, we do not believe that the amendments would be appropriate. They would represent a movement towards judicial warranting, with which we do not agree. Furthermore, they would undermine, to a certain extent, a central element in the accountability of the Security Service to the Home Secretary.
	We cannot accept Amendments Nos. 128 to 131. It is worth bearing in mind that all the surveillance commissioners are serving or former High Court judges. This should continue to be the case for all those commissioners involved in intrusive surveillance authorisations. There are clear statutory powers for the commissioners to quash and cancel authorisations. Furthermore, there are clear powers for them to order the destruction of records when they consider that to be appropriate. We are referring to senior judicial figures; the issues involved may well be complex; we believe that it is right to leave the discretion in their hands.
	Finally, Amendments Nos. 135 and 136 would reduce the length of time a warrant can be granted or renewed for intrusive surveillance carried out by the intelligence services from six to three months. The investigations carried out by these agencies differ from those carried out by the police and customs. They tend to be for long-term investigations involving national security and the economic well-being of the UK. We believe that a six-month warranting system for such operations is right and appropriate. The difference is reflected in the differing lengths of authorisations for interference with property under the Intelligence Services Act and the Police Act. Those differences should remain.
	The noble Lord was right to bring forward these amendments in order to test the Government on whether what has been put into the Bill so far is absolutely right. We believe that the new regime sits well alongside the existing set-up in the Police Act and the Intelligence Services Act, and I hope to some extent that I have reassured the noble Lord.

Lord Hylton: While we are still debating Clause 30, I understand that the senior authorising officers will be taking operational decisions, and that in nearly all cases they are individuals who are heads of their force or branch. However, in subsection (5)(l) at the bottom of page 33, the designated Customs officer can be "any customs officer" designated by the commissioners. How many Customs officers would be expected to be designated? Also, will he define more closely the phrase, "economic well-being of the United Kingdom". I suspect that I ought to know the answer. The noble Lord has perhaps defined it several times already. If that is the case, I apologise to him.

Lord Bach: If the noble Lord will forgive me, I do not intend to return to that issue, particularly when we have a large number of amendments to get through. If he will be kind enough to look in Hansard at some of our early debates in Committee, he will see that there was a debate on what that phrase means. I believe it was on the first day of Committee.
	So far as concerns Customs, the noble Lord is right. Authorisation for intrusive surveillance is by a chief officer, but also, except in urgent cases--and this is very important--with the prior approval of the surveillance commissioner. Only in urgent cases can that chief officer give authority. In most cases it will be done only with the prior approval of the surveillance commissioner.
	The noble Lord asked whether any designated Customs officer will do. The answer is no: the code of practice, which, I am happy to say, is due to be published in draft form before the Report stage, will limit this provision to the chief investigation officer and deputy chief investigation officer before authorisation. No one else will be allowed to do it.

Lord McNally: I commend to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, a reading of the Bassam definition of "economic well-being". I am sure that it has already reached most of the economic textbooks.
	I make no apologies for putting forward these amendments. I think that, sometimes, Parliament is cowed at the thought that the security services, the "spooks", are involved, and we are all supposed to suspend judgment. While I fully respect the work that our security services do, it is important that Parliament continues to scrutinise the powers that we grant them and how they use those powers. That was the spirit in which the amendment was moved and I shall read the Minister's reply with care. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 30, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 31 [Rules for grant of authorisations]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 124A:
	Page 34, line 36, leave out ("or of the City of London police force") and insert (", of the City of London police force or of a police force maintained under or by virtue of section 1 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967").

Lord Bach: I have already spoken to this amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 31, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 32 [Grant of authorisations in the senior officer's absence]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 124B and 124C:
	Page 36, line 7, at end insert--
	("( ) a person is entitled to act for the chief constable of a police force maintained under or by virtue of section 1 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 if he holds the rank of assistant chief constable in that force;").
	Page 36, line 45, at end insert ("or section 5(4) of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967").

Lord Bach: I have already spoken to these amendments. I beg to move them en bloc.

On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 32, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 33 [Notification of authorisations for intrusive surveillance]:
	[Amendment No. 125 not moved.]

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 126:
	Page 37, line 32, leave out subsection (6).

Lord Lucas: I beg to move.

Lord Bach: It is important that public authorities have a statutory basis for carrying out covert activities as soon as possible and that provisions are in force before the Human Rights Act is implemented on 2nd October this year. This is necessary to safeguard the use of these valuable techniques by law enforcement and other agencies. The police and Customs will not be able to use the provisions relating to intrusive surveillance until an order has been made detailing the information to be contained in notifications to surveillance commissioners.
	Such orders will be subject to parliamentary approval. However, in order to allow such an order and rules to be made by the Secretary of State in the absence of Parliament between the period when the Bill receives Royal Assent and Parliament reconvenes after the Summer Recess, the initial order has been made subject to the 40-day rule. This means that the initial order, and only the initial order, can be made without Parliament's prior approval. It would, however, need to be approved by Parliament within 40 days of being signed. The fact that the order in question will still require parliamentary approval is an important consideration.
	Most important of all is the fact that the Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation has considered this provision. Its report considers both the provisions and the parliamentary procedure provided for them to be appropriate. We place much store by that, as I am sure will the committee. We have tabled some amendments in response to its provisional recommendations. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Lucas: I am grateful for that explanation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 33 agreed to.
	Clause 34 [Approval required for authorisations to take effect]:
	[Amendments Nos. 127 and 127ZA not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 127A:
	Page 39, line 28, at end insert ("or
	(iii) a chief constable of a police force maintained under or by virtue of section 1 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967,").

Lord Bach: I have already spoken to this amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 34, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 35 [Quashing of police and customs authorisations etc.]:
	[Amendments Nos. 128 to 131 not moved.]
	Clause 35 agreed to.
	Clauses 36 to 38 agreed to.
	Clause 39 [Secretary of State authorisations]:
	[Amendment No. 132 not moved.]
	Clause 39 agreed to.
	Clause 40 agreed to.
	Clause 41 [General rules about grant, renewal and duration]:

Lord McNally: moved Amendment No. 133:
	Page 44, line 25, leave out ("twelve") and insert ("three").

Lord McNally: This and Amendment No. 134 are wing-clipping and probing amendments. Twelve months seems rather a long time for powers to remain in existence. I beg to move.

Lord Bach: To reduce the length of an authorisation for the use of a covert human intelligence source from 12 to three months is unnecessary and would place great demands on public authorities that use sources in their everyday work.
	The use of a covert source is a long-term activity that needs to be authorised for a longer, rather than a shorter, period of time. Informants and agents can take a long time to build up a relationship or to elicit a particular piece of information. We think that 12 months is about right as a sensible gap between authorisations, and there are extra safeguards in the Bill in recognition of this relatively lengthy authorisation period.
	The Bill requires that there should be at least two officers with responsibility for looking after each source. One should be responsible for the day-to-day care and for the security and welfare of the source. A second will have responsibility for a more general oversight of the use of that source. A person within the authority will have responsibility for maintaining a record of the use made of the source, and the information to be contained in those records will be the subject of regulations by the Secretary of State. Those extra safeguards are necessary because of the 12-month authorisation period.
	Because authorisations last longer, Clause 41(6) directs an authorising officer to particular matters for consideration at the time of renewal. But, as can be seen from the detail of these extra requirements, they are specifically aimed at issues that may arise in respect of the use of a covert source. The idea that these safeguards might also work in respect of surveillance is misguided. Also, the shorter period for surveillance authorisations makes such extra safeguards slightly less necessary. We do not believe that the amendment could work in practice.

Viscount Astor: We on this side of the Committee feel that three months would be far too short. It would involve excessive paperwork and excessive bureaucracy for the authority concerned.
	There may be a case for a slightly shorter period; the noble Lord, Lord McNally, might consider six months. However, in the light of what the Minister has said it is clear that it is quite a long-term matter, and to have to come back every three months would be an excessive burden.

Lord McNally: Against such an array of judgment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 134 not moved.]
	Clause 41 agreed to.
	Clause 42 [Special rules for intelligence services authorisations]:
	[Amendments Nos.135 and 136 not moved.]
	Clause 42 agreed to.
	Clause 43 [Cancellation of authorisations]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 136A:
	Page 47, line 22, at end insert ("or
	(iii) a chief constable of a police force maintained under or by virtue of section 1 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967,").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 43, as amended, agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 136B:
	After Clause 43, insert the following new clause--

RESTRICTIONS ON AUTHORISATIONS EXTENDING TO SCOTLAND

(" .--(1) No person shall grant or renew an authorisation under this Part for the carrying out of any conduct if it appears to him--
	(a) that the authorisation is not one for which this Part is the relevant statutory provision for all parts of the United Kingdom; and
	(b) that all the conduct authorised by the grant or, as the case may be, renewal of the authorisation is likely to take place in Scotland.
	(2) In relation to any authorisation, this Part is the relevant statutory provision for all parts of the United Kingdom in so far as it--
	(a) is granted or renewed on the grounds that it is necessary in the interests of national security or in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom;
	(b) is granted or renewed by or on the application of a person holding any office, rank or position with any of the public authorities specified in subsection (3);
	(c) authorises conduct of a person holding an office, rank or position with any of the public authorities so specified;
	(d) authorises conduct of an individual acting as a covert human intelligence source for the benefit of any of the public authorities so specified; or
	(e) authorises conduct that is surveillance by virtue of section 45(4).
	(3) The public authorities mentioned in subsection (2) are--
	(a) each of the intelligence services;
	(b) Her Majesty's forces;
	(c) the Ministry of Defence;
	(d) the Ministry of Defence Police;
	(e) the Commissioners of Customs and Excise; and
	(f) the British Transport Police.
	(4) For the purposes of so much of this Part as has effect in relation to any other public authority by virtue of--
	(a) the fact that it is a public authority for the time being specified in Schedule (Relevant public authorities), or
	(b) an order under subsection (1)(d) of section 39 designating that authority for the purposes of that section,
	the authorities specified in subsection (3) of this section shall be treated as including that authority to the extent that the Secretary of State by order directs that the authority is a relevant public authority or, as the case may be, is a designated authority for all parts of the United Kingdom.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 44 agreed to.
	Clause 45 [Interpretation of Part II]

Lord Bach: moved Amdt No. 137:
	Page 48, line 5, leave out ("(5)") and insert ("(5A)").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 138 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 138A:
	Page 49, line 6, leave out subsection (7).
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 45, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 46 [Notices requiring disclosure of key]:

Lord Lucas: moved amendment No. 139:
	Page 49, line 35, leave out (", or is likely to do so").

Lord Lucas: Here we come upon a clause that the Government have been kind enough to rewrite extensively and at the very last moment. I cannot pretend that I or anyone that I have talked to has had time to comprehend the details and effects of all these changes. Therefore, I intend to use my comments on this and subsequent amendments to explore what the Government have done and where we are now. It may be necessary. with the help of my colleagues on the Front Bench, to ask for a recommittal of this clause when we have had time to absorb the effect of all the changes, but for now I await advice and information from the Minister with great interest.
	This whole clause is extraordinary. It addresses a problem that the Government imagine they might find their agencies in from time to time of being unable to decrypt information. In all the years that cryptography has been available, there has been only one case in the United Kingdom in which the Government could not decrypt all the files they needed on one particular pornographer's hard disk.
	It is extraordinary that so much damage should have been done worldwide to the reputation of the United Kingdom as a place to do e-business, with anxieties and recriminations echoing round the globe from international lawyers to those who specialise in the Internet. I hope that we may reach a point with the Bill where we are able to allay some of the fears, but it will take a long time for all the damage that has been done to die away. It is extraordinary that it should be done, when there is so little need for this clause as a whole.
	Encryption is in theory perfect. One can hide anything in a way that cannot be broken. Even if the clause were enacted in the way in which it was originally written, before the Government's latest amendments, it would be possible to hide anything one wanted. Internet communications will use ephemeral keys, and there will be no way of breaking that system. Cryptography has evolved in ways which have built-in deniability. The whole way in which the clause has been written assumes that there is only one key, which will reveal one set of information out of an encrypted file. But it is very easy to create a system whereby out of an encrypted file I can produce a Shakespeare sonnet or an order for hard drugs, depending on which key I use to unlock it. There is no way in which the Government can prove that there is a second key if I produce to them a first key.
	One can hide whole file structures. One can hide the existence of files through the use of keys that go down in layers, so that the first key will reveal one file structure, but if one applied another key it would reveal hidden files below. If one uses suitable methods of hiding the files it is impossible to prove that the files even exist.
	Cryptography using one-time pads is a technique we can remember from the war years. That is in theory perfect. There are still wartime codes that have not been broken because the one-time system was used perfectly. There is now the practice, which will doubtless be used more in future, of using data havens, of storing one's data remotely. Again, as long as one takes care to encrypt and hide one's links to it there can be no way of proving that one has it.
	We are up against a system that is technically perfect, and the sort of attack envisaged by the Government will be useless against the serious and careful criminal. The sort of attack that works in practice, that has worked in all but one case to date, results from the fact that anyone doing cryptography is human, that hiding one's data in a consistent way is extremely tedious, and that people tend to take short cuts, and either as a result, or through the methods outlined in Part II--and there are plenty of them that can be used with computers--one can uncover the keys and the information needed to break people's cryptographic systems without going at it in the way envisaged in this part of the Bill.
	What really frightens people about the way in which the clauses are drafted is that because they will be pretty useless against the serious criminal they will be used only against casual traffic, and, more important, will be available for use against messages received and communicated by substantial international businesses. Anyone who uses the Internet, which is essentially an open system--there is nothing secure about it--must use a high level of cryptography and assure clients, customers and associates that his systems are secure. Anything that puts that in doubt or makes business believe that by conducting this activity in the UK it lays itself open to international law suits or merely produces a loss of confidence that data stored in the UK is not as secure as data stored in a country which is not governed by this kind of legislation, even with the latest government amendments, will result in a substantial loss of business to this country.
	I do not believe that business has had time to react to, and review, the latest amendments. We shall wait and see how it reacts to them and to today's debate. If, as I fear, the conclusion is that the Government have not gone nearly far enough, as suggested in today's Financial Times, we should either excise the clause from the Bill or insert a provision to say that it shall not come into effect until a further measure has been passed to authorise its implementation. A method must be found to ensure that the Government have those parts of the legislation that they require to comply with the Human Rights Act for the activities that they currently undertake but are denied the ability to trespass into areas where they have no present need to be, potentially at great cost to the UK's international business and its economic wellbeing, to use the famous definition. We should not imperil that for so little gain. If more time is needed to consider this matter and produce something with which everyone is content, we should provide the Government with a mechanism whereby that end can be achieved.
	The amendment excises the words "or is likely to do so". That wording occurs also in several amendments to the subsections to Clause 46 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McNally. I believe that I see what the Government intend. They want to be armed with an authorisation to demand the key if they find an encrypted file when they search someone's premises. I understand that. However, in effect the way that the provision is written means that they can demand the key to future communications that arrive in the course of the next few days. Therefore, any business that is subject to such a demand must keep its whole cryptographic system open for the investigating authorities. It must leave a gaping wound, as it were, in its security until the investigating authorities say that it can be closed. There is no way to supply the text of messages yet to come; one must supply the key. To leave in this particular phrase is very much against the spirit of what the Government say they want to achieve in tabling their new amendments unless the wording can be tightened up to cover a much shorter timescale and allow the authorities access only to files which they are about to discover in premises that they are about to raid. I beg to move.

Lord McNally: I agree with much of what the noble Lord said. I added my name to the amendment because, as presently drafted, the provision seems to be "future proofing" gone mad on the part of the Government, as the noble Lord explained in his concluding remarks.
	To save a repetitive speech, we have arrived at the crux of the Bill in terms of clearing the hurdle of business disquiet. We must all assess whether what the Government propose in Clauses 46 and 47 meets the concerns of business. I was interested in the initial reaction of one of the companies concerned, Vodafone. Its concern was that in seeking a proportionate response, to use a favourite expression of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, the provision leant too far towards the requirements of the relevant authorities and failed to take account of the needs of the businesses in question. A good deal of the debate on the clause will revolve around the question whether the powers that the Government seek are proportionate in terms of the real or imagined evils that they seek to counteract and the burdens that they place on business.
	I am not one of those who believe that the new cyberspace technology is a zone that should be outside the rule of law. I still have sufficiently strong confidence in parliamentary democracy to believe that, as a necessary protection, all parliaments should be able to construct a framework within which people conduct their activities. I am not a member of the "cyberspace tendency" which believes that this is all beyond us. Who knows? Perhaps those countries which have not yet grappled with a legislative framework for e-commerce will regret it or look at our attempts as pioneering work in the field.
	I hope that both sides will approach this matter in a constructive way. Industry, which has quite legitimately lobbied and stirred up media and political and parliamentary interests and obtained a response from the Government, should take a proper look at what this means for business. I also hope that, having emerged from its tetchy phase, the Government are now willing to listen to industry if further constructive points can be made. The context in which the noble Lord moved the amendment was extremely wise and constructive. If both sides approach this part of the Bill in that way we shall produce clauses that are acceptable to industry and provide a legislative framework for e-commerce in future.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: I entirely agree with the general points spoken to by my noble friend Lord Lucas. So far this Bill has of itself been extremely damaging to Britain's interests because of the perceived threats that it poses. Even if in the course of debates we make amendments which produce a Bill that is 100 per cent acceptable some of that damage will remain. I do not want to expand too much on that point at this stage, but I firmly believe that that is the case.
	The aim of all concerned, including the Government, should be to amend the Bill so as to minimise the damage that has already been done and the damage that will arise in future. Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that the Government have been determined that we should be pioneers in this matter. I am all for Britain being a pioneer in e-commerce, and all to which that relates--the Government say that they are in favour of that too--but I am not in favour of Britain being a pioneer in threatening e-commerce. That is what the Bill as originally drafted did; and to some extent still does.
	Keys, encryption and security are important to the Internet and every kind of e-commerce. At the most basic level, if I buy, as I have done occasionally, some item on the web and feed in my credit card number, I need absolute confidence that that number will not leak from the company selling to me over the Internet, otherwise I shall not buy from it; I shall use some other method. However, at the more elaborate levels of commercial and banking contracts, that concern is multiplied to a far greater importance. That is why the banks and commercial companies and organisations have been so sensitive about this section of the Bill.
	I am not so alarmed by the phrase "is likely to do so" as the Liberal Democrats. If we are trying to gain information about an individual who is suspected of being, for example, a money launderer, and he is the customer of a specific bank, it is not unreasonable for the authorities to say to the bank, "We believe that you have in your possession the documents relating to the transactions already carried out by the suspect. We need to see what was said in those and future documents when he has further transactions". It is that kind of case that I believe those words cover.
	The noble Lord, Lord McNally, referred to real or imagined evils to be countered by these powers. Although sometimes the suspects may prove not to have done anything wrong, I believe that there are some very real evils to be countered. That is why it is necessary to provide the correct powers which will give safeguards. Nevertheless, we need those powers.
	Because of the way in which the Bill has been prepared, this new dimension concerning the Internet, and so on, has had to be added on to the rewriting of the existing telephone tapping and surveillance provisions owing to the imminent arrival of the Human Rights Act. To disentangle them, or to put a hold on the Internet provisions until they are further refined, I believe would be desirable. Unfortunately, the powers are not in one single part of the Bill; they appear throughout. That makes it difficult to deal with them. Nevertheless, perhaps the Government could find a way to leave the Internet provisions on the shelf for only a relatively short period of months while we try to get them right. We need them, but they must be the correct provisions if we are not to destroy the British advances in e-commerce and lose the advantages that we have.

Viscount Goschen: The noble Lord's amendment serves as an excellent introduction to the part of the Bill which has caused perhaps the most controversy. The issue of encryption goes to the heart of the Bill. It sums up the concerns of the industry.
	We are not talking only about e-commerce, the new media industry, but about any international business which wants to operate, has existing operations or aims to set up business in the UK. A recurring theme has been globalisation. It is increasingly easy for companies to locate business where the environment is most conducive for them. There is no doubt that the issue of access to encryption keys causes severe worries among a number of major corporations, not only those involved in e-commerce.
	At the beginning of the Committee stage, the Minister was good enough to say that he was in listening mode. He has been as good as his word--to the extent of rewriting the Bill for your Lordships' House. It will be difficult to disentangle the new provisions in the course of the Committee stage today. Direct questions need to be answered on the Minister's new provisions. We shall wish to return to a number of elements on Report.
	As regards the amendment, it is important to emphasise the degree of concern which surrounds this area. We welcome the moves the Government have made in a constructive spirit. However, the measure will require further examination to see what needs to be done.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I start with an observation on the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen. Throughout the Bill I have sought to be constructive and to offer constructive opportunities to all to make intelligible and intelligent criticisms. We have invited in all sectors of business. To my knowledge, we have not said, "No, go away" to anyone. That approach has now been widely acknowledged. Therefore, when the Government are criticised for extensively rewriting the Bill, or for putting forward provisions at the very last moment, it is because we have been listening--as we always said we would--and there is no other time when we can make these changes. I am sure that Members of this House will recognise and understand that.

Viscount Goschen: I complimented the Minister; I did not criticise him. However, I do not extend that compliment to his colleagues in the Home Office who have direct responsibility for this legislation. This Bill should never have come to either House of Parliament in the state that it has. Now that the Bill is here, I am pleased that the Minister takes note of concerns.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am grateful for the compliment; I am prepared to live with it! I wish also to thank the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for imparting to us the knowledge that he still believes in parliamentary democracy. That was a valuable comment, was it not; otherwise why would we be here?

Lord McNally: There is a serious point. People out there are telling us that this new technology is so footloose and fancy free that it is beyond the powers of parliamentary democracies to control. I put forward the strongly held view that it is not.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I entirely understand. I have heard that argument too; it is interesting.
	However, there is one consistent and recurring theme: that in bringing forward this legislation we have done some fundamental damage to this industry. I find it hard to accept that. I believe the legislation has been brought forward for entirely the right reason; that is, to find a sensible system of regulation. In doing that, the Government must listen to intelligent and well-founded criticism. The Government have tried to do that.
	The noble Lord, Lord McNally, referred to Vodafone's off-the-cuff criticism of the Government's moves thus far in bringing forward the amendments today. If Vodafone has further specific points it wishes to put, the Government will continue to listen. The Government do not claim that they are absolutely right, although they believe that they are. Nevertheless, the Government want to ensure the best legislation; legislation that works to the better interests of industry and government, but more particularly industry because that is wealth-generating and is for the good of the country's economy.
	I turn to the amendments spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Lucas and Lord McNally. I listened to what was said about, in particular, the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and I shall work through those observations. In particular, I noted the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cope. That was a very constructive response to that particular clause.
	It is understood that the objection is the futuristic element. If that futuristic element were to be removed, the Government believe it would have a detrimental effect on the practical use of decryption power. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, asked whether the power was required at all. The Government believe that it is. The noble Lord probably believes it is required, but only in very tightly restricted circumstances. That is where the debate is and it is to be hoped that at the end the Government will have got it right.
	If the amendments were to succeed they would very much limit the effectiveness of the decryption power. The Government resisted such amendments in another place because of that concern.
	It is recognised that there is a futuristic element in Clause 46(1)(a) to (e). The concern is understood to be that that would permit what are colloquially termed "fishing expeditions" for keys, perhaps long-term keys to future information. The Government believe that there is no such effect and I shall try to clarify why. First, it is important to remember that the decryption power may be authorised only in respect of particular protective material which has been or is likely shortly to be lawfully obtained, so it is very closely defined.
	The Bill does not permit the power to be used solely for speculative fishing for keys. The Government believe Clause 46(1)(a) to (e) is needed for cases where there are reasonable grounds for anticipating that, for example, a suspected criminal is using encryption to protect material, and reasonable grounds for believing that the location of the relevant key to that material is known. In such instances, the futuristic element allows an agency to apply for the power to serve a Clause 46 decryption notice at the same time as an application is made to use the underlying power to lawfully obtain the material in question.
	Perhaps I may give an example. It is entirely conceivable that there will be cases where the police have very reasonable grounds for believing that an individual is using encryption; for example, a suspect in a criminal investigation. The police could apply to the court for a warrant to search his premises. Therefore, the Government believe it right that the police should be able to apply for authority to serve a decryption notice at the same time as they apply for a search warrant. Clause 46(1)(a) allows that.
	Similar considerations apply in other instances as set out in Clause 46(1) where use of the decryption power may be authorised. It is conceivable that there could be reasonable grounds for anticipating that encryption will be encountered in all the circumstances where the Bill permits decryption power to be used. That is why the futuristic element is included in Clause 46(1)(a) to (e).The proposed amendments would mean that an application to the relevant authority, be it a judge or the Secretary of State, for the power to serve a decryption notice could be made only after the encrypted material had actually been obtained under the warrant. Clearly, that could lead to critically damaging delays in what might be a very fast moving investigation. It is not believed that that is the intention in promoting these amendments, but that would, nevertheless, be their effect. The Government would therefore argue that for those reasons the futuristic element is necessary. Members of the Committee who proposed the amendments are invited to take careful consideration of the impact of removing that part of the Bill.
	The Government do not say that the Bill permits fishing expeditions. That is not our intention. I want that to be clearly understood and on public record. The Government have carefully explained this to industry, not least the Institute of Directors, which quite rightly and understandably raised the query. It is hoped that with that explanation Members of the Committee who brought forward the amendments will feel able to withdraw them.

Lord Lucas: The noble Lord, of course, makes a very good point with which I entirely agree. I hope I said that in my opening speech. But where the police are about to raid someone's premises, or an equivalent venture is about to be undertaken, it is very sensible that the police should take a Section 46 warrant with them so that they can pick up the key at the same time they pick up the information. If these subsections were directed at that, it is not believed that they would cause any difficulty.
	What causes difficulty is what the wording would allow; for instance, that part of the Bill relating to the interception of communications and the application for a warrant in advance of the communications. A person may go to a bank and say, "This person may be sending messages to you using your public key, and we therefore need to have your private key to decrypt them. We expect the messages to come in over the next couple of weeks, so you must keep your public key the same". That would be an extremely damaging position for a bank. That is what industry and I--and, I hope, the Government--would, on contemplation, find unacceptable. It is limiting the scope and timescale of the measure. It would allow exactly what the noble Lord first described, but it would not put industry in a position where its security system could be opened up and kept open. That is very much the import behind my argument. I do not believe that that question has been answered, and unless the Minister has any further comments to make we shall return to the matter at a later stage of the Bill. Unless anyone else wishes to intervene, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord McNally: had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 139WA:
	Page 49, line 38, leave out (", or is likely to do so").

Lord McNally: Our concern remain the long-term key which is the open door and the one which undermines confidence both in business and in civil liberties. It is believed that we shall return to the matter, and therefore I shall not move my amendment.

[Amendment No. 139WA not moved.]
	[Amendments Nos. 139XA to 139ZA not moved.]

The Earl of Northesk: moved Amendment No. 139A:
	Page 50, line 5, at end insert--
	("( ) If any person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 1 believes on reasonable grounds--
	(a) that any person is able to put the protected information into an intelligible form,
	(b) that the imposition of a requirement to disclose the information in intelligible form, or to disclose the key to the protected information, is--
	(i) necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3), or
	(ii) likely to be of value for purposes connected with the exercise or performance by any public authority of any statutory power or statutory duty,
	(c) that the imposition of such a requirement is proportionate, taking into account the full consequences of its disclosure, to what is sought to be achieved by its imposition,
	(d) that the information in intelligible form, or the key, cannot reasonably be obtained by the person with the appropriate permission without the giving of a notice under this section,
	the person with that permission may, by notice to the person whom he believes to be able to put the protected information into an intelligible form, require the disclosure of that information in an intelligible form, or, in the circumstances provided for in section 47, the disclosure of the key.").

The Earl of Northesk: At the outset, without a hint of criticism, I express both gratitude for and appreciation of the amendments the Government have tabled to this part of the Bill. They go some way towards meeting the concerns which have prompted me to table my own amendments in this group. My own view has always been that if we must have key disclosure, the correct methodology to apply is one where efforts to obtain plain text are properly exhausted before keys are sought.
	Here I echo the complaint of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and promote the thought that recommitment of that part of the Bill should be actively and seriously considered. There has not been time fully to consider these amendments. The revised versions of the relevant clauses were received at approximately six o'clock this evening. I retain a host of reservations, but it may be that the Minister's explanations will ameliorate those.
	Therefore, rather than launch into an exposition of my amendment, it seems to me that the most helpful and useful service I can offer the Committee is to invite the Minister to explain those of the Government. Realistically, they are the substantive business in the grouping. I cannot help feeling that that would make for a tidier debate and I trust that it meets with the approval of the Committee. I beg to move.

Lord Hylton: When the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, moved an earlier amendment, he went so far as to say that he thought the clause would be useless against serious crime. I apologise if I have overstated his remarks; I hope that I have not.
	It would be helpful if the Government could say whether they agree or disagree with that position. If they disagree, can they say why?

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I thank the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, for his tactful intervention and helpful observations. I shall move through an analysis of our amendments and comment on all the Opposition amendments.
	The group of amendments covers a big question: when should the authorities be permitted to require that a decryption key be disclosed rather than simply the plain text of protected material? The associated issue is whether a party in receipt of a notice should be able to choose which key to disclose, if there is more than one which can carry out the necessary decryption. That is an important, but nevertheless secondary, question.
	I recognise that this is a crucial issue, especially for industry. We have received a number of representations on the issue from the British Chambers of Commerce and the Institute of Directors. We have tried to allay their concerns by explaining just what the Bill actually states and what it seeks to achieve. We have also received helpful correspondence not least from the British Bankers' Association setting out its understanding of the way in which Part III of the Bill works. In the light of those representations, we have decided to recast these provisions. I fully accept that Members of the Committee will have to retreat and take time to study them in order to understand their impact more precisely.
	In recognition of the views of industry, we made wide changes to Clause 47 in another place to add an extra test if keys are to be required. That was welcomed and Members of the Committee have proposed further changes. We have suggested our own amendments, which take account of the views of industry and cover the majority of points raised by the Committee.
	Before addressing these changes, I should clarify one existing point on the keys versus plain text issue. In the Bill as drafted, there is already an extra test if keys are to be demanded. Imposing a direction that a key be disclosed is limited by Clause 47(4) to occasions where it is believed that there are "special" circumstances of the case making that necessary; and that imposing such a requirement is believed to be proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by so doing. I hope that that is clear: plain text first; extra test if keys are required. That is the important message which we must get over. If a key is required, the choice of which key to disclose, if there is more than one, rests with the recipient of the notice. The definition of "key" in Clause 52(1) applies. It could be a session key, a short-term key or a long-term key. The choice rests with the recipient of the notice and that is the important qualification which must be widely understood.
	That is the position now. But, as I have said, parts of industry have voiced some concerns and asked whether we could find a way of giving greater prominence in the Bill to the disclosure of plain text and clarifying the issue over the choice of keys. Your Lordships' amendments in this group address those very points. We have listened to the genuine views we have received and have sought to rework Clauses 46 and 47 ourselves. The government amendments before the Committee are the result of that reworking.
	The amendments we have tabled in the group seek to recast Part III in terms of our preference for plain text rather than keys; and to leave it up to the recipient of a notice to decide how to comply with a disclosure requirement. It is on trust.
	We believe that the changes will be welcomed. We were certainly told by industry that such amendments would offer reassurance. Amendment No. 139D begins by recasting Clause 46 as a,
	"disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information".
	The existing necessary and proportionate tests for the use of the power remain with the reasonableness test amended to reflect the new structure, to which Amendment No. 141B refers.
	Amendments Nos. 114A, 114D, 114F and 153B follow suit by making reference to "disclosures" rather than to "keys". Amendment No. 158B inserts a new clause which, again, represents a restructuring to underline the preference for plain text. The remaining government amendments in the group--namely, Nos. 159C, 161A, 171A, 183A to 183C, 195B and 225A--are consequential changes arising out of the recasting of Clause 46.
	The point is that we have listened to industry's concerns and recast Clause 46 to provide reassurance. Disclosing the plain text of material will normally suffice and it is up to the recipient of a notice to decide how to discharge the disclosure requirement. The issue is disclosure, not key.
	I believe that our amendments sweep up the majority of the concerns expressed by Members of the Committee, but a couple are left. These, too, cover some important points and provide me with an opportunity to clarify the Government's thinking.
	As I see it, these remaining amendments are, first, Amendment No. 158C, which would mean that a requirement to disclose a key could be given only by a Secretary of State or judge where there are exceptional circumstances to the case. Amendment No. 164A would do something similar by replacing the existing Clause 47 and would impose further restrictions on the circumstances when a key--as opposed to the plain text--may be demanded. Amendment No. 163 seeks to widen the considerations which must be taken into account in deciding whether it is proportionate to demand a key.
	Let me take those in turn. Amendments Nos. 158C and 164 would both place further restrictions on the circumstances when a requirement to disclose a key might be imposed. I believe that both would prove too restrictive in practice. Both set the test that there must be "exceptional" circumstances to a particular case.
	As we indicated in another place, we gave very considerable thought to putting in such a test ourselves, but we concluded that in practice that might prove to be too restrictive, with the potential to undermine the effectiveness of the power.
	That matter was debated at the Report stage in another place, but perhaps I may explain it again. In the case of decryption requests made to legitimate businesses, a requirement to disclose a key, where the plain text is available, would certainly, it seems to me, be most unusual. The difficulty for the law enforcement agencies surrounds the use of the power against those suspected of involvement in criminality. In these cases--where there may be doubt about the bona fides of the person being served with a notice--requests for keys may perhaps be more frequent. The future is uncertain and we cannot know how often this might arise. But Clause 47(4), as drafted, limits the power to demand a key; and the case must be a special one. We believe that that is the most appropriate test.
	The limbs at paragraphs (b) and (c) and the timing point at subsection (2) of Amendment No. 164 are exactly the kind of considerations that will need to be gone through with the existing Clause 47. However, we believe that the cumulative effect of the way that the amendment works is too restrictive.
	In resisting the amendments, it may be helpful if I clarify again our thinking on keys. We have narrowed down on the face of the Bill the circumstances in which a key can be required to be disclosed. We have imposed an extra test and that has been welcomed. Members of the Committee may ask legitimately what kind of case we might consider to be special.
	As I indicated elsewhere, we shall cover that issue in the code of practice, which should be available before Report. However, I believe that it may be useful if I offer some illustrative examples. First, trust, to which I have referred already, becomes an issue when there is doubt about the bona fides of the person or body being asked to provide the plain text. In a criminal investigation, for example, law enforcement agencies will need to be sure that the plain text of protected material is the correct text, otherwise doubts could easily be cast in court during a future prosecution on the veracity of the information.
	The second example relates to timeliness. In some surveillance operations which involve interception, for example, it may be imperative for the ongoing decryption of protected material to take place in real time, or as close to that as possible. Potentially, delays could be life-threatening, and I am sure that we can imagine circumstances in which that may be the case. If whoever has the key to protected material cannot carry out the decryption quickly enough in time-critical operations, but the authorities can, it may be considered necessary to ask for a key. I believe that that example is clear.
	I should stress that in certain cases there may be technical solutions to these problems; for example, where they affect the timeliness issue. However, the fact is that in some cases solutions--technical or otherwise--may not be available. Therefore, the Bill needs to have the flexibility to allow for keys to be requested, but only where special circumstances make that necessary and where it is proportionate to the aim of imposing such a requirement. I believe that that is an important balancing point.
	Therefore, as are other parts of the Bill, Clause 47 is a reflection of the delicate balancing exercise that we are trying to effect in this area. I believe that in many ways we are trying to deal with a future danger. It is difficult, but we believe it to be entirely right that we do so. I would also argue that no responsible government could or should seek to do otherwise. I believe that it would be foolish of government to ignore that.
	We made changes to Clause 47 in another place because we are seeking genuinely to strike the right balance between providing effective powers and allaying industry and civil liberties reservations about the Bill. I believe that the current tests for requiring the disclosure of a key strike the right balance and that these amendments would tip that balance in the wrong direction.
	I believe that I may not have addressed fully Amendment No. 163 in my comments on the government changes. That amendment seeks to spell out one of the considerations which must be taken into account in deciding whether it is proportionate to demand a key. I understand the concerns of noble Lords but believe the amendment to be entirely unnecessary. The considerations that they seek are implicit in the proportionality test which is already in the Bill in Clause 47(4)(b). Why are keys needed? They are needed in order to put particular protected data into intelligible form; that is, to turn particular encrypted text into plain text. That is, after all, the whole purpose of the power.
	However, in deciding whether to require that a key be disclosed in a particular case, the person who authorises the power will need to address the question of proportionality in its widest sense. That includes considering what kind of key it is, what other information it gives access to, its commercial value and so on. We would be reluctant to accept the amendment lest it implies that other equally important considerations are somehow not relevant. However, I believe that there is nothing much between us on this issue. We must all remember that Clause 47 imposes an extra proportionality test; one is contained earlier in Clause 46(2)(c).
	Importantly, the safeguards provisions set out in Clause 52 also have an impact here. Clause 51(2) requires measures to be in place to restrict the uses to which keys may be put. Where keys are obtained, the authority concerned will not be permitted immediately to decrypt all manner of other communications or data belonging to the individual or organisation which provides the key. It would be unlawful for it to do so. As set out in Clause 46, there must be separate lawful authority to obtain the protected material in the first place.
	Perhaps I may suggest that we now consider the new situation. At present, if the police request electronic data from a bank, they will, for example, apply for an order under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and serve it on the bank concerned. In return, the bank discloses the data together with a statement attesting to its bona fides. The police do not insist on accessing the bank's computers in order to discover whether they are telling the truth. They rely on the bank's integrity and, where necessary, use them as witnesses. We envisage a similar scenario with regard to encrypted material. The exception to that might be where a bank itself was suspected of involvement in criminality.
	We have tabled amendments in order to meet industry concerns. I hope that they are welcome. If particular issues remain, we shall of course be happy to examine them to see whether we can offer further reassurance and remain consistent with our overall aims. In the meantime, I beg to move the government amendment in this group and, in the light of what I have said, ask Members of the Committee to withdraw their amendments.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: As others have said, and as the Minister acknowledged, this important set of government amendments was tabled at the last minute. I should add at once that I believe it to be helpful to the Committee that the amendments were tabled. I do not criticise the noble Lord for deciding to do so at the last minute. At least we know the direction in which the Government's mind is moving, and, in fact, they have moved quite firmly in that direction. At the same time, I am sure the Minister will appreciate that it has made it difficult not only for the Committee but for others outside--to some extent, even more so for others outside--to read through the detail of the Government's amendment and to assess exactly what they are doing and whether it is sufficient.
	I should like to put on record that we have been much helped--at least, I have been much helped--by the ever-helpful Foundation for Information Policy Research, which earlier today put on the web a copy of how these clauses will appear if all the Government's amendments are agreed to. That makes for much easier reading than going backwards and forwards between the amendments. Not for the first time, the foundation has been of great help to us in assessing the way in which the clauses will affect the situation.
	The series of amendments tabled in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, attempt to achieve something similar to that intended by the Government; that is, to put plain text in the front line and to allow applications for a key only when absolutely necessary. I accept at once that Clause 47, as it now is, contains the reservations to which the Minister referred. There is a difference in the wording and the Minister drew attention to that. Basically, the Government's wording continues to say that there need to be "special" circumstances, whereas we say that such circumstances should be "exceptional". That is a distinction, but I do not consider it to be as large a distinction as in some cases one might be led to believe.
	However, a point on which I should like to be clear--I must admit that I am not clear about it at present--is ultimately who authorises the attempt to obtain the key as opposed to the plain text in a particular situation. As far as I can see, the person giving the notice does not have permission to insist on the key. Only the judge or the Secretary of State can order that the requirement can be complied with only by the disclosure of the key. That is the effect of the government amendments and those that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, and I have tabled. Given the drafting of Clause 47, the Government clearly agree on the importance of placing the production of keys in a significantly different framework from the production of plain text.
	There are some other detailed points relating to the amendments, but I have dealt with the most important issue. If the Minister could give us an assurance along the lines that I have asked for, it would help us to accept the clause. He may say that it is obvious from the clause as written, but it is not obvious to me.

Lord McNally: I shall not go into great detail. From what the Minister has said, I think that we are close to an agreement, but we shall read Hansard and take wider advice.
	We seem to be putting the plain text at the forefront. We have been at pains to make sure that the acquisition of the key must not become a useful end in itself, because that would result in an open door, which has caused a great deal of concern. The Minister has reassured us and, as the noble Lord, Lord Cope, eloquently explained, that was the intention of our amendments.

Lord Blackwell: Like other noble Lords, I listened to the Minister with great interest and appreciated his argument, but despite the welcome movement on plain text, there are still a large number of issues, both of principle and of practicality, on which I am not fully satisfied. The issues of principle are the broadest ones. Although it may seem reasonable to the man sitting in Whitehall for the Government to have certain powers for use in exceptional circumstances, that fails to take into account the perceptions of people outside and their fears about how those powers may be used. That goes to the heart of whether these clauses are appropriate.
	Leaving that to one side, there are other significant issues of practicality that have not been addressed, particularly on clause 46. They go back to some of the points that my noble friend Lord Lucas made. The word "key" is widely used in the Bill, and the amendments, as though we were talking about a key that could unlock something simply, like a door to a room. However, developing technology means that, in many cases, keys will not exist in that form. As I understand it, the dynamic generation of new keys may be ephemeral and it may not be possible after the event for somebody to say what the key was, because it was simply generated, used and destroyed.
	There are some practical issues that I do not yet understand. Do the Government believe that it is technically feasible after the event to ask people to give them information that will enable them to go back and decode messages that have been encoded and transmitted using such ephemeral keys? I am not sure that it is possible. If the Government think that it is, we need to understand why, and how it can be achieved. If it is not technically feasible, the whole apparatus will fall flat on its face, because everyone will move to those forms of encryption that cannot be caught under the powers in the Bill. Only the honest and the simple will be constrained.
	Even if it is technically feasible in a way that I do not understand, I am still not sure whether the language used in the Bill creates the powers to do whatever is necessary to understand enough about the systems that generate keys to give the Government the legal entitlement to find out how to decrypt messages. Whether the legal language in the drafting is right depends on the answer to the first question and whether there are technical solutions that will deal with ephemeral keys in particular.
	I do not necessarily expect an instant response, but before we conclude, we need to understand whether the Government have answers to the difficult questions on the principles and practicalities of the clauses. If not, there is a danger that the legislation will be merely tilting at windmills and none of the aims of the Bill will be achievable as technology moves on.

Lord Lucas: I very much support what my noble friend Lord Cope has said. The important issue is the level of authorisation needed to obtain a key. If the authorisation has to come from a senior judge, people will take some comfort from the fact that it will happen only in exceptional circumstances. However, it might be that only the authorisation of an official is needed. How will the system work? Clause 46(1) allows the prospective key to be obtained in a wide variety of circumstances. Some information can be obtained only by having the key. If keys are going to be asked for frequently, it will be a tedious process if authorisation has to come from a senior level. To an extent, Clause 46(1) and the amendments rub against each other.
	The Government also need to address the issue of self-incrimination. If someone knows that the data that they have encrypted will incriminate them, how can they be made to reveal the key?

Viscount Goschen: I welcome the thrust of the government amendments. Will the Minister tell us a little more about the special circumstances under which keys will be required?
	Putting plain text to the fore is a move forward. I am trying to test how much the Government believe their own arguments. If there is a circumstance in which an agency of government has to resort to law to compel a company to give its information, is it likely then to believe the plain text which is provided? It is rather like asking someone to search his own house and then tell the police what he found when they arrived. In what sort of circumstances does the Minister envisage that plain text would suffice? One can imagine a number of such circumstances; for example, where a trusted organisation was asked to reveal information, perhaps, about an employee who was considered to be suspect.
	But does the Minister feel that that would be the case in the vast majority of circumstances? Whether or not this will work, as my noble friend Lord Blackwell, said, will the circumstances be so very special or will the Government use the excuse, as it were, that the plain text is just not good enough once the Bill is safely tucked away on the statute book?

The Earl of Liverpool: I, too, express my gratitude to the Minister for the amendments that he has tabled, which may go some way towards allaying my fears.
	I shall refer to my Amendment No. 163, which is buried in this enormous group of 34 amendments. Where the surrender of keys is being demanded, it is essential that such demands should be subject to the appropriate tests of both reasonableness and--I use a favourite word of the Minister--proportionality. I am afraid that I did not have the advantage of seeing the government amendments at six o'clock last night. I saw them only this afternoon at about three o'clock. To what extent does he believe that his amendments have answered the concerns raised in my Amendment No. 163?

The Earl of Northesk: Like other Members of the Committee, I thank the Minister for his full explanation. However, I hope that the Minister will forgive me if I take up a few points.
	I should say for the record that I acknowledge the benefit to be derived from the primary purpose of this part of the Bill. It is self-evident that, where criminal elements avail themselves of the use of the protection of encrypted electronic messages, there are strong arguments in favour of law-enforcement agencies having adequate and appropriate powers to access such protected information. I emphasise my use of the phrase "adequate and appropriate powers". Like many others, I remain unconvinced that the way forward is for the UK Government to take what I perceive to be unilateral action in this area. My personal belief has always been, and continues to be, that that would be better delivered by means of international agreement.
	The reasons are manifest. While my noble friend Lord Lucas has already elucidated them most eloquently, they bear repetition. First, the criminal fraternity will, in any event, develop ways round key disclosure. For example, with the free availability of steganography programmes from down-load sites, it would seem that the Internet community, let alone criminal elements, have already discounted that part of the Bill.
	Secondly, there are legitimate concerns that the imposition of that regulatory regime will act adversely upon the UK's ability to compete effectively in both the e-commerce and financial services industries, the more so given that those are such hugely mobile industries.
	Thirdly, the more logical and effective recourse for law enforcement agencies in this area is through such means as forensic hacking. There must be a risk that that investigatory avenue could begin to play second fiddle to key disclosure. That would be extremely regrettable.
	I have a few general questions. First, do the Government have a finger on the pulse of what percentage of encrypted traffic is derived from criminality? While I acknowledge that that is difficult to quantify, I have yet to see any figures which enable us to assess the scale and seriousness of the problem. Given the huge popularity of the Internet, logic leans me towards me the supposition that its use by criminal elements is, in reality, quite a small percentage of overall traffic.
	The important point is that without that knowledge, it is all but impossible to assess--I use that word again--the proportionality of the Government's proposals.
	Following on from that, it would be extremely helpful if the Minister could afford the Committee some insights into how other countries are facing up to that problem. In other words, how do the Government's proposals compare with practice, either existing or proposed, elsewhere in terms of scale and degree? Do other countries, particularly our competitors, have, or are they taking, powers to require key disclosure in whatever form? In the event that they are, how do their safeguards compare with the regime proposed in the Government's amendments. Needless to say, that is of paramount importance in assessing the sort of impact which the Bill may have on our competitive position.
	I turn from the general to the specific. The Minister proposes a number of amendments which substitute the phrase,
	"requirement to disclose the key",
	with,
	"disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information".
	That is all good and well. That is an essential part of the recast of the clauses. I simply ask the Minister why, in the circumstances, and for the sake of consistency, it is not possible to use the formulation,
	"disclosure of protected information in an intelligible form".
	In other words, I should be grateful if the Minister will explain the distinctions between the two phrases.
	At the risk of stating the obvious, there is a very significant and important practical point at issue here. One almost tires of saying it, but the single biggest obstacle to the take-up of e-commerce is that of trust in its confidentiality and security as a medium of communication and exchange. It must be said that a regulatory regime which conveys the perception that such matters are being compromised is, by definition, antipathetic to the Government's aspiration to make the UK the best and safest place for e-commerce in the world.
	To be fair, the Government have said consistently that it was and is their intention that only in exceptional circumstances will Clause 46 notices require the surrender of keys. But that is not the way in which the Bill was originally drafted, nor, on my reading, do the amendments spoken to by the Minister entirely resolve the issue. However inexpertly, my amendments in the group, Amendments Nos. 139A and 164A, sought to achieve the same objective.
	I have but one more point of concern which is relevant in this regard and I hope that the Minister will assist me with it. I am uncertain how the new cast of the relevant clauses will interact with other legislation, both here and overseas. In particular, are the Government entirely satisfied that in instances where the surrender of a key is required, there is no likelihood that inadvertent breaches of contractual or legal obligations for confidentiality will occur? It may well be that I am worrying unnecessarily on the point but some clarification from the Minister would help.
	Finally, like my noble friend Lord Lucas, I subscribe to the view that, in the circumstances, the best solution available is to withdraw the whole issue of key disclosure from the Bill. With the best of imaginations, it is very difficult to formulate the sort of amendments required to unravel the harm which those proposals may cause to UK plcs.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am grateful to all Members of the Committee who have contributed to the debate. I am grateful also to all those who have made positive contributions, and most of the contributions were positive. I shall try to answer as many of the questions as I can, although I must study in some detail the questions of the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, and reflect on them because they were rather more complicated.
	We can provide him with an extensive description as regards international comparisons but it may be that that is best done through correspondence.
	The noble Lord, Lord Cope, asked who authorises the acquisition of the key in those circumstances. It is the Secretary of State, a circuit judge or magistrate or a police superintendent or equivalent in the Customs and Excise and Armed Forces. I believe that that answers that important point.
	Quite rightly, the noble Lord, Lord Cope, was delighted, as we were, that Members of the Committee have been furnished so quickly with a revised version of the Bill. That was a helpful initiative. We also hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cope, and other Members of the Committee have similarly found helpful the document that we sent out to describe exactly how we see our revisions working. We shall continue to perform in that way because it is right that we put as much in the public domain by way of explanation, context and understanding as we can.
	While no government likes criticism, it is essential. If it stimulates important debate and enables us to focus on hard issues, it does a great service. In this exercise it has been extremely helpful.
	The noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, made comments that related to the point of principle and to matters of practicality. As I understand his comments, they seem very helpful. I hope that the way in which we have proceeded will be of help to him. When he reads Hansard I believe that he will see that we have tried to address points of principle and points of practical implementation.
	The concept of "key" is defined in Clause 52 and it bears some close reading. If there is no key to encrypted data, clearly the powers cannot be exercised. The whole point about encrypted data is that someone somewhere will have the key to that data. That is plain.
	It may be useful if I refer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, in relation to self-incrimination. The Article 6 point can arise only in the context of criminal proceedings brought against a person who has been required to disclose a key and where the data that that key unlocks are used by the prosecution in any proceedings against that person. Clearly, that will not arise in many cases--for example, where encryption requests are made to third parties, communication service providers, and not to the accused. We believe that our proposals are ECHR compatible, even when the holder of protected data is required to disclose the key. Of course, the key itself is not self-incriminatory.
	In our view, the correct analysis is that a key has an existence independent of the will of the subject. We believe that that was explicitly approved by the European Court in the leading case of Saunders v. United Kingdom in 1996. The court found that the right against self-incrimination does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material that may be obtained from the accused for the use of compulsory powers, but which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect; for example, documents recovered under a warrant. I hope that that clarifies the issue for the noble Lord.
	The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, asked about the circumstances. I believe it would be circumstances in extremis. He also asked whether plain text would be involved in the majority of cases. I believe that plain text will suffice in most cases. That is our clear intention, and that is why we have been more than happy to rewrite this in the way that we have.
	The noble Earl, Lord Liverpool, said that he thought that our amendments had not addressed his concerns. The simple answer is that we already believe that the Bill, as drafted, effectively addresses them, but we are more than happy to consider further the point that he has made. After giving it further consideration, we may bring forward an amendment on Report that puts the matter beyond doubt. We are happy to look again at the issue he has raised.
	I felt that the argument of the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, was based on pessimism. From what he said, it seemed that the imaginative criminal mind will always be so far ahead of us that it would be self-defeating to attempt the art of enforcement and the recovery of information. I do not believe that he thinks that is the case in his heart of hearts, but that was how it sounded.

The Earl of Northesk: I actually said the opposite. I said that in pure terms, so far as encrypted data are concerned, the resources available to law enforcement agencies in terms of forensic hacking and so on, are better arms at their disposal than something that is so patently easy for the criminal to get round by being on the face of the statute.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am prepared to take the argument at face value. I do not believe that the noble Earl has entirely disabused me of his intention. From what he has said, it seems that he believes that we should not be legislating in this area at all and that we should approach the matter from a completely different angle. That is an argument that rests on pessimism.
	I said that I would respond in detail because the questions were detailed. I hope that I have answered as much as I can in what has been a useful debate. On that basis, I shall move our amendments. I hope that noble Lords will withdraw their amendments in favour of the government amendments, which try to answer the points raised in the various amendments tabled for this debate.

Lord Lucas: Perhaps I may return to a couple of matters. As the noble Lord said, the paragraphs of Clause 46(1) cover the situation whenever the police or the Customs and Excise are on a raid. It is inconceivable that under those circumstances the warrant will not ask for the key. In those circumstances the key will be needed; you will not trust the people concerned to do the decryption for you. Although the Government say that only exceptionally in the current set-up will keys be asked for, I believe that they will be asked for every time there is a raid. There must be tens of thousands of raids a year. Anyone raiding premises for computer equipment will go equipped with a warrant saying, "We want the key". Unless we have clear comfort by way of letter, I believe that we shall have to be firm on this matter on Report.
	To throw another stone into the pool of self-incrimination, I keep my passwords in my head; they are not written down anywhere. Presumably, under those circumstances, I could not be asked to reveal them.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: I am still slightly uncertain as to exactly who can authorise a key as opposed to plain text. The Minister said that authorisation could be given by the Secretary of State, by a circuit judge, by a magistrate, or by a police superintendent or equivalent person in other areas. I am not sure how the police superintendent comes in at this stage. Reading the Bill--perhaps I read it wrongly--it seems that the warrant from the Secretary of State, the judge or the magistrate giving permission would, in various cases, need to state that a key had to be disclosed or was required so that the police superintendent or equivalent person could put that into the notice. If the warrant did not state that, the police superintendent or other person would not have the necessary permission. Perhaps I am wrong, but it seems to me that one should say so--although I entirely accept the point made by my noble friend Lord Lucas that, if I am right, warrants habitually will state that. The definition of "special circumstances", or the use of the phrase "special circumstances", will deteriorate over a short period of time until it means practically any circumstances in which a warrant is served.
	It is important to understand, if we can, what the line of defence is as between plain text and key. Is it the Secretary of State, judge or magistrate issuing a warrant or the officials of the law enforcement agency, the police superintendent or above, who are giving the additional permission for the key to be obtained?

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I believe the comfort the noble Lord is after is in Schedule 1, which follows on from Clause 46(7). That sets out the various levels at paragraph (6). If the noble Lord is not satisfied with the explanation I gave earlier, then I shall be more than happy to come back and provide him with some extra comfort, as we shall through all stages of this legislation. I trust that that answers his point.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: The Minister is very kind to look after my comfort. But the specific part about which I am concerned is Schedule 1, paragraph (4). That seems to widen the permission but is so obscurely phrased that it is difficult to be certain exactly what the effect will be in practice, at least as far as I and others with whom I have discussed this matter can see. In my view, it may well need amendment to ensure that the additional permission required to go for the key as opposed to plain text should be given by, at the very least, a magistrate in the course of giving permission for the operation to take place.
	I can see that I shall not get much further with this matter this evening. We may have to return to this at a later stage.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am happy to consider the point the noble Lord makes, but I say that without commitment.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: I am grateful for that.

The Earl of Northesk: As the Minister said, we have had a useful debate, even if it turns out to be only a first trot round the course. I would of course like to be able to say that I am entirely satisfied with the outcome. But I hope the Minister will recognise why it is that I and other Members of the Committee persist in having residual concerns on this matter.
	I thank the Minister for his assurance that he will write to me on a number of issues. Perhaps I may suggest that it would be helpful if he could copy that correspondence to others who have contributed to the debate.
	There is absolutely no doubt that we will return to this issue again. It simply falls to me at this juncture to bang the drum yet again for recommitment. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bach: I beg to move that the House be now resumed. In moving this Motion, I suggest that the Committee stage begin again not before 8.53 p.m.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
	House resumed.

Vaccine Damage

Lord Ashley of Stoke: rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will improve the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme.
	My Lords, the story of vaccine-damaged children and the campaign to secure justice for them is one of high hopes, disaster, sadness, anger, bitterness, frustration and despair.
	No government, until now, has a proud record on this issue, but the record of the Labour Government is far more enlightened than that of Tory governments. Only government can give the story a happy ending and I am glad to say that, after yesterday's announcement, this Government are moving in that direction. But it will only be a happy ending of sorts because no government can restore the health of someone severely brain damaged, who suffers lifelong convulsions and who has neither talked nor learnt anything since she was vaccinated as a happy, healthy child some 40 years ago. Those are the facts.
	Not only was that child's health and happiness shattered, so were the high hopes of her parents. And I pay warm tribute to her mother, Rosemary Fox, who established the Association of Parents of Vaccine Damaged Children in 1973 and with whom I campaigned for many years. Only she, myself and my wife Pauline, who worked with me, know how appallingly tough the going was in the early 1970s. The only other person involved was Kay Andrews--now the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews--from the House of Commons Library, who did a tremendous amount of work supporting us.
	In those days we met with prejudice, ignorance and generally a contemptuous dismissal of our claims. The £10,000 payment in 1978 came about only as a result of an imaginative and generous intervention by the then Prime Minister, James Callaghan. Today, the atmosphere is much more favourable, with many people well informed.
	I have always expressed my support for the immunisation programme and I am glad that the great benefits of vaccination are now accepted almost without dissent. So is the need to establish herd immunity. But it is also clear beyond all doubt that there is a small risk--probably a very small risk--with vaccination. If the Government impose pressure on parents to vaccinate their children so that society can be protected, as they do through the GP incentive scheme, they must also accept their moral duty to support the affected children and parents, as they are now doing.
	Arguments over how and to what extent the Government should provide support have raged for some 20 years. I congratulate the Daily Express on its recent forceful campaign. In its day, the £10,000 payment scheme was hailed a triumph, though only because we campaigners saw that as a prelude to the introduction of the Pearson Royal Commission strict liability scheme. As the years passed and no such scheme emerged, the parents became more and more embittered and MPs have been vociferous in their support in recent years. I pay tribute to the splendid work of Ian Stewart and his all-party group.
	Ministers have just published the results of the Government's review of the payment scheme. I congratulate Alistair Darling on this major step forward and Hugh Bailey, who did so much of the work. I am sure that the whole House knows of the unswerving support given to vaccine-damaged children by my noble friend Lady Hollis.
	I cannot speak for the parents and I suspect that those who asked for £1 million each will not be content. But I warmly welcome the proposals. They are a comprehensive and much needed improvement on the current payment scheme.
	The amount of £100,000 will not provide a lifetime's care. But it is a worthwhile amount. It will ease the burden and help parents, especially over those initial awful years when they begin to realise what lies ahead. It is a welcome lifeline, more than doubling the existing amount. I welcome also the Government's decision to help those children--many of whom are now adults--who were damaged in previous years. All too often the natural distaste for retrospective legislation is a barrier to justice. It certainly was when Service people were allowed to claim for negligence, but not retrospectively--the famous Section 10 debate in the House of Commons. This Government have avoided that with vaccine damage and I am pleased that parents who have already received a payment will get it topped up so that all receive equal benefit.
	The existing Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme has been criticised for two reasons--first, because the payment level has been inadequate and, secondly, because of the high barriers around it. In some years, only one claimant in 10 received an award. That was a deplorable situation and one which requires a ministerial explanation. I hope that my noble friend can help us on that issue.
	The reduction of the 80 per cent disability level to 60 per cent is an excellent step forward. I am delighted that the Government have been wise enough also to apply this change retrospectively. But I want to ask my noble friend: how many more children will become eligible? If she does not know the facts, perhaps she can estimate the number. I ask that question because some press reports say that only a few will benefit. The House would like to know the truth.
	The increased time for claiming is also helpful; but it is not good enough. Some children were damaged 30 or 40 years ago and, for good reasons, parents did not claim within the existing six-year time limit. They will lose out. There should be no time limit at all; indeed, there is no logic, no reason and no rational basis for it. I hope that my noble friend will be able to help me on that.
	These advances by the Government raise two further issues. The first is to ensure that all families receive the full award and that none of them loses out through means testing either by the Benefits Agency or, as is more likely, by local authorities. Many of the affected children are now adults and live in local authority homes. Of course, the number will grow as their parents die. Will my noble friend ensure that the money from the £100,000 payment will be disregarded for means-testing purposes? I regard this as a point of cardinal importance because it would be quite wrong to make this a swings and roundabouts issue.
	Secondly, where do we go from here? The issue of proper compensation, as recommended by the Pearson Royal Commission in l978, remains unresolved. Pearson recommended that the Government should be strictly liable in tort for damage caused by state promoted vaccination; and that full compensation should be awarded by the court on proof of causation, without the need to prove negligence. I believe this to be the next major step forward. However, today is a day for congratulating the Government on easing the appalling burdens that have shattered families for decades.

Lord Brennan: My Lords, I speak in this debate as someone with personal experience of litigation involving those affected by vaccine damage; and I regret to say that it was a negative involvement. It is well known that I advised the Legal Aid Board a number of years ago that the medical science in this field did not show a definitive connection between the vaccine and its neurological effect, as alleged. That meant that the "solution"--if it is to be properly so called--to these problems for parents and child was not to be found in our courts. It probably explains why the Pearson Committee took the suggestion of strict liability so seriously all those years ago.
	I have introduced that background to indicate to the House that there is no present science that will definitely establish the connection between the vaccine and the consequences from which these children suffer. That is why the Vaccine Damage Act and its scheme give a payment based on a system of practical justice, whereby, if the neurological effect follows the administration of the vaccine in so quick a span of time that a reasonable person could make a causative connection, there will be an award. That is a novel system of compensation in our attempts to look after those as grievously damaged as these children.
	The vaccine damage scheme is not a compensation scheme. Were it to be so, the mercifully small number of children affected--some 900--would each, depending on his or her life expectancy, be anticipating an award of anywhere between £1.5 million and £2.5 million from a court. That would represent a colossal amount of money, which the Government could not afford to pay. However, it graphically illustrates the extent of need which these children have and which is presently almost entirely met by their parents and family.
	It was, therefore, with great pleasure that I read yesterday's Statement by the Secretary of State, which included some major changes to the operation of the scheme. First and foremost--and properly described--there is to be a dramatic increase in the lump sum payment. It was increased by this Government from £30,000 to £40,OOO in 1998 and has now been increased to £100,000. Secondly, and most importantly, it has been backdated so that everyone who is a proper beneficiary of the scheme will be paid the full amount, or the proportionate amount, up to £100,000, depending on the age of the claimant.
	Thirdly--and, again, most importantly--the removal of the six-year time limit within which to bring a claim is a just act. The time limit is now to be extended to 21 years. It is difficult to conceive of a family afflicted with this problem who, within those years, would not discover that there was a scheme to which they could have recourse. Fourthly, the disability threshold is to be reduced from 80 per cent to 60 per cent. In the minds of the families concerned, that really should produce a sense of justice where previously there was a strong sense of injustice. It is not a perfect solution, but it is a considerable step forward.
	Finally--and this should not be forgotten in the years to come, should benefits be reviewed--the interaction of incapacity benefit and mobility benefit whereby they are increased will be an additional benefit to the lump sum payment. All these changes are of the greatest importance to these families. They are small in number but the effects of the damage inflicted on their children are enormous. These changes go some way towards recognising that burden. However, there is more to be done.
	I shall not repeat the most important remarks made by my noble friend Lord Ashley to the effect that means testing ought not to be introduced in relation to these payments. We must not forget that, with the advance of modern medical science, many of these children will probably outlive their parents and finish up in hospitals or state institutions. When that event arrives, it would be a tragedy if what little means those children had were to be means tested.
	What should next be done to build upon this new initiative? First, and surely most important of all, when will these changes be introduced? They require primary legislation and subsidiary regulations. As regards primary legislation, the Secretary of State said in another place yesterday that it would introduced at the "earliest available opportunity". As for regulations, he said that he would introduce them,
	"as quickly as I can".--[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/00; col. 723.]
	We do not often hear such determined promises as that. I do hope that they will be fulfilled. No one--I emphasise the words--could conscientiously object to either legislation or subsidiary legislation being pushed through these Houses of Parliament with maximum speed for this cause.
	Secondly, in the year or two--if it is that--in which these changes are to be brought in, inevitably the families involved, and the new ones who become involved, will want to know how the scheme will affect them. Problems of interaction of benefits and so on will be acute for them. I invite the Minister to indicate whether in this preparatory stage to legislation, or perhaps in a year or two after it is introduced, there will be a system in which a nominated civil servant or a nominated office within the department will have the specific task of dealing with and answering the queries of parents that are sure to arise. That can be done efficiently through the Association of Parents of Vaccine Damaged Children. It is no good satisfying ourselves that legislation will make a change unless we accompany it with promises and action that explain the changes to the people most affected.
	Finally, the scheme is the product of the need of society to vaccinate children against serious illness. That is a worthwhile intent. However, it has immoderate and tragic consequence with which we are dealing tonight. What is at the heart of the problem? It is the administration of a drug. The drugs used are the products of multinational companies of enormous size and wealth, which, having profited from the sale of the vaccine, could paradoxically be the vendors of the very medicines that are used to alleviate the damage that is thought to be associated with the vaccine. In this new century, surely we can expect a moral content in the world of commerce that was previously lacking, can we not?
	I point out to your Lordships' House that Smithkline-Beecham, one of the largest vaccine manufacturers, made a profit last year of £1.98 billion from transactions that included the sale to the state of £779 million-worth of vaccine. That is one example of several. That company is in a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic position. It is fair, just and reasonable that it contributes to the cost of the damage in this small number of cases. It is therefore with extreme disappointment that I hear that when the Government approached that company for help there was a frank and firm refusal to do anything. That is unacceptable. It should change; the Government should not give up, and not just because of vaccine damaged children. In years to come genetic medicine, biochemistry and the medical field will produce huge profits for companies such as those that I have described. If their attitude is as described by the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry; namely,
	"The Government implemented the vaccination programme knowing in full detail what the possible side-effects were.
	They knew what they were taking on, the damage is therefore their responsibility and they should compensate people accordingly",
	that sends an extremely tough message from commerce to government. Fortunately, government seek to represent the people and, in doing so, the pressure they bring on these companies over the next few years should be unrelenting. The companies should contribute without adding the cost of that to the profit they seek to make from sales to government.
	Having addressed three necessary steps, I end my speech by congratulating all those people--some of whom are present in the Public Gallery--including my noble friend, Lord Ashley, and the honourable Member for Eccles--on all they have done over 20-odd years to produce some justice for those who deserve it. At the end of the 20th century all we know is that in the years to come there will be yet more children--small though the number may be--affected by vaccine damage. In my experience in the lifetime of a government there are one or two defining moments which may be moderate in their compass but profound in their effects for society. This is such a moment because it enables the Government to show that they care for people in need. I welcome the proposals.

Lord Clement-Jones: My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ashley, for initiating the debate with his usual impeccable timing. The debate takes place not only a day after the Government's Statement but on the very day that the major vaccine damaged children lobby took place in Westminster Hall. I pay tribute to the noble Lord's long-standing commitment to the cause of vaccine damaged children. We have already heard two fine speeches. The debate has already proved to be one of high quality and great interest.
	The history of the vaccine damage payment scheme is extremely well known and has been rehearsed by the noble Lords, Lord Ashley and Lord Brennan. The history of the review of the scheme says nothing for the Department of Social Security's sense of urgency or the Treasury's compassion. Despite a pledge when in opposition to address the issue, it was only yesterday that the outcome of the review was announced, some three years after the general election and some two years after the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, pledged that the Government would conduct a thorough review of the service.
	Throughout the past three years Members of this House and the other place have asked numerous questions about progress, and I believe that parliamentary lobbies have taken place on three occasions. The Labour MP for Eccles, Mr Ian Stewart, the chairman of the All-Party Group for Vaccine Damaged Children--of which I have the privilege to be a member--initiated an adjournment debate at the end of 1998 in the course of which he was promised the results of the review in 1999. My right honourable friend Charles Kennedy MP made a telling contribution on the subject of the scheme only two weeks ago at Prime Minister's Question Time. It is a testimony to the tenacity of the parents and that of the all-party group, particularly its chairman, Mr Stewart, and that of the Daily Express that the Secretary of State, Mr Darling, finally made an announcement yesterday.
	I certainly do not want to be churlish about the contents of yesterday's announcement, which we on these Benches very much welcomed, particularly those provisions which have retrospective effect. The noble Lord, Lord Brennan, referred to those. However, there are key questions that need to be mentioned. The noble Lords, Lord Ashley and Lord Brennan, raised some of those questions. I hope that I may ask some further questions of the Minister and that she will respond to them when she replies to the debate.
	Will the new 60 per cent disability threshold also be backdated for those who have previously applied to the vaccine damage payment unit but have exhausted the appeals process? There is the injustice of setting an arbitrary threshold, whether that is 60 per cent or 80 per cent, as at present. I am sure the Minister will be aware that parents will continue to feel strongly about this matter whether the threshold is 60 per cent or 80 per cent. Why could not a tapering system have been adopted? That would surely have been the most just way of proceeding. After all, how can one precisely quantify a 60 per cent disability? Surely this is a highly subjective process. How can we even guarantee parity between one method of assessment by one consultant and the next?
	I have other questions. When will the payments to victims be made and how will they be made? Which elements of the announcement can be put into effect very shortly, perhaps before the Summer Recess, by regulation, and which elements will require primary legislation? What is the timetable envisaged by the Minister's department for each of those elements? Can payments be made on account? Is that envisaged? How will payments--the issue of means-testing was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Ashley and Lord Brennan--affect income support and other benefits available to the victims of vaccine damage? Will guidance be issued to those who will be in receipt of these additional payments?
	As has already been said, the key point to make in this debate is that the changes to the vaccine damage payment scheme must be seen only as a first step to securing justice in the form of full compensation for the vaccine victims. Many of the victims require 24-hour support. I met many of them today, as I have on previous occasions. The cost of providing this support by professional carers ranges from approximately £80,000 to £120,000 per annum. At the moment in many cases parents are the only carers. Some of them have terrible tales to tell about the withdrawal of invalid care allowance when they reach pensionable age. Many of the parents are over pensionable age. I received correspondence regarding one parent who is being pursued for £1,400, a so-called over-payment because of the receipt of payments after she reached pensionable age.
	I have checked with personal injuries lawyers--perhaps not as distinguished as the noble Lord, Lord Brennan--who act in personal and medical injury cases about how the appropriate income would be provided for by a court in circumstances where a court made a determination of compensation. I was informed that £3 million--I would go rather higher than the noble Lord, Lord Brennan--would be required in a case such as this to provide for that level of income. After the recent case of Wells that may well be the kind of figure that would be claimed. Three million pounds is a very large amount of money.
	Therefore, will a back-dated payment of just £67,000 provide adequate compensation for families who have endured up to 40 years of financial hardship and emotional turmoil? I suggest not. These parents, many of whom are now in their 70s, need to have the assurance that their vaccine damaged children will be properly supported when they, as parents, can no longer do so. Only through a proper lump sum payment can this be done.
	Much has been made by this Government and the previous one of the vaccine damage payments being payments rather than compensation. Yet the fact is, as both the noble Lords, Lord Ashley and Lord Brennan, pointed out, that government have a responsibility to provide adequately for the welfare of those undergoing vaccination. To quote Dr John Clements, a vaccine safety expert at the World Health Organisation:
	"There is no perfectly safe or completely effective vaccine, but we all benefit from them. Countries should have a responsibility to make sure if people take part in a programme they are supported if things go wrong".
	On a previous occasion, the noble Lord, Lord Ashley, likened--in my view rightly--the victims of vaccine-related disability to war veterans who have suffered for the good of society. He said:
	"They are the victims of a war fought on behalf of us all and must be compensated for their sacrifice".
	The Government therefore need to answer the following additional questions. Do they recognise that the changes to the VDP scheme are only a first step to securing full compensation for these vaccine victims? Will the Government now take steps to secure proper compensation for the victims of vaccines so that these very badly disabled individuals can be supported when their parents are no longer able to care for them? Will the Government redouble their efforts with the relevant pharmaceutical companies, such as Glaxo-Wellcome, to ensure that they take responsibility and share in the financial settlement? Will they redouble their efforts to ensure that the medical records of vaccine victims are made available, many of which seem to have been unaccountably lost after they made a claim? In all of this, which is the lead department that will take the initiative?
	I have enormous sympathy for the parents and the victims of vaccine damage and I feel angry on their behalf. It is quite scandalous how long they have been allowed by governments of each colour to suffer without adequate legal or other remedy when they have clearly been the casualties of an official government public health vaccination policy, whether this has been for DPT, MMR, polio or whatever.
	It is the Department of Health which institutes public health policies and the department which chooses the vaccines and the department which should have tested them properly in conjunction with the pharmaceutical companies. It should now be urgently reviewing the position, particularly in the light of worries about the fall in the rates of certain vaccinations which could, in the view of public health experts, lead to epidemics in diseases such as measles.
	If the Department of Health and the pharmaceutical companies do not take responsibility for past vaccine damage but hide behind the legalities of the law of tort and the requirement to show clear causation and negligence, it is hardly surprising that parents have second thoughts before arranging for their children to be vaccinated. The noble Lord, Lord Brennan, cogently described the way in which the parcel had tended to be passed by the pharmaceutical companies to the Department of Health, and so on.
	I have a confession to make. I am one of those parents who has second thoughts about vaccinating their child, particularly as regards MMR for my young son. I am clearly not alone in this. Even with the knowledge that the chances of vaccine damage to a child may be one in a million, the Department of Health's historically dismissive and legalistic attitude--indeed even denying that there is such a thing as vaccine damage--will ensure that vaccination rates continue to fall. I suggest that Ministers and the Public Health Laboratory Service--now in the wise hands of a Member of this House--urgently review the position, not only in respect of the vaccine-damaged children under discussion today, but for the future as well.
	Unless there is put in place a proper no fault compensation scheme, similar in generosity to that in the United States, and as recommended by the original Pearson report, and similar to the kind of compensation that could be achieved in court, I do not believe that the confidence of parents will be re-won. And certainly justice will not have been done to these severely disabled children who have already been the victims of vaccines.

Lord Brennan: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps I may invite him to agree that it is important in a debate such as this that unreasonably high hopes are not sent out to the affected parents. Is he really suggesting that the problem which we face should be dealt with by full compensation, which, on my calculation, would amount to between £1.5 billion and £2 billion? That is beyond the means of any competent government.

Lord Clement-Jones: My Lords, that is a very fair question. My view is yes. If one accepts that there is compensation to be paid, one has to come up with a scheme that provides an income for the severely disabled children so that they are able to cope when their parents are no longer able to care for them. It was perfectly possible to do so in the case of the thalidomide children. It is perfectly possible to envisage a scheme--perhaps a trust fund rather than individual forms of compensation--where a lump sum could be paid from which these parents could derive an income. Obviously the income that they derive from that scheme would depend on the level of disability of their children.
	This is not a question of raising hopes. It is a matter of wishing to see justice done in these circumstances. If a court had awarded these children compensation, the types of payment that I have suggested would not be outlandish; they would be entirely appropriate.

Earl Howe: My Lords, yesterday's announcement on the improvements to the vaccine damage payment scheme was extremely welcome. Even though it pre-empted much of what I was going to say today, perhaps I may take a few minutes to ask the Minister some questions and cover some of the important issues arising from the announcement.
	First, however, I should like to set out a little of the background to this issue. If one looks back over the past quarter of a century at any of the important political crusades relating to the needs of the disabled, the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ashley, is almost certain to be closely associated with it. There can be few better examples of that association than the issue which the noble Lord has brought to the House this evening. It was through his efforts in another place in the late 1970s that the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 came into being. That legislation was welcomed at the time as a recognition of a moral duty on the part of the state to provide financial assistance to those children who had suffered severe physical or mental damage as a result of being vaccinated.
	As stated by other noble Lords, the scheme was never billed as being a form of compensation in the normal sense of the term, nor indeed did it carry any implication of public negligence. Rather, it was an implicit acknowledgement by the state that in any programme of mass vaccination, whether it be for measles, mumps, polio, whooping cough or for a range of other serious diseases, there will be a very tiny percentage of children who experience unpredictable adverse consequences. For some, those consequences are minor and transient. For others, they are truly devastating.
	Traditionally, damage that arises from non-negligent accidents occurring in the NHS has not given rise to any form of state payment, but in one important respect the damage that stems from vaccination is different from other damage. Vaccination does not simply benefit the individual who receives it. It is the state which says that parents should immunise their children because it is for the common good that life-threatening diseases should not be spread around the general population. The state encourages vaccination even though it is known--notwithstanding the no doubt legally secure position of the noble Lord, Lord Brennan--that a very few individuals will suffer a serious and irremediable adverse reaction.
	But paying those individuals from public money is not simply a recognition that they have suffered for the general good. There is another dimension; namely, that any immunisation programme depends for its success on a certain level of take-up. Once the take-up rate falls below a critical figure the risk of an epidemic becomes a very real one. It is obvious that unless the public has confidence in an immunisation programme, it will not subscribe to that programme. Perhaps I may say to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, with whom I do not often disagree, that it was the fears surrounding the MMR immunisation, misplaced though they were, and the accompanying decline in public confidence that led to the recent worrying drop in the take-up of that vaccination programme.
	I believe that all political parties have a duty to join forces on a policy of this importance--resting our case on the basis of the scientific evidence, which is firm. But confidence has a number of buttresses. The Government can also protect their vaccination programmes if parents of children know that in those few cases which lead to tragedy a scheme is in place that will provide a worthwhile measure of financial support.
	That is why yesterday's announcement, coming as it did after two years of deliberation by the Government, was so welcome. I shall not carp too loudly at the time it took for the Statement to arrive, knowing as I do something of the frustrations of trying to secure inter-departmental agreement on such matters. In any event, I hope that the retrospective element in the new package will do something to assuage those who feel, in the words of the Minister in another place, Mr Bayley, that,
	"Two years is indeed a long time".--[Official Report, Commons, 6/6/00; col. 20WH.]
	Had yesterday's Statement not been made, there were two changes in particular that I would have asked the Government to introduce. The first was to abolish the six-year limit for making claims. That has effectively been done and I congratulate the Government on it. The second was to bring down the disability threshold from the level of 80 per cent and to introduce a sliding scale of payments for disability assessed at below that level. That is the request that has been made by the Vaccine Victims Support Group, whose patience and dignity I think we must all applaud and respect. It is a proposal which seems to me to be entirely equitable. The change proposed by the Government to bring the threshold down to 60 per cent will mean that anyone with damage assessed at below that level will receive nothing. I ask the Government why they believe that that is a fair way to proceed. Even at this juncture, I hope that they will be prepared to reconsider the issue.
	I wonder if the Minister can clarify one or two other points in relation to the primary legislation that we understand will be needed for both of these measures? First, when do the Government propose to introduce the necessary Bill? It need only be a short Bill. I give the assurance that we on this side of the House will co-operate with the Government fully when it appears.
	Secondly, can the Minister tell us a little more about the retrospective element of the announcement? If the threshold is to come down from 80 per cent, does that leave the way open for individuals whose claims were rejected because they did not come up to that level to re-open their claims? Similarly, will it now be possible for those who had their claims turned aside because they were not made within the six-year limit to reapply for a payment under the scheme, even though they may now be over the age of 21?
	Perhaps I may add my welcome to the significant uprating of the sum payable to those who have suffered severe damage from vaccination. The figure of £100,000 is not a king's ransom, but it is an order of money that more realistically reflects the burdens suffered by victims and their families than does the current level of payment. Can the Minister say whether the appropriate regulations will be laid before the Summer Recess?
	I should also like to ask the Minister about research. The extraordinary discoveries announced this week on the mapping of the human genome may one day enable scientists to predict which children have a genetic susceptibility to an adverse reaction from vaccinations. However, can the Minister say what research is currently under way into the formulation of improved vaccines and into efforts to minimise the terrible adverse reactions that we have been debating?
	I conclude by asking the Minister whether she will take this opportunity to reaffirm the Government's policy on childhood immunisation? On this important issue, do the Government agree with me that party politics should be put aside? Indeed, will they consider entering a joint campaign with the Opposition to promote vaccination as an essential public health measure? I hope, too, that the Minister will take the opportunity to reassure the House today that all vaccines approved for use in this country are rigorously tested to the highest standards of safety, quality and efficacy? That is a message that bears repeating often, as does the warning that, were a vaccination programme to fail through lack of adequate take-up, it could lead to consequences as devastating in their severity as those that have been referred to this evening, but for a very much more numerous cohort of children.

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, I am delighted that the Government's measures have received a warm welcome tonight. Substantially, the measures owe much to the delicate, subtle and hesitant persuasion brought to bear on Labour Ministers by my noble friend Lord Ashley. I am very pleased that the whole House recognises the role played by my noble friend in achieving these results.
	Perhaps I may begin by setting out a little of the background to the review of the scheme. Soon after the present Government came to power, Ministers were approached by various groups and by the newly-formed All-Party Group on Vaccine Damage. We were asked how we would review the scheme. At the time, I had responsibility for disability issues as well as children's issues. I announced that a review would be undertaken, in consultation with the Department of Health, as part of our overall review of welfare.
	Since that time, various meetings have taken place between myself and members of the all-party group, along with members of the parents' groups who have so eloquently presented their case. These groups included the Association of Parents of Vaccine Damaged Children, the British Polio Fellowship, the Justice, Awareness and Basic Support Group (JABS), and the Vaccine Victims Support Group. This afternoon, the Vaccine Victims Support Group held a well-attended lobby in the Grand Committee Room, and I believe that my noble friend was present.
	The groups raised a number of issues with us. They disagreed on some, but the five principal issues were the time limit of six years, the 80 per cent threshold, the need for an additional lump sum, an ongoing benefit for those damaged following vaccination, and a contribution from the pharmaceutical industry towards the support of those damaged by vaccines--the point raised by my noble friend Lord Brennan. The groups also raised questions about vaccination incentive payments and the promotion of vaccines.
	We promised to look at all those aspects, which is why the matter has taken a long time. We have also, at the behest of parents, contacted the pharmaceutical industry to seek a financial contribution towards the support of this group of vaccine damaged children. Although it was sympathetic to the issues, the industry did not feel it appropriate to become involved--to my regret. I hope that the efforts of my noble friend and others may persuade it to reconsider its position in the future.
	In consultation with the Department of Health, we have therefore been carefully examining the nature of the vaccine damage payments scheme and the scope for changes that we might make. That was why, in that context, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Social Security, Mr Darling, made the Statement yesterday.
	The proposed changes do not represent any changed judgment about the safety of vaccination but simply our view, as I said when we increased the payment in 1998, that it is appropriate, decent and compassionate to implement these changes.
	Subject to parliamentary approval of our proposals to pay £100,000 for new claims, we shall effectively be increasing the rate of payment that we inherited by some £70,000. It is a significant increase. In addition, we have listened to the concern of those parents who received £10,000 in the early 1980s and who, as we know, struggle daily under very difficult circumstances. When we last increased the payment in 1998 to £40,000 we said that that amount would more than restore the value of the payment.
	At April 2000 rates, £33,000 would have been the equivalent of £10,000 awarded at the start of the scheme. We have therefore decided that it would be only right in this unusual circumstance to consider top-up payments to bring past recipients up to the new £100,000 rate by revaluing their original payments. It is not often that a government make retrospective payments. I am delighted that they are doing so in this case.
	This means that, if Parliament approves, those recipients who received £10,000 will receive an additional lump sum payment of £67,000. Those who received £20,000 will receive £62,500. Those who received £30,000 will receive £61,500 and those who received £40,000 will receive a further £58,000. This represents an additional £60 million for the most severely disabled--a very significant sum.
	Again, subject to parliamentary approval, we hope to introduce the proposed changes as soon as possible. Perhaps I may make clear my understanding of the timetable. It is our hope that the payment of the new £100,000 will be in place before the Summer Recess. We hope to make the top-up payments to those who have already received sums as soon as possible following the other regulations, but that may take time. Some of the payments were made 30 or 40 years ago; addresses need to be checked; people may have changed addresses and we may have lost contact with them. But subject to those practical limitations, we want to make the top-up payments as soon as possible after the regulations have completed their passage through this House and another place.
	The other two aspects of the scheme--the threshold of disability being reduced from 80 per cent to 60 per cent, and the changes in years--require primary legislation. That will be introduced as soon as possible. But primary legislation is not required for the payments; we can make those following regulations, which is a much speedier process.
	The £100,000 payments will be treated like the original payments for the purposes of income-related benefits and for the purposes of residential care. They will not disentitle recipients of those benefits. As I said, we also intend to bring about changes to the time limits.
	We have decided that in the case of time limits for claiming, we should seek to act within the spirit of the proposals in the Law Commission's recent consultation paper on the limitation of actions. The time limit for making a claim will be amended to three years, although in the case of minors the time will not run out until they have achieved their majority. For young children, who make up the vast majority of VDP claimants, there will therefore be an extended period, up to age 21, in which to make a claim.
	As I said, we further propose to reduce the disability threshold from 80 per cent to 60 per cent. It is true that the test of at least 80 per cent disability adopted for the Act was and remains generally recognised as the lower end of the spectrum of severe disability--for example, for severe disablement payments, payments for industrial injuries and the like. Lowering that level might be considered inconsistent. None the less, we have taken heed of representations and we think that a reduction to the level of 60 per cent is justified and, representing as it does a still significant level of disability that was incurred as part of a wider public interest policy, it remains compatible with the original aims of the scheme.
	The present statutory scheme was introduced in 1979. It was a payment of a lump sum, not in terms of meeting compensation. That, as my noble friend Lord Brennan said, is a matter that should be pursued through the courts. It is concerned instead with seeking to meet some of the additional costs incurred by parents. As my noble friend Lord Brennan indicated, the families and the disabled children themselves continue to receive, and rightly so, higher rate disability living allowance and long-term IB, which is now more generous than severe disablement allowance. Their parents will receive ICA and, if they are on income support, the carer's premium on IS, which continues right through. So I think that on all of those points we are able to help your Lordships.
	My noble friend Lord Ashley raised a number of specific points. He asked why there was only one award in some years. In most years there are five or six awards, but it is true that in one or two cases--I now know of only a single case-- that was the number who were considered that year to meet the entitlement conditions. Obviously, those figures will now change. We do not know the number, but an approximate estimate is that 20 vaccine damaged children a year presently lose out because of the time limit and will now fall within the provision. Again, we do not know how many lose out by virtue of the 60 per cent, but it is our guess that perhaps a handful a year might, and then maybe some 50 or so cases who were refused because they were disqualified by being below the 80 per cent threshold but above 60 per cent. We shall be inviting those people to reapply and, where we can, to make contact with them.
	My noble friend's second question--a point also raised by the noble Earl, Lord Howe--related to claims made 30 or 40 years previously. As I say, we aim to make the new provisions fair to people who missed out in the past and who may qualify under the new rules. We cannot say exactly what the position will be. We are carefully considering these points. If my noble friend has a particular case in mind that would fall outside the 21-year cut-off point, we should like to follow that up. Perhaps my noble friend will write to me.
	One question which my noble friend did not ask but on which I may be able to bring good news is that, where a child has already died, the department will be considering top-up payments. That is perhaps more generous than my noble friend anticipated.
	I hope that I have addressed my noble friend's third question relating to someone in local authority residential accommodation. Similar rules apply in charging regimes for local authority residential accommodation to those that apply to income support: the amounts of payments made into a trust fund or under court supervision are disregarded. I am happy to place those words on the record.
	My noble friend Lord Brennan asked whether there would be a nominated or named official as an information point. We have not made provision for that at present. We will take the point away and consider it. Clearly, it is important that families know whom to contact, as well as having the literature. The possibility of a website was raised. We shall pursue those kinds of questions to see how we can be helpful.
	The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised a point about retrospection. I hope I have dealt with that. Anyone who applied and was disallowed because he or she was below the threshold will be invited to reapply and have the claim reassessed. If there are delays, it will be because we do not necessarily know any changes of address, given that the previous payments were made 15, 20 or 25 years ago.
	I sincerely join in the wise words of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, when he gently chastised the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in terms of his policy towards vaccination and his suggestion that he might consider not exposing his own child to MMR vaccine. I could not repeat more strongly than the noble Earl, Lord Howe, that there is no scientific evidence whatever in a series of highly regarded reports, including the Thames survey, which was done fairly recently, to show that there is any connection between MMR and Crohn's disease or inflammatory bowel disease. It is simply not the case. There have been repeated studies in this country and in the US and elsewhere abroad showing that there is no such connection.
	It is the case that children may develop those diseases, and may do so at the same age as that at which they are having their vaccination. It is a correlation, but no causal connection has been established.
	The alternative, which is to expose children to those illnesses, is very serious. I should like to give the noble Lord some information about what happened when there were similar scares relating to whooping cough, percussis. Before the introduction of a vaccine in the 1950s major epidemics of whooping cough were frequent, with the annual notification exceeding 100,000 year. After the introduction of immunisation against whooping cough it fell in the 1970s to about 2,500 a year. However, following public and professional anxiety about the vaccine, anxiety that was proved to be unfounded, there was a marked decline in vaccine acceptance from over 80 per cent to around 30 per cent. The number of susceptible children rose, and in the 12 years after 1976 three major whooping cough epidemics accounted nationally for over 300,000 notifications and at least 70 deaths. The fears became the reality.
	If I may so put it, nobody has the right to--I do not want to say "freeload", because that sounds wrong--rely on other people having the vaccine given to their children, believing that as a result they do not need to have their own children vaccinated. They are, so to speak, piggy-backing on the moral generosity of others. I want to put it strongly, because only one medical risk has been established. That is with the polio vaccine, which is one in a million. In no other cases is there any risk, but we know that the risk of the disease can be extremely serious. Any contribution from a Front Bench spokesman will be taken seriously. A suggestion that there is a serious question as to whether one should not have that vaccine can only add to public fears and damage incalculably many other children, which I am sure the noble Lord would not wish.

Lord Clement-Jones: My Lords, I hasten to reassure the noble Baroness the Minister that I am not anti-vaccine myself, but she should note--and I will not trade scientific data with her--that with regard to the MMR vaccine 2,000 claims for compensation against pharmaceutical companies are coming. The evidence is being put together slowly but surely about the effect of the MMR vaccination. I also remind the noble Baroness that the United States Congress has been holding a series of hearings about the effect of MMR vaccination, which she may not be aware of either. Serious issues are involved, and I would not mention them lightly.

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, slowly but not surely, there is only one piece of medical research. Without naming the doctor concerned, the Medical Research Council has said that those findings are insubstantial and not to be relied on. We will see what happens.
	The time is nearly up. I wanted to spend some time trying to address the issue that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, raised. I want finally to say how pleased I am that I am responding to the noble Lord after yesterday's Statement and to put into the record the very graceful and gracious message we have received from Rosemary Fox, who will be known to many of your Lordships and who has led the campaign for so many families, the Association of Parents of Vaccine Damaged Children. Her message reads:
	"Congratulations on your decision to make a reasonably large addition to the vaccine damage payment. All parents ringing in are pleased to have further help and are awaiting further details, which I have promised to ask for and pass on to them. Some parents have particularly asked to be dissociated from criticisms being made about the payment. After 20 years of waiting, most are very pleased."
	I commend this to your Lordships' House and thank my noble friend for introducing the debate.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill

House again in Committee on Clause 46.

The Earl of Northesk: moved amendment No. 139B:
	Page 50, line 7, after ("believes") insert ("that the protected information cannot reasonably be obtained by him by means other than the giving of a notice under this section and if that person believes").

The Earl of Northesk: In moving the amendment, I should also like to speak to Amendment No. 141A.
	I confess that some of the steam has been taken out of my concerns as a result of our debate on Amendment No. 139A. Part of my motive was to seek the promotion of plain text ahead of key disclosure. However, a tangential issue remains, concerning the structure of the clause. I cannot help feeling that in the context of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) subparagraph (d) is incongruous. Hence my formulation of including it in the preface to subsection (2). I should be grateful for an explanation from the Minister as to why, in so far as it remains relevant, subsection (2) is structured in the way that it is. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: The change in the amendment and the consequential change proposed by Amendment No. 141A are covered by government Amendment No. 141B, which we have already discussed. The amended subsection (d) reads:
	"it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected information in an intelligible form without the giving of a notice under this section".
	I hope that that amendment reassures the noble Lord. It should; that is certainly our intention.

The Earl of Northesk: I thank the noble Lord the Minister for that reply. He will be aware, from our previous debate, that I still have slight reservations about the phraseology in his amendment No. 139D, but he will write to me on that point in any event.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: There are a number of amendments in this group which belong to the Liberal Democrat Party. I do not know whether my noble friend would wish to comment on them before he sits down, or whether anyone else would wish to do so.

Lord Lucas: I would certainly wish to comment on them. I was waiting in the hope that someone might magically appear on the Liberal Democrat Benches.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: So was I.

Lord Lucas: If we wait long enough we may have the presence of the noble Lord, Lord McNally. I should be very interested to hear him, particularly on Amendments Nos. 157 and 158, where we enter the area of the non-disclosure of key signatures. Where one has used, as some programs will use, one's signature to encrypt something, one's signature is liable to be seized. If that is so, I am not clear how, under the Electronic Communications Bill, the authorisations and signatures that one has made using that signature are affected. Their security is no longer perfect and the possibility that they have been forged becomes real. I am concerned about the way in which the two Bills will work together--the ability to seize someone's signature and the uses to which it will now be put under the Electronic Communications Bill. I do not know how that will all hang together.
	Amendments Nos. 157 and 158 address the issue in a slightly different way and add another level of protection. As the Bill is drafted, if one has used a password to hide one's signature one may be forced to reveal it. However, I believe that under Amendment No. 157 a person would be spared that requirement. I should not like to miss the noble Lord's comments on those amendments.

The Earl of Northesk: I wait to see whether or not the noble Lord, Lord McNally, wants to promote his amendments in this group.

Lord McNally: Our amendments were tabled to close a loophole as far as concerns the use of electronic signatures. Because I entered the Chamber half-way through the debate I am not sure what the weakness in our amendments is supposed to be. The intention is to achieve recognition of the electronic signature and protection thereof. I say no more.

The Earl of Northesk: The Minister may want to respond to points made by my noble friend Lord Lucas and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, who spoke to the Liberal Democrat amendments.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: It is rather difficult to respond to amendments that have not been spoken to. I am content to run through all the amendments in the group, if that is what the Committee desires. Very little reference has been made to the entirety of the grouping. Most of the points made relate to Amendments Nos. 157 and 158. If it assists the Committee, I shall respond only to those amendments which I believe the noble Lord, Lord McNally, and others regard as the most important in the group.
	We fully recognise the importance of maintaining the integrity and security of electronic signatures. In that sense we understand why these two amendments have found their way into the group. For the record, I stress the policy position. There is no law enforcement requirement relating to keys that are used solely for the purposes of electronic signature. We believe that there are misplaced worries about signature keys being obtained and then used to impersonate their owners. Clearly, that would not be in the interests of law enforcement, since possibly it would have the wider effect of undermining the validity of such devices and potential prosecutions. The whole point about electronic signatures is to ensure the integrity and authenticity of data.
	As I understand it, it is possible for signature keys also to be used for the purposes of confidentiality; in other words, to protect or encrypt the content of data or messages. This is of interest to us. The ability of criminals to encrypt the content of their data is the precise threat that we address in Part III. We believe that where keys have been used for both purposes it is reasonable to have power to require their disclosure. The Committee recognises that in the first limb of Amendment No. 157. The question is whether the second limb--sub-paragraph (b)--and Amendment No. 158 add extra safeguards. Frankly, we do not believe that they do. The protection of electronic signature keys is already there. By virtue of Clause 46(6), if keys have not been used for any other purpose they cannot be required to be disclosed: the Bill prohibits such access. But we believe that if keys have been used for the purposes of confidentiality it is right that they may be required to be disclosed.
	In all this it is important to have in mind that we envisage that the times when keys themselves will be required to be disclosed will be limited. The choice of which key to disclose, if there is more than one which can decrypt the relevant information, is very much left to the recipient of the notice.
	Amendment No. 158 seeks to address the possibility that keys which may once have been used for the purposes of confidentiality, but have not been so used for some time, may be required to be disclosed because of some recent malicious behaviour by a party who is not the keyholder. We are aware that such a scenario has been painted, but we believe that those fears are overstated. The fact remains that the Bill needs to cover keys which have been used for the purpose of confidentiality and signature. We believe that there are appropriate tests and restrictions that govern access to keys and that Clause 46(6) provides necessary, proper and adequate safeguards for signature keys.
	Clearly, confidentiality and integrity are key factors--no pun intended. We understand the spirit in which these amendments and the others in the group are tabled. I trust that, following my comments on Amendments Nos. 157 and 158, the noble Earl will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord McNally: This is a key point. I flipped through some papers that I received from Japan where people have gone to great lengths to guarantee and protect signature keys. They regard that as a key part of public confidence in commerce in this area. I thank the Minister for his reassurances on this matter.

The Earl of Northesk: I believe that I am satisfied with the Minister's response to my own amendments. There is slight confusion. As ever, I shall read Hansard further to inform me on the point. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 139C not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 139D:
	Page 50, line 10, leave out ("requirement to disclose the key") and insert ("disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 140 to 141A not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 141B:
	Page 50, line 17, leave out from ("that") to ("without") in line 18 and insert ("it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected information in an intelligible form").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 142 to 144 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 144A:
	Page 50, line 21, leave out ("require the disclosure of the key") and insert ("impose a disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 144B and 144C not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 144D:
	Page 50, line 22, leave out ("requirement to disclose a key") and insert ("disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 144E not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 144F:
	Page 50, line 27, leave out ("requiring the disclosure of any key") and insert ("imposing a disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 144G not moved.]

Lord McNally: moved Amendment No. 145:
	Page 50, line 28, leave out ("not in writing)") and insert ("given by electronic means)").

Lord McNally: The intention is to clean up the form and content of notices. I beg to move.

The Earl of Northesk: Amendment No. 151A is grouped with this amendment. I trust that the Committee will think it convenient if I speak to it.
	I return to an argument I advanced in debate on the first amendment we considered on the previous Committee day. It is ludicrous that Clause 46 notices,
	"may take such form and be given in such manner as the person giving it thinks fit".
	I believe that that affords carte blanche to the subjective opinion of anyone with the appropriate permission under Schedule 1 to compile their own versions of Clause 46 notices.
	My amendment seeks to address the need for objectivity rather than subjectivity. The provision has the potential of imbuing the regime with uncertainty and an unwelcome lack of clarity. I might have preferred the noble Lord, Lord McNally, to have spoken to his Amendment No. 151, which I believe seeks to deal with the problem from a different perspective. None the less, I look forward to the Minister's reply.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I shall deal with the entire grouping, if I may. There are a number of amendments in this group relating to the nature of notices served under Clause 46. Some of the government amendments which we have already discussed have an impact on these amendments. I should like, first, to set out the rationale behind the amendments in this group.
	Government Amendment No. 149XA should be welcomed. The amendment is tabled expressly as a result of representations from industry. Many in industry have been concerned that, notwithstanding the constraint on service of notices, some "spoof" notices purporting to be under the Bill could be served on companies and, in this way, security of companies could be compromised. No one wants that. We are anxious to minimise the possibility of any such spoof notices. We believe that the requirement in Amendment No. 149XA--that the office, rank or position of the person who granted permission for the giving of a notice under Schedule 1 be on the face of the notice--will add extra reassurance to those who received notices that those notices are genuine.
	Amendments Nos. 149YA and 150ZA relate to the information that is to be on a notice served under Clause 46. These changes are consequential on the earlier restructuring of the balance between keys and plain text.
	Amendments Nos. 150B and 158A are also consequential on the requirement, covered in the new clause tabled by the Government, that notices should be served on directors of companies or equivalent. As such, I hope that these, along with the other government amendments, will be welcomed by the Committee.
	There are some outstanding issues from this group which I should address. Amendment No. 145 seeks to clarify that decryption notices can be given only in writing or by electronic means. I can see what the noble Lord is driving at. But I believe that the amendment is unnecessary. Our position on the form of decryption notices is this. They will be in written form. In time, we anticipate that, where necessary and applicable, they should be capable of being served electronically. I think that that is what the noble Lord seeks. But that is already catered for by the words in Clause 46(4)(a),
	"or (if not in writing) must be given in a manner that produces a record of its having been given".
	In another place, we amended Clause 46(4) to put on the face of the Bill further stipulations about the form a decryption notice should take. We have continued that process today. This is in response to industry concerns about the possibility of receiving spoof notices. There is no intention that notices should be given verbally with no written back up. As the Government said in another place, there is clearly a need for consistency regarding notices, for the sake of those authorising and serving notices and for the sake of those receiving them, be it individuals or business.
	There should be an agreed format to notices. How that looks in practice is properly to be the subject of consultation with industry, of course, and others. The Government want to get this right in order to achieve clarity and best practice. It will be taken forward in the public consultation on the code of practice for Part III, which will suggest an example of the notice.
	Amendment No. 146, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, seeks to ensure that there should also be a record of the notice having been received. I do not argue with the intent of that amendment. I question whether it is necessary. If notices are not received, then nobody is under any duty to comply with them. If there were to be a prosecution for non-compliance, the prosecution would have to prove that the notice was duly served. Therefore, it is in the interests of law enforcement to be able to show that the notice was indeed received. For these reasons the Government believe that what the Bill currently stipulates is as much as is necessary.
	At least part of Amendment No. 146A is dealt with by the new clause tabled earlier by the Government requiring notices to be served on a director or equivalent within a company. As regards the other part of that amendment, that the notice should specify the person to whom the notice is given, it is believed that that would be good practice in accordance with the code of practice which will be issued for that part of the Bill.
	The Government believe that the important requirements are already covered by subsection (4) of the clause as the Government propose it should be amended. It is not believed that the addition suggested in Amendment No. 146A will add to the verification process.
	Amendment No. 148 seeks to ensure that the notice specifies which of the purposes listed in Clause 46(3) is applicable. That is certainly how the Government intend notices to be framed. That will be clarified in the code of practice.
	It is believed that the intent of Amendment No. 149 is met by government Amendment No. 149XA, and, for that reason, the noble Lord is requested to withdraw Amendment No. 149.
	The Government do have some sympathy with the intention behind Amendment No. 151. It is the intention of the Government that notices should be served in line with the guidance in the code of practice. There may, however, be some circumstances in which it is not possible, or not possible precisely to follow what is set out in the code. The Government undertake to consider the matter further to explore whether there is any extra reassurance that can be offered on the face of the Bill.
	Amendment No. 155 seeks to ensure that where material is disclosed to an individual who is not the person giving the notice, that person should be in the same category of person as the person giving the notice. It is believed that that will remove a degree of flexibility which will be important.
	Take for example the Technical Assistance Centre: where keys are to be demanded, it may be that secure transmission conditions require that the key be disclosed direct to the Technical Assistance Centre rather than the person giving the notice. Staff at the Technical Assistance Centre will be selected for their technical proficiency and their security classification rather than for the rank which they hold in a particular organisation. It is believed that the stricture required by Amendment No. 155 may limit the flexibility required in terms of secure transmission to the TAC, and for that reason it is resisted. It is to be hoped that it can be agreed that the primary objective here in the rare cases where keys are demanded is that there will be transmission. That is the objective.
	I have outlined the reasons behind the Government's amendments in this group. I have also outlined why the Government do not feel able to accept the amendments of the noble Lords opposite. In one case, the offer has been made to consider the matter further. In other cases, the intent of the noble Lords' amendments is, I believe, already met by those tabled by the Government.
	In the light of those considerations, it is to be hoped that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw their objections. I commend the Government's amendments to the Committee and resist those tabled by Members opposite.

Lord McNally: There were a large number of reassurances in the Minister's reply. As I said, the intention of these amendments was to try to tighten up and clarify these procedures. Some of the amendments have indeed been overtaken by the Government's own amendments.
	Regarding the amendments tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, they look similar and are probably better than ours. I beg to leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 146 to 149 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 149XA and 149YA:
	Page 50, line 33, at end insert--
	("( ) must specify the office, rank or position of the person who for the purposes of Schedule 1 granted permission for the giving of the notice or (if the person giving the notice was entitled to give it without another person's permission) must set out the circumstances in which that entitlement arose;").
	Page 50, line 34, leave out paragraph (e).
	On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 149ZA:
	Page 50, line 36, at end insert--
	("( ) may contain a requirement as described in section 50(1), and may in exceptional circumstances forbid the taking of action to preserve the confidentiality of other communications;").

Lord Lucas: I shall not press the amendment. If the Minister wants to comment on it, that is up to him. Neither shall I speak to Amendment No. 162A in the group; we have covered that subject. The amendment merely suggests another way in which, in the tiny number of cases in which the key will be demanded, we can obtain high-level authorisation. If it cannot be obtained from a judge, it should come from the interception of communications commissioner.
	I shall speak to Amendment No. 176ZA with Amendment No. 171 because the two go together. If the Minister wants to comment on them now, I shall listen to him with great interest. I beg to move.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: My Amendment No. 178 refers to the secrecy of a key once it has been obtained. It is most important that all concerned should be reassured about that. If the Minister can point to a provision in the Bill which places a duty on the authorities concerned to maintain the secrecy, I shall not press my amendment. However, it is important that the provision is written into the Bill somewhere.

Lord McNally: Amendment No. 179 is almost identical to Amendment No. 178. I say merely that the representations I have received indicate a real concern about the security of the key once it enters the government machine, partly because it undermines international confidence. Part of the problem with the Bill relates to differences of perception. The men or women in Whitehall are confident that their remarks and assurances will satisfy any reasonable person who knows how Whitehall or public bodies work, but it is not reassuring to those who are dealing with international companies or trying to maintain business confidence. These are important issues and, like the noble Lord, Lord Cope, I look for guidance and assurance from the Minister.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I shall deal with all the amendments in the group, from Amendment No. 176ZA onwards. That amendment covers ground to which we will come when we discuss the amendments relating to the tipping-off offence. I believe that the concern is that some legitimate action will be caught by the tipping-off offence. When we come to the group of amendments, I shall explain why, for example, revocation of keys--a device for ensuring the confidentiality of systems--does not fall foul of the offence. Similarly, Clause 51 does not prevent or penalise other legitimate action taken to preserve confidentiality.
	Amendment No. 149ZA is most perceptive. I believe that the noble Lord is seeking to be helpful with his proposal. We had thought about including such a provision in the Bill, but, in the event, we decided against it. We believe that there would need to be some kind of additional test for forbidding such action, perhaps including "reasonable" and "proportionate", as well as "exceptional". Again, it is a question of the delicate balancing exercise which we hope we have constructed properly.
	In some instances we are simultaneously criticised for being too draconian in the Bill and for not giving law enforcement officers sufficient powers. It is difficult to get the balance right. Certainly it is difficult to satisfy both ends of the argument. Therefore, we decided not to proceed with a provision along the lines of that set out in the noble Lord's amendment. However, we hint at it in Clause 50(4)(b) as part of the defence where particular software is designed to disclose the fact that a key has been revealed. However, I am grateful to the noble Lord for having raised that particular point.
	From my understanding, Amendment No. 162A tries to add an extra safeguard in cases where keys may be required under a disclosure notice. However, the interception commissioner will not necessarily be the appropriate oversight point for all cases where a key may be demanded. We believe that that nullifies the intended effect of the amendment.
	I turn to Amendments Nos. 178 and 179. I appreciate the spirit behind these amendments. In particular, I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, about international confidence. He is right. It has much to do with perceptions. Perhaps we have embarked upon this erroneously, but I believe that all Members of the Committee can be helpful in trying to add that reassurance to the Bill. That is why I particularly welcome the spirit behind the amendments.
	As Members of the Committee will be aware, we resisted a similar amendment in another place. However, as with the other issues connected with Part III, we recognise fully that the question of secure handling of keys is of critical importance. I am happy to set out our position again.
	First, it is worth stressing that we understand the need to store securely all sensitive material obtained under the Bill. As regards keys obtained lawfully under Part III, Clause 51 already sets out strong safeguards which govern the retention, copying, destruction and treatment generally of material otherwise obtained under the new powers. I believe that the safeguards are described in very practical terms.
	We are not convinced that the addition of the word "safely" is at all necessary. As I said, we set out in practical terms the safeguards provisions which must be in place; for example, with regard to limiting the extent of disclosure. Similar considerations apply to the sensitive material obtained under interception warrants. It is the case now that material obtained lawfully under existing interception powers is held very securely. The reasons for that are plain to see. However, as with the case for Part III, the relevant safeguards provisions which cover interception in Clause 14 of Part I do not contain a specific requirement for material to be held safely. I believe that that point was debated earlier in Committee.
	The safeguards arrangements in Clause 51 will be overseen by independent commissioners who will have a statutory responsibility to examine the adequacy and veracity of the arrangements and to report on inadequacies to the Prime Minister directly. However, that said, industry and the public at large will undoubtedly wish to be reassured that, over and above what appears on the face of the Bill, the Government are taking very seriously the issue of protecting keys. As I said, we believe that to be of fundamental importance.
	Deploying the highest level of protection for keys and other sensitive information relating to key holders is a specific objective of the technical project to establish the dedicated resource--the Technical Assistance Centre--which we are putting in place to assist law enforcement in relation to encryption.
	As Members of the Committee will have seen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made available to the Home Office £25 million of modernisation capital to establish that facility. Work is in progress. Security is paramount, including the security of data and keys being transported to the centre, whether physically or electronically. The commissioners will have access to the facility. It is essential to provide reassurance that it is properly executing functions derived from the legislation.
	Clause 51 already sets out strong safeguards governing the handling of keys. We take the issue seriously. Questions of technical, physical security are being taken forward by the project to establish the TAC. I hope that, with that fairly lengthy explanation, for which I apologise, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Lucas: I am grateful for that explanation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The Earl of Northesk: moved Amendment No. 149A:
	Page 50, line 37, leave out ("the time by") and insert ("a period, not exceeding 40 days, within").

The Earl of Northesk: With your Lordships' leave, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 150A.
	I concede that my choice of 40 days is arbitrary. I am not wedded to it. Indeed, dare I say it, I am more comfortable with the Liberal Democrat amendments.
	The fundamental point on subsection (4)(f) is that the timetable for compliance should be reasonable. At least to that extent, these are probing amendments. I should be grateful to hear the Minister's views on the appropriate timescale. The underlying principle--that a Section 46 notice should have a reasonable timetable for compliance--is a sound one. I beg to move.

Lord McNally: The noble Earl, Lord Northesk, has caught the spirit of our amendments. There should be a time limit. Notices should not be left open-ended. We want the provisions to work, but they should not be left hanging over companies or individuals. We want to probe the Minister on that and I shall be interested to hear his response.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I shall deal with the entire group. The amendments all cover the duration of Section 46 notices. Some people are concerned that they will last for ever, which might place unreasonable requirements on bodies, commercial organisations or individuals. I assure noble Lords that notices will not last for an eternity and I welcome this opportunity to explain our thinking behind the current wording.
	Amendments Nos. 149A, 150A and 152 would all limit the duration of notices--each in a slightly different way. The noble Earl, Lord Northesk, said that he was not wedded to 40 days. I thought that it was a Biblical reference--40 days and 40 nights--and I am impressed that he used it.
	The fears about the duration of notices are misplaced. I shall try to offer some reassurance. It would not be right for a Section 46 notice to last beyond the period for which the seeking of information could be justified as necessary. There are a series of measures in the Bill to achieve that.
	Clause 46(2) states that a person may serve a notice only if he believes that its imposition is necessary or likely to be of value and it must be proportionate to what he is trying to achieve. So, clearly, a notice with a long duration would be entirely inappropriate in minor cases.
	Secondly, Clause 46(4)(f), as currently drafted, requires that the notice should specify the time by which the disclosure is to be made. Again, a notice which required disclosures to be made ad infinitum would be hard to justify on any ground, proportionality included.
	Thirdly, it is important to remember that the decryption power in Part III of this Bill is merely ancillary to existing powers. Clause 51(2)(a) requires that a key disclosed in pursuance of a notice is only used to access information in relation to which power to give such a notice was exercised, or could have been exercised if the key had not already been disclosed. In other words, the duration of notices will in general be tied explicitly to the duration of the underlying statutory power. So, for example, where an interception warrant is authorised for three months, the ancillary Clause 46 notice will expire shortly after the date when the warrant expires, or be renewed along with it. Search warrants under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 usually expire after 28 days. Again, a relevant Clause 46 notice would expire shortly afterwards.
	Fourthly, the code of practice for Part III will set out in considerable detail appropriate duration periods for different types of notice. As we have said many times, we shall consult on the code, which is of course subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
	To sum up, there are already measures in the Bill to ensure that notices may not last for ever, as some have mistakenly believed.
	I turn now to Amendment No. 153. Similar concerns about the duration of notices lie behind this amendment. But what is proposed in this amendment is unnecessary. Clause 46(2) already ensures that notices may be served only where the imposition of a disclosure requirement is necessary and proportionate. Those tests remain in place under the new construction that we are proposing for Clause 46.
	Amendment No. 150 suggests that a person served with a notice should be given a reasonable time to comply with it, and that the authorising officer should take account of the technical difficulties of performing the disclosure in setting a requirement by when compliance must take place. We resisted a similar amendment in Committee in another place. I shall reiterate what we said then.
	What constitutes a "reasonable" time to comply with a notice will undoubtedly vary from case to case and will depend on a number of factors. The technical capacity or expertise of the body or individual on whom the notice is served is one consideration. But it is not the only one. Whether there are particular time pressures on an investigation is clearly another consideration. Would it be reasonable, for example, to require an urgent response to a notice in genuine life and death circumstances? We might legitimately argue that it would. In other cases, a slower response might suffice. But those are questions for the person authorising the use of the decryption power to properly weigh up in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. We shall cover all those issues in the code of practice.
	As we also pointed out, the Bill as drafted provides a reasonable safeguard against unreasonable demands being made at Clause 49(3)(a) by providing a defence to the offence of failure to comply. We retain that defence in the new construction of the offence in Clause 49.
	I hope that that full explanation will enable the noble Earl to withdraw the amendment.

The Earl of Northesk: I am grateful to the Minister for his response, which was, indeed, helpful. It may be that we shall return to this matter at a later stage. I remain keen on phraseology along the lines of "reasonable in the circumstances", but I take the Minister's point in relation to the code of practice, which I hope it will be possible for us to see. For the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 150 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 150ZA:
	Page 50, line 38, leave out paragraph (g) and insert--
	("( ) must set out the disclosure that is required by the notice and the form and manner in which it is to be made;").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 150A not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 150B:
	Page 50, line 40, after ("(a)") insert ("and subsections (4A) and (4B)").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 151 to 152 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 152A:
	Page 50, line 41, at end insert--
	("(4A) Where it appears to a person with the appropriate permission--
	(a) that more than one person is in possession of the key to any protected information,
	(b) that any of those persons is in possession of that key in his capacity as the officer or employee of any body corporate, and
	(c) another of those persons is the body corporate itself or another officer or employee of the body corporate,
	a notice under this section shall not be given, by reference to his possession of the key, to any officer or employee of the body corporate unless he is a senior officer of the body corporate or it appears to the person giving the notice that there is no senior officer of the body corporate and (in the case of an employee) no more senior employee of the body corporate to whom it is reasonably practicable to give the notice.
	(4B) Where it appears to a person with the appropriate permission--
	(a) that more than one person is in possession of the key to any protected information,
	(b) that any of those persons is in possession of that key in his capacity as an employee of a firm, and
	(c) another of those persons is the firm itself or a partner of the firm,
	a notice under this section shall not be given, by reference to his possession of the key, to any employee of the firm unless it appears to the person giving the notice that there is neither a partner of the firm nor a more senior employee of the firm to whom it is reasonably practicable to give the notice.
	(4C) Subsections (4A) and (4B) shall not apply to the extent that there are special circumstances of the case that mean that the purposes for which the notice is given would be defeated, in whole or in part, if the notice were given to the person to whom it would otherwise be required to be given by those subsections.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 153 and 153A not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 153B:
	Page 50, line 42, leave out ("disclosure of a key") and insert ("making of any disclosure").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 154 to 158 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 158A:
	Page 51, line 5, at end insert--
	("( ) In this section "senior officer", in relation to a body corporate, means a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate; and for this purpose "director", in relation to a body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, means a member of the body corporate.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 46, as amended, agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 158B:
	After Clause 46, insert the following new clause--

EFFECT OF NOTICE IMPOSING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT

(".--(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, the effect of a section 46 notice imposing a disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information on a person who is in possession at a relevant time of both the protected information and a means of obtaining access to the information and of putting it into an intelligible form is that he--
	(a) shall be entitled to use any key in his possession to obtain access to the information or to put it into an intelligible form; and
	(b) shall be required, in accordance with the notice imposing the requirement, to make a disclosure of the information in an intelligible form.
	(2) A person subject to a requirement under subsection (1)(b) to make a disclosure of any information in an intelligible form shall be taken to have complied with that requirement if--
	(a) he makes, instead, a disclosure of any key to the protected information that is in his possession; and
	(b) that disclosure is made, in accordance with the notice imposing the requirement, to the person to whom, and by the time by which, he was required to provide the information in that form.
	(3) Where, in a case in which a disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information is imposed on any person by a section 46 notice--
	(a) that person is not in possession of the information,
	(b) that person is incapable, without the use of a key that is not in his possession, of obtaining access to the information and of putting it into an intelligible form, or
	(c) the notice states, in pursuance of a direction under section 47, that it can be complied with only by the disclosure of a key to the information,
	the effect of imposing that disclosure requirement on that person is that he shall be required, in accordance with the notice imposing the requirement, to make a disclosure of any key to the protected information that is in his possession at a relevant time.
	(4) Subsections (5) to (7) apply where a person ("the person given notice")--
	(a) is entitled or obliged to disclose a key to protected information for the purpose of complying with any disclosure requirement imposed by a section 46 notice; and
	(b) he is in possession of more than one key to that information.
	(5) It shall not be necessary, for the purpose of complying with the requirement, for the person given notice to make a disclosure of any keys in addition to those the disclosure of which is, alone, sufficient to enable the person to whom they are disclosed to obtain access to the information and to put it into an intelligible form.
	(6) Where--
	(a) subsection (5) allows the person given notice to comply with a requirement without disclosing all of the keys in his possession, and
	(b) there are different keys, or combinations of keys, in the possession of that person the disclosure of which would, under that subsection, constitute compliance,
	the person given notice may select which of the keys, or combination of keys, to disclose for the purpose of complying with that requirement in accordance with that subsection.
	(7) Subject to subsections (5) and (6), the person given notice shall not be taken to have complied with the disclosure requirement by the disclosure of a key unless he has disclosed every key to the protected information that is in his possession at a relevant time.
	(8) Where, in a case in which a disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information is imposed on any person by a section 46 notice--
	(a) that person has been in possession of the key to that information but is no longer in possession of it,
	(b) if he had continued to have the key in his possession, he would have been required by virtue of the giving of the notice to disclose it, and
	(c) he is in possession, at a relevant time, of information to which subsection (9) applies,
	the effect of imposing that disclosure requirement on that person is that he shall be required, in accordance with the notice imposing the requirement, to disclose all such information to which subsection (9) applies as is in his possession and as he may be required, in accordance with that notice, to disclose by the person to whom he would have been required to disclose the key.
	(9) This subsection applies to any information that would facilitate the obtaining or discovery of the key or the putting of the protected information into an intelligible form.
	(10) In this section "relevant time", in relation to a disclosure requirement imposed by a section 46 notice, means the time of the giving of the notice or any subsequent time before the time by which the requirement falls to be complied with.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 158C not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 159:
	Before Schedule 1, insert the following new schedule--

("SCHEDULE

RELEVANT PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

PART I

RELEVANT AUTHORITIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF SS. 27 AND 28

Police forces etc.

1. Any police force.
	2. The National Criminal Intelligence Service.
	3. The National Crime Squad.
	4. The Serious Fraud Office.

The intelligence services

5. Any of the intelligence services.

The armed forces

6. Any of Her Majesty's forces.

The revenue departments

7. The Commissioners of Customs and Excise.
	8. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue.

Government departments

9. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.
	10. The Ministry of Defence.
	11. The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions.
	12. The Department of Health.
	13. The Home Office.
	14. The Department of Social Security.
	15. The Department of Trade and Industry.

The National Assembly for Wales

16. The National Assembly for Wales.

Local authorities

17. Any local authority (within the meaning of section 1 of the Local Government Act 1999).

Other bodies

18. The Environment Agency.
	19. The Financial Services Authority.
	20. The Food Standards Agency.
	21. The Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce.
	22. The Personal Investment Authority.
	23. The Post Office.

PART II

RELEVANT AUTHORITIES FOR THE PURPOSES ONLY OF S. 27

The Health and Safety Executive

24. The Health and Safety Executive.

NHS bodies in England and Wales

25. A Health Authority established under section 8 of the National Health Service Act 1977.
	26. A Special Health Authority established under section 11 of the National Health Service Act 1977.
	27. A National Health Service trust established under section 5 of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990.

The Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain

28. The Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Schedule 1 [Persons having the appropriate permission]:

Lord Cope of Berkeley: had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 159A:
	Page 83, line 1, leave out paragraph 4.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: The issues pertaining to Amendment No. 159A were discussed when dealing with the related amendments grouped with Amendment No. 139A. Therefore, I do not propose to move it.

[Amendment No. 159A not moved.]
	[Amendment No. 159B not moved.]
	Schedule 1 agreed to.
	Clause 47 [Disclosure of information in place of key]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 159C:
	Page 51, line 7, leave out from beginning to ("unless") in line 21 and insert--
	("(1) A section 46 notice imposing a disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information shall not contain a statement for the purposes of section (Effect of notice imposing disclosure requirement)(3)(c)").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 160 and 161 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 161A:
	Page 51, line 23, leave out ("a section 46") and insert ("the").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 162 to 164A not moved.]
	Clause 47, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 48 [Arrangements for payments for key disclosure]:
	[Amendment No. 164AA not moved.]
	Clause 48 agreed to.
	Clause 49 [Failure to comply with a notice]:

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 164AB:
	Page 52, line 2, leave out from ("person") to end of line 6 and insert ("to whom a section 46 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice.").

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am happy to deal with this group of amendments if the Committee so desires. I understand entirely the motives behind the amendments in the group. We have been considering whether or not the offence at Clause 49 can be redrafted so as to retain its effectiveness while removing any potential for harm to justice. It will be noted that we tabled Amendments Nos. 164AB, 167B, 167C and 167D as a result of our deliberations.
	These are difficult issues and it is a difficult offence to formulate. It involves many technicalities--the possession of a key--which it will be difficult for the prosecution to prove. However, I shall try to address the amendments as briefly as I can.
	Amendments Nos. 164B and 164C seek to introduce the notion of intent into the offence. It is said that it should not be enough for the prosecution simply to prove that an individual did not comply with the notice, but also that there should have been some intent on their part. We resisted this in the past and shall continue to do so. A Section 46 notice will impose a legal burden. The offence is clear. It is simply a failure to comply with the notice. There is of course a defence for those who were not able to comply because it was not practical to do so.
	I can be more helpful on Amendment No. 164C. This would say that a person is only guilty if he intentionally fails to comply; in other words, a person who fails to comply because he never received the notice or through sheer inadvertence is not guilty. We do not feel the strict liability which the offence imposes is onerous or unjust and do not believe the amendment is necessary. In the light of what I have said, I hope that Members of the Committee will agree that to raise the burden on the prosecution any higher would be unnecessary and would remove the efficacy of the deterrent. I hope noble Lords will consider not moving those amendments.
	In Amendment No. 164D the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, seeks to add a stipulation that the offence will only work where someone failed to comply with a valid notice served under Section 46. We agree with the sentiment behind this amendment but believe it to be a clarification too far. There can be no question, under the Bill as currently drafted, that the offence will only work if the Section 46 notice is valid.
	Turning to Amendment No. 165, there are difficulties with the notion of proving that a person,
	"has had possession of the key".
	Let me spell out why the Government included this in Clause 49(1)(b). This limb to the offence is included not because we intend that people should be prosecuted where they have had possession of a key but have no longer got it when they are served with a notice; that is not now and never has been our intention. Rather, this part of the offence is there as explicit recognition of the extreme difficulty of prosecuting these offences.
	The real issue created by the second limb of the offence is what burden is placed on the defendant where the prosecution has only been able to prove prior possession of the key. We have tabled an amendment making it clear that where the prosecution has been able to prove previous possession, that alone cannot lead to a conviction if the defendant raises some doubt as to whether or not he still has the key. I believe that that will deal with the issue addressed by Amendment No. 165.
	Amendment No. 166 tries to add the possibility that the prosecution need only prove possession of a key or that someone was reasonably able to obtain such possession. I believe that that possibility is already provided for in Clause 52(2), to which we have tabled a slight amendment. Amendment No. 166 is therefore unnecessary and I ask the noble Lord not to move it.
	Amendments Nos. 167 and 167A come from broadly the same motives. Amendment No. 167A includes the notion of intention, with which I dealt in my comments on Amendments Nos. 164B and 164C. The rest of the thrust of Amendments Nos. 167 and 167A deals with the time by which a person may have had possession of a key and the difficulties caused by including in Clause 49(1)(b) the notion that a person may be guilty of an offence where he,
	"has had possession of the key".
	Those issues are addressed by government amendments.
	We have tabled amendments that make it clear that proof of previous possession can lead to a conviction. However, it will not do so if the defendant raises an issue about whether he still has possession of the key. Once that happens, the burden falls back on the prosecution in the normal way. I believe that that will deal with the issue addressed by Amendments Nos. 167 and 167A. Accordingly, I hope that noble Lords will not press those amendments.
	Lawyers refer to this as placing an "evidential" burden on the defendant, as opposed to a "persuasive" or "legal" burden. It means that the defendant simply has to raise some evidence to discharge the burden. That could be done, for example, by the defendant going into the witness box and saying that he has lost his key, or by producing some evidence that his system has crashed.
	I believe that I understand the intent behind Amendment No. 168. In providing for a defence to the offence under Clause 49, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, wishes to ensure that it will be sufficient for an individual to hand over any key that enables possession of the information to be obtained rather than a key that is specifically demanded. As I said earlier, it will not be possible under the Bill for the authorities to identify a specific key that they wish to be handed to them--rather, they must identify the protected information in question. That being the case, any key that unlocks the protected information will work for the purposes of the defence at Clause 49(3)(c). Again, we have tabled amendments to make that clearer.
	Amendment No. 168A tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, is an attempt to make it plain on the face of the Bill that, where a key has been destroyed as part of routine practice designed to protect confidentiality, this should be a defence against any prosecution. Once more, that is already catered for in the Bill as drafted. All the circumstances set out in this amendment would undoubtedly meet the threshold required to be proved by a defence in a case where previous possession has been proved. Indeed, in as far as this amendment only provides for destruction of keys as part of "routine" practice, it may not go as far as the current situation outlined under the clause as drafted. As currently drafted--and even more so if government amendments are accepted--it should be enough just to explain that a key has been destroyed in a particular set of circumstances.
	Amendment No. 168B seeks to lower the burden of proof on the defendant in this case to an evidential burden. I am sure that Members of the Committee will have noticed that a similar amendment has been tabled under my name. However, there is one significant difference. As drafted, Amendment No. 168B would seek to lower the burden of proof on the defendant in those cases where his defence is that compliance with the requirement was impractical. The Government's intention is only to apply this to the defence of showing lack of possession.
	We do not see the need to lower the burden on the defendant as outlined in this amendment. This defence is for someone who, on the face of it, has committed the offence. The notice has been proved to have been served on him; he has been proved to be in possession of the key; he has not complied with the notice; but he is claiming that there are circumstances which made it impractical for him to comply. Necessarily, those circumstances are within his knowledge. Therefore, it must be for him to show them. In the light of this and the changes proposed by the Government, I ask noble Lords not to press the amendment.
	The discussion that we are having on Amendments Nos. 168C and 169A was forecast at Second Reading and also in another place. Although I share to a considerable extent the concerns expressed and can see the attractions in moving in the direction proposed, I believe that there are constraints on us in this respect. In the final analysis, I do not believe that we can make such a move.
	Amendment No. 168C is a very straightforward proposition--the maximum sentence for failure to comply with a Clause 46 notice should be 10 years, not two. This would be designed specifically to cater for the circumstance in which an individual sought to conceal his activities by not handing over a key in the full knowledge that, were his activities to be revealed, he would be facing a much longer sentence. How will the prosecuting authorities, or the judiciary, ever know the nature of protected information in a case where an individual has not complied with a Section 46 notice?
	I share some of the frustrations of those who seek to move these amendments, but we need to focus on the offence in question. The offence is not complying with a notice under Section 46. By any view, a sentence of 10 years for such an offence must be disproportionate.
	I turn to Amendment No. 169. I believe that in the fundamental interests of justice we must focus on the offence at Clause 49. That offence is failure to comply with a notice served under Section 46. By definition, if someone fails to comply with a Section 46 notice, the prosecution will not know the nature of the material that has been protected. They may have strong suspicions but they cannot know what the material is.
	Even where the nature of other charges against an individual may lead one to have suspicions that the material has been protected, I still believe that the interests of justice dictate that the sentence for this offence must focus solely on what that offence is. I believe that a situation in which a person can be convicted of, say, an offence of unlawful possession on the assumption that unknown material is treated as incriminating risks offending against the presumption of innocence. I appreciate that Amendment No. 169 involves a different way of trying to achieve a similar objective to that in Amendments Nos. 168C and 169A. We need to focus on the offence. For that reason we believe that the appropriate sentence for this particular offence should not exceed a two year prison term and/or fine.
	I have outlined our views in detail and I have tried to draw attention to the issues which I think are dealt with by the Government amendment in this group. In the light of that I ask noble Lords not to move their amendments. I beg to move.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I thank the Minister for Amendments Nos. 167B to 167D, which go to the very heart of the unease felt on these Benches--and, indeed, on the Government's own Benches--about the standard of proof which prevailed in this important clause. As the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, pointed out in the course of rejecting one of the amendments in the group, the maximum sentence for breaching this clause is two years' imprisonment and a fine.
	I shall speak briefly to Amendments Nos. 164B and 167, which stand in my name and those of my colleagues. We propose to withdraw Amendments Nos. 167A and 168B. However, I hope that I may raise just one point on the question of intent, on mens rea, in relation to offences under Clause 46. Given that it is a serious criminal offence, I am not content merely to have the Minister assert that the Government do not propose in this case to apply the normal test which is basic to our criminal legal system; namely, that there should be no serious criminal offence found without an intent to commit the crime. The Minister might, in responding to this short debate, say something about that.
	The second point I wish to raise concerns our Amendment No. 167. In our view, there is virtue--I believe that others share this approach--in requiring any notice to be time limited so that the person or persons to whom it is addressed know where they are in terms of the length of its validity. Our proposed Amendment No. 167 is probing in this regard. Again, I should be glad if the Minister could say whether he sees any problem with that because it seems to us that a time limit is a practical and sensible restriction on the scope of the notices.
	Finally, I raise two questions of interpretation on government Amendments Nos. 167B and 167C. Amendment No. 167B provides that if it is shown that a person was in possession of a key and so on, certain consequences flow. I should like to refer to the key phrase,
	"if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key".
	Is that, as I hope and assume it is, a test on the balance of probabilities and not therefore a test beyond reasonable doubt? If that is correct--I believe it to be so--we have no trouble with it. If, on the other hand, the person who is at risk under that provision has to show at that stage beyond reasonable doubt, we do not think that the amendment works.
	My second query is in relation to the crucial amendment, Amendment No. 167C. Paragraph (a) states that,
	"sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it".
	"Sufficient evidence", I assume and hope, in this context means prima facie evidence and does not mean a balance of probabilities. We are content with the arrangements proposed under this amendment to throw the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt back on to the prosecution but only if the evidence--the sufficient evidence that has to be produced by the accused--is prima facie evidence. Subject to those points, we are content with the amendments tabled by the Government.

The Earl of Northesk: Perhaps I may comment very briefly on the amendments standing in my name in the group. I think I am content with the Minister's response to Amendment No. 164D. I shall certainly read the Minister's comments with care. As to Amendment No. 168A, I am less certain. One of the many difficulties I have with the Bill is that, in its strident efforts to be technology neutral, it often conveys the impression that either it is ignorant of the way in which current technology operates, or pretends that there is no technology at all. The issue with which this amendment, Amendment No. 168A, attempts to deal is the particular case in point. I shall certainly read the Minister's comments very carefully indeed, but I suspect that this will be an issue to which I shall have to return at a later stage.

Lord Lucas: All that Amendment No. 169 does is to try to draw a line from the current position on the right to silence--that is the right of the court to draw an inference from the silence of a defendant. What we are talking about here is just another instance of silence by a defendant. He has refused to provide a key to enable the court to see what lies behind the files on his computer. I should have thought there should be a similar right for the court to draw conclusions from that as it sees fit.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I rise to oppose Amendment No. 169. I am more used to being in alliance with the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, on these matters, but it seems to me that this is not a good analogy with the existing inferences that the courts can draw where an accused is silent. This is rather piercing the veil, as one might put it, of past convictions, which is a key foundation of our criminal law. Someone who has been found guilty in the past shall not in the course of a new trial have that past guilt around his or her neck. That would be a backward rather than a forward step, although I understand the point behind the proposal.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: I am glad that the Government have moved on the question of burden of proof. It was important that they should do so. I shall not comment any further on the points made by Members of the Committee on that issue.
	Amendments Nos. 164C and 168C stand in my name and are essentially a pair. They seek to draw attention to the dilemma which, along with several other noble Lords, I mentioned at Second Reading. If someone is holding incriminating evidence on his computer, he may refuse to give the key because the incriminating evidence might incur a severe sentence. In those circumstances, if it is thought that someone has done that, that person deserves to receive a sentence longer than two years because he would receive a much longer sentence if he were convicted of an offence of, say, paedophilia as a result of the police gaining access to the computer.
	However, this dilemma appears to be one that none of us can solve. I accept the Minister's point that a sentence of 10 years is a high penalty to impose in many of the cases that would be brought in this area. I fear that the dilemma remains and perhaps there is nothing that we can do about it.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: At last I feel the urge to join in. I am delighted that my noble friends Lord McNally and Lord Phillips of Sudbury have been leading on this extremely complex Bill. I regret that I have not been able to join in the debates that have been held since Second Reading. That has not been entirely helped by the Government's change of dates for the Committee stage. However, I can assure noble Lords that I have followed the deliberations avidly.
	In the debate on Second Reading, I raised concerns about the problems surrounding the penalty for failing to disclose a key. I must say that the view expressed by the police is that they would definitely prefer to see a far more severe sentence. They feel that this offence must be an arrestable offence, along with powers of search as set out in Sections 18 and 32 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. As it stands, serious and organised criminals might possibly risk the two-year penalty--the likely tariff would be six to 18 months--if the encrypted material could provide evidence of serious criminality such as drug trafficking or paedophilia. If convicted on that evidence, they would face prison sentences of 10 years to life. On the face of it, the penalty provides little deterrent for major criminals. I am sure that the Minister will recognise the concerns of the police here, although I note that he has given reasons why he does not feel that this can be taken any further.
	However, I agree with the Minister that a blanket 10-year sentence will not provide the answer. We need to be far more specific about what such a sentence would mean in practice. It could be a draconian measure. As the Minister said, it could well be disproportionate.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I believe that most of the questions that have been put to me were dealt with in my opening remarks. I do not intend to rehearse all those arguments again. There was perhaps rather too much of it even for my benefit and enjoyment.
	However, I should like to respond to one or two questions put by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. He raised a question about the way in which a matter would be considered under Amendment No. 167B. The noble Lord said that he would be satisfied if the test was made on the balance of probabilities. So far as concerns the Government, it would not have to extend even as far as that; a weaker version of it would be acceptable. I hope that helps the noble Lord.
	The noble Lord also asked the Government to look again at the issue of intent as it is covered in Clause 46. At present we hold the view that Amendment No. 164B is unworkable, but that Amendment No. 164C may be more effective. We should like to give it further detailed consideration. If the noble Lord is content, I shall return to that matter, perhaps on Report.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Is it unfair to ask why he thinks that a normal criminal test of intent is unworkable?

Lord Bassam of Brighton: That is not what I am saying. I said that we shall look at the issue in relation to Clause 46. We believe that Amendment No. 164B is not workable, but we believe that the way the proposal is expressed in Amendment No. 164C may well be workable. It is for that reason that I want us to have the time to give it further consideration. I am not querying the issue of intent as an issue in itself and how one expresses and understands it. That is not the point of the observation.
	The noble Lord asked about "sufficient evidence". We see "sufficient evidence" as being any evidence that raises an issue. It is, if anything, less than prima facie evidence. I hope that that resolves that issue.
	The noble Baroness spoke with considerable wisdom in addressing issues relating to the penalty, as did the noble Lord, Lord Cope. But I do not think that it is an easy matter for us to resolve. Both are right, but it is a matter of getting it right for the nature of the offence. At the end of the day, it comes down to an issue of compliance. That is what we have to satisfy. Those were the main additional points which were perhaps not covered in my earlier comments.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 164B to 167A not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 167B:
	Page 52, line 7, leave out from ("section,") to end of line 8 and insert ("if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key to any protected information at any time before the time of the giving of the section 46 notice, that person shall be taken for the purposes of those proceedings to have continued to be in possession of that key at all subsequent times, unless it is shown--").

Lord Bach: I have already spoken to this amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 167C:
	Page 52, line 10, leave out from ("it") to end of line 14 and insert--
	("( ) For the purposes of this section a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if--
	(a) sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it; and
	(b) the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").

Lord Bach: I have spoken to this amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 167D:
	Page 52, line 16, leave out from ("defence") to end of line 31 and insert ("for that person to show--
	(a) that it was not reasonably practicable for him to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the section 46 notice before the time by which he was required, in accordance with that notice, to make it; but
	(b) that he did make that disclosure as soon after that time as it was reasonably practicable for him to do so").

Lord Bach: I beg to move this amendment, to which I have already spoken.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 168 to 169 not moved.]
	Clause 49, as amended, agreed to.

Baroness Thornton: moved Amendment No. 169A:
	After Clause 49, insert the following new clause--
	:TITLE3:REGISTER OF OFFENDERS
	(" .--(1) Where a person is found guilty of an offence under section 49 this fact shall be recorded on a register which the Secretary of State shall establish and maintain in such manner as will afford convenient and rapid access to anyone with a material interest in knowing whether or not a person has been found guilty of an offence under section 49.
	(2) Pursuant to subsection (1) the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament within three months of Royal Assent to this Act his directions as to how the register shall be established and maintained, and the circumstances in which, and by whom, it may be accessed and at what cost.").

Baroness Thornton: This amendment seeks to establish a register of offenders convicted for not handing over their encryption key or clear text. It has the support of all the UK's major children's charities: NCH Action for Children; the NSPCC; Barnardo's; Childline; the Children's Society; the National Children's Bureau; and the National Council for Voluntary Child Care Organisations. That is an indication of the seriousness with which those organisations regard this issue, which was also raised in another place.
	The purpose of the amendment is to establish a register of anyone and everyone who is convicted for refusing to hand over their key so that prospective employers, on discovering that a job applicant has such a conviction, can at least ask the person concerned to explain the circumstances which led to the conviction. It does not mean that anyone convicted will necessarily be assumed to be a child pornographer, a paedophile, or anything else for that matter; but an employer would at least be alerted to the fact that the person dabbled with or used encryption software and refused to assist the police when asked, even to the point of receiving a conviction for the refusal.
	This provision is particularly important for the children's charities (and many educational institutions), which routinely refer to List 99 and the Sex Offenders Register for many categories of jobs that they advertise. The amendment would establish one more register that it would be essential for them to refer to. The extra administrative burden for them would be tiny in comparison with the comfort that they would obtain from having done this check.
	If someone was convicted for refusing to hand over the key and escaped going on one of the existing registers, they could then in theory secure a job working with children. Who wants to take the responsibility for the tragic consequences for a child or children if that happened?
	Someone who has evidence of serious offences encrypted and installed on their machines would be sorely tempted not to hand over the key and risk conviction for the lesser offence, carrying a maximum sentence of two years. The Guardian and other newspapers have lamented the existence of that obvious escape route, but I see no immediate or clear way around it.
	I make no apology for reminding the Committee of the case of Mr. Gary Glitter, who, had he encrypted the images on his PC, would probably never have been arrested in the first place. But if he had been, and had refused to hand over his key, he would never have been convicted of the offence of possessing child pornography and would never have suffered the opprobrium that went with it. He would also have escaped being on the sex offenders' register, and at least in theory, although it might be unlikely in his case, would then have been free to apply for work in a residential children's' home.
	There is clearly a real need for the Government to address this issue. I am encouraged by my observation that my noble friend the Minister has heeded the justified concerns of the industry and civil liberties organisations. I hope that he will give similar consideration to the organisations that have expressed their concerns about the matter. I beg to move.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I regret to say that I must oppose the amendment. I appreciate the way in which it was put forward. I understand the reasons for it and have every sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said about the children's charities that she mentioned. I suppose that I should declare an interest and say that I act for some of them.
	The way in which the amendment is drafted does not confine it to children; it gives anyone with a material interest in knowing previous convictions a right to have access to the register. It blows a hole in the fundamental principle of British justice that convictions are not public knowledge, willy-nilly, and that anybody tried for an offence is not to have, as I put it earlier, a label round their neck saying "Previous convictions: 1,2,3,4,5". If the proposal came anywhere near satisfying the basic, traditional protection of people in civil society, it would have to be much more narrowly drafted. Therefore, I must oppose it.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I find myself, not in great difficulty, but in sympathy with the spirit of the amendment of my noble friend Lady Thornton and somewhat perplexed that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, does not think that its subject matter is an issue in the way in which it has been set out. He probably recognises that there is an issue but does not believe that it should be pressed in this way.
	The amendment offers a fairly imaginative way around some of the problems that we have identified in the past. It is welcome that the child-caring charities, those concerned with the issue, have lent a measure of support to my noble friend in bringing the amendment forward. However, I have one or two concerns and questions about it, not least because we have to contemplate the circumstances in which individuals are convicted of offences. At its heart, the amendment suggests that offenders be placed on a register. I have no great difficulty with that principle, but I question the use to which the register might be put. I suppose that it could be asked whether it would be available for those who would employ people who cared for children. If so, there must be a variety of possibilities as to why people might offend under Clause 49. Not all such cases may arise from the possession of paedophile or similar material. That is perhaps one of the deficiencies of the clause as drafted.
	There is a possibility that a register brands others who have offended, perhaps through a misplaced notion of civil liberties, by intentionally withholding information when served with a Clause 46 notice. I do not think that the amendment does the job, and it may be a dangerous path to follow. There is some light on the issue. As I understand it, registers are already in existence which provide a measure of comfort. The DfEE runs a register called List 99. I do not fully understand what it means, but that is its title. That register is compiled under the Education Reform Act 1988, Section 218(6) of which gives the Secretary of State power to give a personal direction that an individual be prohibited from employment which also involves access to children.
	In relation to this debate, a person need not necessarily have a conviction for a sex offence for the Secretary of State to give such a direction. It may appear to be a draconian power, but I believe that it is equal to the problem. However, sufficient grounds must be provided about the position of the individual so that his name can be added to the register. Of course, that relies on good intelligence about the person's involvement in paedophile behaviour which cannot go before a court. The Department of Health also has a list based on similar principles.
	While I fully understand the motives behind the amendment--I appreciate the ingenuity of my noble friend in moving it--in all likelihood the best way forward at this stage is to have continuing dialogue on the subject to see whether we can be helpful. The case of Gary Glitter is a lesson to us all. I do not quite see the problem to which my noble friend refers, but perhaps we need to devote further time to it. I give an undertaking to keep the situation under review. It may serve us all if further discussions take place between noble Lords with an interest in this matter and officials who have responsibility for this area of policy. With that, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Lord Lucas: It may be of interest to look at some of the circumstances that surround this particular cause. Anyone who finds himself on the register as a result of the amendment must first have had a key required of him. The Minister assures us that that will arise only in exceptional circumstances and on only a very few occasions. Presumably, therefore, the individual will be one against whom there is a good deal of prima facie evidence of involvement in activities which the Government seek to prove against him. In those circumstances, surely it is possible to put such an individual on List 99, if nothing else.
	The situation would be improved if the Government changed their opinion on the inclusion of Clauses 16 and 17. In those circumstances, if there is a good deal of prima facie evidence it is more than likely that it will be based on the interception of communications which at present cannot be produced in court. That must be the reason why the Government are so desperate to obtain additional evidence of wrongdoing.
	As I understand it, on the sole occasion when a difficulty arose as a result of a paedophile encrypting data on a hard disk there was sufficient evidence in clear to obtain a conviction, so at least that individual ended up on the register. One hopes that in most cases, given the very narrow circumstances in which people end up with a conviction under this part of the Bill, there will be sufficient evidence available either to convict them or at least to put them on List 99. Perhaps in that way the problem will not arise. However, the inability to catch paedophiles because of their use of encryption is to be laid at the door of Clauses 16 and 17 of the Bill, not this part of it.

Baroness Thornton: I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for his support. I know that he and I share an interest in this matter. I also thank my noble friend for his remarks, from which I take some comfort. We are talking about serious crimes about which the children's charities are enormously concerned. As with other serious crimes, new technology is being used. We shall take up the offer to continue the discussions. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 50 [Tipping-off]:
	[Amendment No. 169B not moved.]

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: moved Amendment No. 170:
	Page 52, leave out lines 42 and 43 and insert--
	("during the period within which the notice is in effect, to keep secret from any specified person, or class of persons, the giving of the notice, its contents and the things done in pursuance of it, and to inform any other person who is made aware of any of those things of the requirements of the said provision").

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: In moving the amendment, I speak also to Amendments Nos. 172 to 174. These amendments relate to the new offence of tipping-off. It is one of the few phrases in the Bill about which one can feel friendly. It is a new offence. It has no parallel in British law. The amendments are put forward in a probing spirit, in the hope that other Members of the Committee will lend their wisdom to this debate.
	There is serious unease about whether the provision will create more problems than it solves. I argue that on the ground of the barbaric complexity of the arrangements governing tipping-off. I believe that it could prove more of a stumbling block and a source of angst to operators in the e-commerce world than any other provision in the Bill. I can imagine the managing director of any one of a thousand companies writing to his or her solicitors asking, "Would you kindly advise us on our risk vis-a-vis Clause 50?" As a practising solicitor, I assure the Committee that he or she would receive a 20 or 30 page letter--solicitors guard their backs carefully these days--raising spectres that the Minister would scarcely contemplate, let alone think were within the ambit of the clause. The provision is extraordinarily wide and loose. Amendment No. 170 seeks to contain the extent and reach of the clause by requiring the notice to specify the person or class of person to whom it relates. I shall be grateful if the Minister will tell me whether the amendment is superfluous. At the end of Clause 50(3) there appear the words,
	"to keep secret from a particular person".
	Should one infer from that subsection that all Clause 46 notices must specify the person or persons in relation to whom the secret must be kept?
	The consequences of passing information to others may be extremely difficult to contain and control. Within an organisation many people may have access to keys or protected information. They may be unaware of the consequences of passing on that information to others. It is vital that the knowledge of a Clause 46 notice can be passed from the person upon whom it is served to others within the same organisation.
	I move the amendment in the hope that others will contribute to this extremely difficult issue. The Police Act 1964, as amended, provides that,
	"any person who obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty shall be guilty of an offence".
	That extends to tipping-off offences. The case of Regina v. Green and Moore, which was heard in the High Court in October 1981, established that quite specifically. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, was acting for the prosecution in that case when they secured a conviction for tipping-off.
	It may help if I refer to a particular case mentioned in that judgment; the case of Regina v. Westlie, a Canadian case. A plain clothes officer was patrolling the streets of one of the less salubrious parts of Vancouver in order to see whether any of the citizens were begging or committing other offences. Mr Westlie frustrated his efforts by walking alongside him and explaining to all who were interested that he was an "under-cover pig" or an "under-cover fuzz". The police brought a prosecution under an equivalent of the old English provision of obstructing a constable in the course of his duty, and obtained a conviction.
	My question is whether we need to go through the agony of this long and tortuous new clause. Why can we not rely on the old obstruction of justice provision, which appears to catch tipping-off cases in any event? I beg to move.

Viscount Astor: I have to admit that I find Clause 50 rather mystifying. I, of course, am not a lawyer, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Phillips.
	An important point was raised in relation to subsection (5)(b), where the idea is given that it might specify a person. Subsection (1)(b) requires,
	"every other person who becomes aware of it or of its contents, to keep secret the giving of the notice, its contents and the things done in pursuance of it".
	The subsection seems to be extraordinarily wide in its ambit. Does it, for example, prevent someone who has been given a notice discussing it with his solicitor? I do not know. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is a solicitor and he may be able to tell us. Does it mean that anybody who has received a notice cannot write to his MP? From whom must he keep it secret?

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: As the noble Viscount asks that question direct, I will answer. There is a provision allowing disclosure to a professional legal adviser, but not to one's bookmaker or barber.

Viscount Astor: What about a Member of Parliament? If someone wanted to complain to his MP or, indeed, write to one of your Lordships, that seems to be disbarred by the Bill. I wonder whether the Minister could confirm how that works. It does appear that the clause goes beyond laws that are in existence and which relate to other others. The Minister will have to justify the powers in the Bill for your Lordships to be reassured by Clause 50.

Viscount Goschen: I, too, am mystified by the provision. The practicalities of the Bill would seem to be extraordinarily complex and perhaps when a notice is served a copy of Clause 50 could be sent along also and the person told to work out for himself who can or cannot be told. The practicalities are very real.
	It would appear that the possibility of committing an offence by mistake would be serious. May one discuss it with one's secretary or one's board colleagues, or, if one is working for a subsidiary of an American company, is one not allowed to tell the principal? I imagine there could be a duty upon a director to his board and shareholders that could be contravened by not making any statement. It seems almost inconceivable that this could not be dealt with in a much more straightforward and brief manner. The notice served could specify who could and who could not be told, rather than having to work it out from a very long section of the Bill.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I had hoped to be brief, but perhaps it is worth spending a little time on the amendment. The major issue is that of secrecy and it might help if I explain the purpose of the offence.
	The offence is not a new invention. Perhaps Members of the Committee opposite will be more familiar with it than I because it is based on precedents in Section 93D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and Section 53 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. We believe that the provision is needed to preserve the covert nature of an investigation and to deter deliberate and intentional behaviour designed to frustrate statutory procedures and assist others to evade detection. That is reflected in the construction of the clause.
	It is important to remember that the secrecy requirement will not apply in all cases--a fact which must be understood, but has been overlooked by a number of critics. As with other parts of the Bill, some ludicrous scenarios have been painted about the perceived effect of the tipping off offence.
	I shall attempt to clarify the issue. Clause 59(3) limits the occasions when such a provision may be imposed. There is simply no need for secrecy in all cases, which the Bill recognises. By definition, it need not apply when a person is asked for the key to his own data. But were another party has access to a relevant key, we believe it reasonable in certain circumstances to require him to keep quiet about being served with a notice in order to prevent a suspect, for example, discovering that he is the subject of an investigation. That is analogous to interception where, under Clause 18, a service provider is required to keep quiet--

Viscount Astor: Perhaps I may ask the Minister a question on that point. Does that mean that it must be kept secret from the person involved in that interception or must it be kept secret from everyone? The Minister was not clear about that.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I believe the answer is that it must be kept secret from everyone.
	Some of the concerns about the offence appear to come from business which is concerned, perhaps mistakenly, that the decryption notices would perhaps be served on junior employees in an organisation who would not be permitted, because of a secrecy provision, from telling anyone senior. That was behind some of the recent criticism of the Government in seeking to act as some kind of "shadow director".
	I believe that those concerns should have been allayed by the amendments we proposed to Clause 46 concerning the serving of notices on directors. However, I recognise that there may be some lingering doubts about Clause 50.
	The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, asked a fundamental question about this offence. He asked why it was necessary and why we could not rely on the general interfering-with-the-course-of-justice-type provision which has existed in the past. We decided that, on balance, we would be right to have the offence in the Bill, which is why Clause 53 sets down limits as to when a secrecy requirement might be imposed because of its seriousness. We carefully considered whether an offence such as interfering with the course of justice might be more appropriate. It has also been suggested that we could have relied on contempt of court to achieve what we want by way of deterrent. However, we do not believe that that would cover everything, particularly where the Secretary of State authorised interception warrants.
	We therefore believe that the provision is essential. It is contained in existing statutes and for those strong reasons it is important that we pursue it. However, I understand the strength of feeling raised by Members of the Committee who have opposed it. However, we have gone through the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, and we do not believe that the offence is defined too broadly. The Bill restricts the situations in which a secrecy provision can be imposed. I believe that there may be difficulties with the approach suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. Therefore, with those comments and with the undertaking that I have given, I ask Members of the Committee who have moved amendments on this issue to withdraw them.

The Earl of Northesk: I gain the impression from what the Minister said that statutory precedents exist for the tipping-off offence as drafted on the face of the Bill. Perhaps it would assist the Committee if we were told what those precedents are.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I did quote them and I am happy to quote them again. If the noble Earl wishes me to do so, I shall be happy to send him a copy of the particular clauses to which I have referred.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: Before the Minister sits down, perhaps I may also ask a brief question. In my opening remarks, I asked what was the extent of the provision in Clause 50(3) in so far as it refers to the words,
	"keep secret from a particular person".
	Perhaps the Minister will write to me to let me know how that requirement works with the remainder of the clause. It may be that our amendment is unnecessary if that is implicit in the requirements of a proper Section 46 notice.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I should be happier to correspond with the noble Lord on that matter, then both he and I shall understand it more clearly.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 171:
	Page 52, line 46, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert ("the consent of an ordinary Surveillance Commissioner has been obtained").

Lord Lucas: First, I bring the Committee some good news: we are now half-way through the Marshalled List. I have no intention of calling a Division until about half-past one in the morning, just to make sure that the Chief Whip is doing his job.
	Amendment No. 171 is simple. It seems to me that offences in the area of tipping-off cause industry a good deal of concern. I refer in particular to the scenario mentioned earlier of a relatively junior employee--say, the systems manager of the computer department--being the person on whom the notice is served. Particular concern may arise if a notice is served in conjunction with the opening up of keys to continuing data traffic so that the security of a significant firm is breached. I can imagine a situation where that might occur; for example, if we had another BCCI on our hands. It may be clear that the board of directors is corrupt but they may well be employing honest people lower down.
	However, it seems to me that, in order to give comfort to industry in general, people must be sure that there are adequate safeguards on the occasions when the tipping-off offence is put into place, otherwise there will be a temptation to put it there in every case. That is simply my suggestion as to what one such safeguard might be. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I understand the noble Lord's concern. However, this matter comes down to a question of practicalities. As the clause is drafted, we do not believe that Amendment No. 171 would add any extra safeguards. For that reason, we shall resist the amendment. I can understand the reasoning behind it and I have a degree of sympathy for it. However, I believe that, if the noble Lord reflects on the way in which we have recast our clauses under Part III, he will appreciate that this amendment is unnecessary and probably would be disproportionate in all the circumstances. For those reasons, I invite him to withdraw his amendment this evening.

Lord Lucas: I shall certainly look at the Bill as it appears after Committee stage and I hope that the noble Lord will have convinced me. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 171A:
	Page 53, line 6, leave out ("the key to which it relates is a key to protected information which") and insert ("the protected information to which it relates").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 172 to 174 not moved.]

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 175:
	Page 53, line 26, leave out ("software") and insert ("systems").

Lord Lucas: I merely wonder why the word "software" is used when hardware might be involved instead of or as well as software. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I presume that the noble Lord is concerned about futureproofing. We, too, have sought to ensure that the Bill is futureproofed.
	Subsection (5) has been included because the industry requested it to ensure that specific software that has been designed to give an automatic warning that a key has been compromised will not fall foul of the tipping-off offence. There are sensible security reasons for that design option.
	The subsection provides a statutory defence when disclosure occurs as a result of the action of the software and the person concerned was not reasonably able to stop that from happening after being served with a notice. There is clearly a need for the provision.
	We have had no little discussion within the Government about the drafting of the clause. Its present construction reflects counsel's attempt to provide something accurate and workable. Your Lordships will note that the subsection is the same as Clause 13(3) of the draft Electronic Communications Bill, which was published for consultation last summer. We have used the term "software" advisedly. It is our understanding that the defence provided in the subsection is needed to cover a design feature of particular software that triggers the disclosure.
	I hope that that gives some contextual background and that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment. I appreciate that it was tabled in an attempt to be helpful.

Lord Lucas: I entirely understand what the Minister says. However, the pattern is for what is written in software this year to migrate into hardware in a couple of years, so in a couple of years the subsection will not work if the Government leave it as it is. However, if that is how they wish it, I see no reason to argue further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 176:
	Page 53, line 32, leave out subsection (6).

Lord Lucas: I tabled this amendment because I do not understand how subsection (6) works. It provides a defence that,
	"the disclosure was made by or to a professional legal adviser in connection with the giving, by the adviser to any client of his, of advice about the effect of the provisions of this Part".
	If I am served with a notice, presumably I toddle off to the company's legal adviser, who is then free to tell anyone else in the company. That seems to get round the intention of this part of the Bill. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am sure that the noble Lord does not really want to delete subsection (6) and that this is a probing amendment. That subsection serves a particular purpose. It seems to us right that a person served with a Section 46 notice that contains a secrecy requirement because of particular circumstances should nevertheless be permitted to approach a legal professional for advice about the effect of the notice without being penalised under the tipping-off offence. It would be unfair if they were not able to do that.
	I trust that that clarification helps the noble Lord and that he will now feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I point out to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas that, under subsection (8), the protection given to a legal adviser under subsection (6) does not apply if the legal adviser lets the information out in the course of furthering a criminal purpose. Doing so to enable somebody to escape the net would be a criminal act.

Lord Lucas: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 176ZA:
	Page 53, line 46, at end insert--
	("( ) Nothing in this section shall prevent any person described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) taking such action as may be necessary to preserve the confidentiality of any communication (other than that concerning the protected information described in section 46(1)) unless such action is expressly forbidden in the section 46 notice.").

Lord Lucas: We touched briefly on this issue earlier but I seek further clarification. It seems to me that where confidentiality has been breached, under most circumstances a company should have the right to repair that breach. The Minister said he would touch on that matter again when we discussed tipping-off and I now give him that opportunity. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: The noble Lord has caught me out. It will take me some time to find the information that he requires. I shall have to write to the noble Lord. I apologise to the Committee.

Lord Lucas: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 176A:
	Page 54, line 19, leave out from first ("the") to ("or") in line 20 and insert ("Intelligence Services Commissioner").

Lord Bassam of Brighton: This is a long group of government amendments, the effect of which abolishes the posts of Intelligence Services Commissioner and Security Service Commissioner and replaces them with a single intelligence services commissioner. These amendments respond to the concern expressed in another place about the number of commissioners.
	The post of Security Service Commissioner was introduced in the 1989 Security Service Act. The post of Intelligence Services Commissioner was introduced in the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The Security Service Commissioner has responsibility for the oversight of functions in connection with the Security Service and the Intelligence Services Commissioner carries out similar functions in relation to GCHQ and the Secret Intelligence Service. In practice, both roles have since been held by the same person, as most Members of the Committee will know. These amendments formalise that arrangement by having a single commissioner carrying out both functions, together with the additional functions required of him under the Bill.
	The new commissioner will be responsible for reviewing: the Secretary of State's exercise of powers under Sections 5 to 7 of the Intelligence Services Act--warrants for interference with property or wireless telegraphy; the Secretary of State's exercise of powers in relation to the intelligence services and in relation to MoD/Armed Forces other than in Northern Ireland under Parts II and III of the RIP Bill; and the exercise and performance of functions by all three intelligence services and by MoD/Armed Forces, other than in Northern Ireland, under Parts II and III of the Bill.
	Government Amendment No. 231 amends the title of the Bill to include the establishment of the new commissioner posts. I am sure that slim-lining the number of commissioners in this way will be welcomed by the Committee. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 177:
	Page 54, line 20, at end insert ("or Assistant Surveillance Commissioner").

Lord Bach: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to the other amendments in the group. We are aware that concern has been raised about the proliferation of different commissioners with oversight of the various intrusive investigative techniques and we have responded by removing from the Bill the covert investigations commissioner and amalgamating that oversight function with that of the chief surveillance commissioner.
	However, by doing so we have set the chief surveillance commissioner a wide-ranging and onerous task. He already has responsibility for oversight of all authorisations given under Part III of the Police Act 1997. This Bill gives him added responsibility for oversight of authorisations for covert surveillance and the use of covert sources, not only by law enforcement departments but by a large number of government departments, with offices spread across the length and breadth of the country.
	In his current responsibilities relating to authorisations for interference with property, he is supported by five surveillance commissioners, who are serving or retired High Court judges. As a measure of the seriousness with which this function is taken, every authorisation given under Part III of the Police Act is scrutinised by a surveillance commissioner and, indeed, the prior approval of a surveillance commissioner is required for certain categories of authorisation. In practice, the Bill will add to these responsibilities the scrutiny and decision whether or not to give prior approval for every authorisation given for intrusive surveillance by the law enforcement agencies. That, together with their current work, will keep them fully employed.
	Therefore, we must provide the chief surveillance commissioner with further assistance in order to ensure that he is able effectively to scrutinise other forms of covert surveillance and the use of covert sources by law enforcement and other public authorities. For the police alone, we expect that to involve in excess of 150,000 authorisations each year. He cannot do that alone and we anticipate that he will want to set up some form of inspectorate to assist him.
	However, we also believe that it is important that the chief surveillance commissioner should be provided with some judicial support for this function. That could be done by increasing the present numbers of surveillance commissioners but there are simply not enough serving or retired high court judges out there. Instead, therefore, we propose to increase the pool of potential commissioners. These amendments will achieve that by allowing the Prime Minister, after consultation with the chief surveillance commissioner, to appoint serving or former circuit or Crown Court judges to assist in the monitoring process. By that means, we shall ensure independent judicial scrutiny of authorisations by all public authorities. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 50, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 51 [General duties of specified authorities]:
	[Amendments Nos. 178 and 179 not moved.]
	Clause 51 agreed to.

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 179A:
	After Clause 51, insert the following new clause--
	:TITLE3:LIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORISED DISCLOSURE OF KEY
	(" . Any person disclosing a key in an unauthorised manner shall be liable for any damage so caused.").

Lord Lucas: Amendment No. 179A gives me the opportunity to ask the Government who is liable if one of its officers, servants or agents discloses a key and thereby causes substantial damage to a major corporation. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: We recognise that this is an issue of fundamental concern to industry. The general welcome for the intentions of the Bill by industry has been qualified by that concern. Some areas of concern remain and they are reflected in the intention of the Government in amendments tabled for today or in amendments that we intend to table on Report. I note that the potential liability incurred through the disclosure of seized keys is one of the points on which industry seeks particular reassurance.
	In the light of that we have actively looked into the possibility of including something on the face of the Bill to make it clear where liability lies. However, it should be borne in mind that where keys are demanded, they are most likely to be held by the technical assistance centre. A considerable amount of resource has been devoted to the establishment of that centre and a primary objective of the centre will be to look after keys securely. I am in no doubt that where the centre negligently fails in that regard, and where there is a duty of care, it will be liable for the disclosure of any keys. But I should add that I do not expect the centre to fail in that regard.
	I should draw the Committee's attention to Clause 14 of the Bill and the safeguards that are to be applied to intercept material. The safeguards in Clauses 14 and 15 are built, to a large extent, on those that exist in Section 6 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985. Such high standards for protection and destruction of material have existed since then and I do not believe that any of our researches have shown any leakage. I would expect that impressive track record to continue in respect of any keys that are seized.
	All that said, we have looked at the possibility of reflecting the secure position of persons acting in obedience to disclosure notices served under the Bill. The industry concern is the potential civil or criminal liability that they will face by making disclosures pursuant to a Section 46 notice. The Government reassurance, for the record, is that we believe a contractual term will be unenforceable if it puts someone in breach of meeting a statutory requirement. We expect the criminal law to be construed similarly.
	The London Investment Banking Association helpfully pointed us to the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. Section 52 of that Act is the offence of failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering. Section 52(4)states:
	"Where a person discloses to a constable ... his suspicion or belief that another person is engaged in drug money laundering, or any information or other matter on which that suspicion or belief is based, the disclosure shall not be treated as a breach of any restriction imposed by statute or otherwise".
	Similar wording appears in regulation 16(4) of the Money Laundering Regulations 1993.
	We have looked at those pieces of legislation to see if they provide a precedent. But they do not. The cases are different. The person acting on a subjective suspicion in those two examples is not obeying a statutory requirement which unequivocally applies to his situation, whereas the person obeying a Section 46 notice is indeed obeying a statutory requirement which does unequivocally apply to his situation.
	In short, there is no doubt as to the lawfulness of what the person who obeys a notice is doing. But the provisions of the Drug Trafficking Act are needed because that doubt exists. If we were to repeat such a formulation on the face of the Bill, there would be a real danger that the need to spell out the position on liability in this Bill would be inferred to apply across the statute book. Generally, that compliance with a statutory duty to disclose information does not, without express words that might be put into this Bill, provide a defence to criminal and civil liability. That could have serious implications elsewhere. We know of no precedent for such a provision and should not create one.
	I appreciate that this is good and bad news. The good news is that we are clear as to the position of people served with disclosure notices. We are also confident that keys which are treated negligently will give rise to liability where a duty of care is found to exist. The bad news is that not only do we not see the need to place this on the face of the Bill, but we also see positive dangers in so doing in so far as it could impact on other parts of the statute book. The good news is the important news here, and I hope that Members of the Committee, and particularly concerned elements of industry outside, will hear what I have said. I trust therefore that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment accordingly.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: This is an important amendment. Clearly we shall have to study carefully what the Minister said because there were important elements in his response, among them that if the centre did disclose a key, then it would be liable if it disclosed it negligently. That is quite a high test in the courts, a much stronger test than that proposed in Amendment No. 179A.
	The Minister also sought to reassure us about contractual liabilities in relation to companies which might find themselves in this position. He may be right--I have no reason to doubt that--in relation to United Kingdom law, but many of the liabilities about which bankers and others are worried arise from the law of other countries. That is where the liabilities will be and, in some cases, they could be extremely large. That is why there is nervousness about this provision. That is why we shall study carefully what the Minister said.

Lord Lucas: As the Minister is doubtless aware, one prominent American but London-based merchant bank has already taken steps to transfer its entire central data operation from London to Switzerland. It has put in place steps so that no authorisations or key disclosures can be actioned from any address in the United Kingdom. Therefore no employee served with that sort of notice in the UK can get at any of its keys because they are all in Switzerland and he cannot have them.
	Given the quality of the people who have taken this action, I would expect this to be followed fairly quickly by other businesses taking preventive measures. The sort of action that follows from this is that, once you begin to establish your real core, central operations somewhere outside the United Kingdom to avoid this sort of legislation, other parts of your operations will follow. I do not believe that this is a healthy state of affairs for us; indeed, it is something that this Government ought to be taking seriously. They should be taking positive, not just tentative, steps to try to allay the quite reasonable concerns of industry when it comes to this sort of international obligation, as pointed out by my noble friend Lord Berkeley.
	I hope that we will hear more from the Government on this area during the Report stage. But, if we do not, I shall certainly wish to return to the matter. However, for now, I shortly hope to be able to sleep on the Government's reply. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 52 [Interpretation of Part III]:

Lord McNally: moved Amendment No. 180:
	Page 55, line 31, at end insert (", and does not affect the intelligibility or accessibility of that communication or data").

Lord McNally: About seven-and-a-half hours ago, the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Elvel, chastised my noble friend Lord Phillips for questioning the wisdom of the Marshalled List. I take courage in both hands now partly because--for reasons I do not quite understand--the noble Lord is no longer in his place. However, I am sure that he will read the Hansard report of these proceedings and "buttonhole" me tomorrow.
	However, the latter is the preamble to saying that I should prefer to talk to Amendments Nos. 180, 181, 183 and 186 as a group. They all relate to this definition clause and have the same objective; namely, to try to tighten up the electronic signature and key definitions to close various loopholes. The present wording brings all sorts of applications of signature-only keys into the ambit of Clause 46 notices, which is contrary to the content of the Bill. The proposed wording would make it abundantly clear exactly when a key is being used for the purposes of signature.
	Amendment No. 181 provides the third reason--"the authority"--for using an electronic signature, which is defined under Amendment No. 186. Amendment No. 183 seeks to ensure that the word "key", as applied to encryption, always implies some intent to conceal, which surely is the essence of encryption. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am happy to consider the re-grouping of these amendments, as proposed by the noble Lord. These amendments hark back to concerns which underpinned noble Lords' proposed changes to Clause 46(6) by restricting access to keys that have been used solely for electronic signature purposes.
	In simple terms, I suppose that an electronic signature can be described as something associated with an electronic document that is the electronic equivalent of a manual signature. Providing a definition for this in statute is somewhat trickier. I understand what the noble Lord is seeking to achieve by way of these amendments, but we believe that the definition in Clause 52(1) is clear enough. Perhaps I may just draw the important words to the attention of the Committee. Clause 52(1)(c) states that an electronic signature is anything in electronic form which,
	"is used for the purpose of facilitating, by means of a link between the signatory or other source and the communication or data, the establishment of the authenticity of the communication or data, the establishment of its integrity, or both".
	In respect of Amendment No. 180, I believe that I would probably go further and suggest that if signatures are encrypted they will always affect the intelligibility or accessibility of the data in question. Therefore, the effect of the amendment seems questionable--if, indeed, there is an effect. I am not certain that there is.
	Amendment No. 181 seems to have an intended effect similar to Amendment No. 185 which we shall discuss later. Both address the question of whether a legal effect is intended. Similar reference to what is included in this Bill was included in the Electronic Communications Act for fear that, without it, some activity might be caught in which there had been no intent to create legal relations. The provisions as drafted here, and in the other Act, are intended to ensure that signatures are a means of creating legal relations only where that is intended and not, perhaps, by chance through the accidental operation of software. Authenticity and integrity are the crux of the matter. Clause 52(1), as drafted, says that. I hope that that deals with the point.
	I turn to Amendment No. 183. We have currently cast the definition of "key" for the purposes of this part of the Bill in what we hope are clear and workable terms. A key which may be required to be disclosed is one--this is the crucial point--which allows access to the electronic data in question, or facilitates putting the electronic data into intelligible form.
	This is the whole purpose of the Part III power. We believe that the current definition is clear. We are not convinced that the suggested amendment adds anything to it. We have already discussed the issue of electronic signature keys. We do not believe that the inclusion of limb (b) in Amendment No. 183 is appropriate here. It seems to try to include in the definition of a key something that is more appropriate for the definition of a signature. In as far as the only need to mention signatures in this Bill is to exclude them from what can be accessed as keys, it would be distinctly unhelpful specifically to include these signatures in the definition of keys in the first place only to exclude them later.
	We have difficulties with the first limb of the amendment. What is described in the first limb seems to be an encryption key. What is relevant to this legislation is a decryption key. This is a significant difference which I am sure noble Lords will appreciate. I take it that Amendment No. 186 must be consequential to Amendment No. 181 and provides a definition of "authority" as regards an electronic signature. I have already explained why we do not believe that the proposed addition of a reference to "authority" is appropriate. It follows that this proposed definition is unnecessary. While the amendments have sought to be constructive we do not believe that they add anything to the legislation.

Lord McNally: I thank the Minister for co-operating in my re-ordering of the Marshalled List. I promise not to tell the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Elvel, that he has done that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 181 not moved.]

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 182:
	Page 55, line 38, leave out from ("means") to end of line 40 and insert ("anything (including any key, code, password, algorithm or other data) the use of which, with or without any other thing").

Lord Lucas: Amendment No. 182 merely seeks to broaden the definition of "key" and supposes that the "key" is a key as we ordinarily understand that, or at least such a key is part of the "key". We seem to have a definition in the Bill whereby if you have some kind of physical lock on information, as well as a password lock, you are home free. That seems to me unsatisfactory. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I believe that I have already used the word "perceptive" in regard to amendments moved by the noble Lord. This is a perceptive amendment. However, it has the consequence--I do not know whether this is intended--of widening the definition of "key". I should be interested to know whether that is the noble Lord's intention. The query really is whether the definition we have for "key" in Clause 52(1) is future-proof.
	As with the rest of the Bill, we have sought to ensure that the definitions included in it are future-proofed as far as possible without making them too loose or unworkable. The definition of "key" here is probably a case in point.
	I am attracted to the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. We have given it a good deal of consideration. However, the use of the word "thing" may be casting the definition of a key too widely. I quite like things being called things.
	In drawing up these proposals we considered the issue of what might happen in the future in terms of devices used to access data--something like biometrics or electronic fingerprinting are perhaps good examples. Even these devices will ultimately be reduced to data before they can have their intended effect. The Part III power is about being required to hand over something--for example, a key or a password--which allows access to particular data or puts it into what we would accept is an intelligible means or form. We have included a reference to data in the definition of key in Clause 52(1). That is as far as we feel we can legitimately go. I appreciate the helpful way in which the noble Lord moved the amendment. However, I hope that with my explanation he will feel able to withdraw it.

Lord Lucas: I should be grateful, not now but in correspondence, if the Minister could point me to a definition of data in the context of legislation which is as wide as he seems to presume it is. Suppose one thinks of a system which is a fingerprint recognition system which does not reduce the "thing" to a digital pattern but which relies on some kind of analogue matching system, so that actually the "thing" is never reduced to data. It merely produces the answer, yes. It is very hard to describe "fingerprint" as "data" if it is never reduced to data. I suppose one might embrace it in the term "information" if one was prepared to use the philosophic version of that. I am not aware that that has been incorporated or understood in legislation. I should like to understand the basis for what the Minister is saying. The noble Lord is quite right. I am seeking to widen this to the point where we do not just think in terms of how it happens to be done at the moment--at the beginnings of cryptography--but use something other than an essentially digital password as protection. I should like the reassurance that the word "data" covers that.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am always happy to correspond, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, knows. The fingerprint is an interesting example. When does the fingerprint become data? Does it become data when it is stored? I shall be happy to pursue the point further. No doubt we can pick that up with some of the other issues we shall be putting down on paper.

Lord Lucas: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 183 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 183A to 183C:
	Page 56, line 12, leave out subsection (2).
	Page 56, line 16, leave out ("protected information") and insert ("information (including a key to protected information)").
	Page 56, line 19, after ("concerned;") insert--
	("( ) to his having an immediate right of access to it, or an immediate right to have it transmitted or otherwise supplied to him;").

Lord Bach: These amendments were spoken to with Amendment No. 139A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 184 not moved.]

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 185:
	Page 56, line 34, leave out sub-paragraph (iii).

Lord Lucas: Amendment No. 185 seeks to leave out sub-paragraph (iii) of Clause 52(5). I cannot see what,
	"whether it is intended to have a legal effect",
	has to do with authenticity. Authenticity is quite well-defined by sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii). If those conditions are satisfied, I am happy that the communication is authentic. Why should legal effect have anything to do with it at all? I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, thinks that this is irrelevant to the question of authenticity. The definition contained in Clause 52(5), to which this amendment refers, is exactly the same as that set down in Section 15(2) of the Electronic Communications Act 2000.
	I believe that we should engineer as much consistency as possible between these two statutes. I have explained why this definition appears in the Electronic Communications Act. In that legislation we were concerned to ensure that electronic signatures had "legal effect" only where that was intended. Having felt the need to make such a clarification in that Act, we decided that it would be confusing not to replicate it in the legislation before us. I hope that it is clear to the noble Lord that we are seeking consistency here.

Lord Lucas: I understand entirely what the Minister has said. I shall have to do a little more homework to check that the two measures are truly consistent. I have happy memories of taking a Bill on construction through this House where, for the sake of consistency, a definition of construction was taken from the Taxes Act. Sometimes these matters can be taken a little too far. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 186 not moved.]
	Clause 52, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 53 [Interception of Communications Commissioner]:

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 187:
	Page 57, line 3, leave out paragraph (a).

Lord Lucas: Matters are now moving a little too quickly for me. I find myself hoisted by my own petard here while I try to catch up with the intention behind this amendment.
	The Minister will recall a letter that I received from him, to which I have referred on previous occasions, which examined the extent to which the activities of the Secretary of State were subject to review. It was pointed out that Clauses 12 to 19 were free of such review. We dwelt on that point while moving through our detailed examination of those clauses. The noble Lord said that he would consider again whether in fact that was right; namely, that some of those activities should be free of supervision.
	Amendment No. 187 merely provides an opportunity to call attention to that absence. Amendment No. 188, tabled in the name of my noble friend, does this rather better and replaces the clauses. Amendment No. 189 is a similar attempt to look at the spread of powers of the commissioner. I beg to move.

Lord Dean of Harptree: If this amendment is agreed to, I shall not be able to call Amendment No. 188.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: Amendment No. 188 tabled in my name seeks to extend the duties of the interception of communications commissioner to cover Clauses 14 and 15 of the Bill as well as those with which he is already charged. The clauses detail the safeguards governing the restrictions on the use of intercepted material. It seemed to me that it would be helpful if the commissioner had an oversight of those matters so as to reassure those who are, as it were, at the receiving end of these provisions.

Lord Bach: Amendments Nos. 187, 188 and 189 seek to add to the role of the interception of communications commissioner. During our discussion last week on Clause 15, I undertook to consider the position of the interception of communications commissioner in relation to that clause. We have done that and I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, that Amendment No. 188 is not necessary.
	Perhaps I may deal first with Amendment No. 188. Its ambition is simply to add Clauses 14 and 15 to the elements of Part I of the Bill which are to be overseen by the interception of communications commissioner. Noble Lords will see from subsection (2)(d)(i) of Clause 53 on page 57 that the duties of the Secretary of State under Clause 14 already fall to be overseen by the interception of communications commissioner. It is also the case that Clause 15 merely elaborates on the duties that are to be undertaken in order to ensure that the duty under Clause 14 is properly discharged. The effect is that the interception of communications commissioner already has, under the Bill as drafted, a role in the oversight of the very important regime under Clauses 14 and 15 of the Bill. I hope that the noble Lord finds that reassuring.
	The ambition of Amendments Nos. 187 and 189 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is rather greater. These amendments seek to ensure that the entirety of Part I of the Bill is reviewed by the commissioner. I have answered the question in relation to Clauses 14 and 15--they are already under his auspices. I now move to those elements of the Bill which are not under the auspices of the commissioner and explain why that is not necessary.
	There are not many clauses which are not under the interception of communications commissioner. The clauses in question are Clauses 12, 13, 16, 17, 18 and 19. No one will forget our previous detailed discussions of Clauses 12 and 13. Noble Lords opposite have impressed on us very firmly the need to offer further reassurance as to their operation. As we have indicated, the Government are seriously considering the regime under Clauses 12 and 13 and what extra reassurance can be offered. But we do not believe that there is a proper role for the interception commissioner in providing this reassurance. These assurances are about detailed technical issues and the costs involved.
	Noble Lords opposite have suggested that a technical advisory board is the appropriate answer, at least in part. We accept that and continue to consider whether this board needs a statutory base. The vital and independent insight that is needed on the operation of Clauses 12 and 13 should come from industry and industry organisations. We do not see that the interception of communications commissioner can fulfil that role. In short, we continue to search for ways of providing reassurance on the operation of Clauses 12 and 13 but we do not think that this is a role for the commissioner.
	Turning to Clauses 16 and 17, during our debates last week, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, prompted a fascinating discussion of those clauses which addressed important legal points. But the import of the clauses is that they set out rules that are to be followed by the prosecutor in each case, and sometimes by judges. As such, we believe that there is no requirement for further judicial oversight on the operation of those clauses.
	That leaves Clauses 18 and 19. Clause 18 carries an offence of tipping off which will only ever be effected through the courts, so there is no need for oversight by the interception of communications commissioner. To put it another way, it makes no sense for offences to be overseen. That is what is required only in respect of functions conferred by the Bill. Clause 19 is merely about the interpretation of Chapter I, which similarly does not require oversight by the commissioner.
	I have spelled out why the only elements which fall outside the oversight of the interception of communications commissioner should remain outside. Clauses 14 and 15 actually fall within it. I hope that my remarks are enough to satisfy Members of the Committee and that they will feel able to withdraw their amendments or not move them when they are reached.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: With respect to Amendment No. 188, I fully accept that Clause 14 is covered by the provisions in subsection (2)(d). But the wording is significantly different from that in subsection (2)(a). Subsection (2)(a) refers to a review being of the "exercise and performance" of the various matters, which is also the wording in paragraphs (b) and (c); whereas subsection (2)(d) merely states that the commissioner shall review "the adequacy of the arrangements" by which duties are sought to be discharged. It is a considerably lesser hurdle. As the arrangements we are talking about are the ones for certificated warrants, it is important that they should be properly supervised. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will reflect on his answer on that matter between now and Report.

Lord Lucas: I am so pleased by the news that Clause 12 is under active review that I am prepared to withdraw almost anything, and certainly this amendment. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments No. 188 and 189 not moved.]

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: moved amendment No. 189A:
	Page 57, leave out lines 36 and 37 and insert (", provide the Commissioner with such technical and other staff, equipment and other resources as may be requisite to enable him to carry out his functions").

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: The amendment is designed to try to ensure that the power and resources of the interception of communications commissioner are sufficient for him or her to do what is, on any reckoning, a massive job. The background is that the Bill represents a complex and vast legal superstructure necessary in order to control a burgeoning new industry, increasing in scale and scope day by day. Therefore, I do not think it is helpful to consider the power and resources of the commissioner against those currently at the behest of the existing interception commissioner.
	We on these Benches feel that the duties of the commissioner under the clause are enormous. Basically, apart from the few clauses to which the noble Lord, Lord Bach, referred, he or she is the watchdog of the whole Bill. Unless there are fully adequate resources in all respects--people, machinery, equipment and so on--there is no chance that what we all so devoutly wish for will come about, namely, that the great powers and discretions under the Bill will be matched by commensurate safeguards. The motif of all these debates is concern about civil liberty issues above all others.
	The commissioner's duties under subsection (2) go to the whole of the operation of the Bill, except for the few matters mentioned. It will be necessary for the commissioner to have oversight of the 10 categories of authority set out in Clause 6; of the eight categories of authority set out later in the Bill; and of the police forces, not just at chief constable level but at lower levels as will be authorised as the Bill comes into effect, where one is issuing direct surveillance authorisations and covert human intelligence authorisations. There are emergency warrants to consider, intrusive surveillance procedures to oversee. Every discussion on every amendment has pointed to the difficulty and complexity that that will involve.
	I suppose that what the amendment is based upon is a doubt that in the event there will be sufficient resources available to the commissioner. Our governance is littered with individuals who have huge jobs to do with inadequate resources. I mentioned earlier the failure to deal at all with insider trading in the City, which is partly a function of lack of sufficient expertise and resources.
	I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, for responding as he did two days ago to a letter I wrote him on 13 June raising these concerns. He referred to the hope of a unified and investigative secretariat whose resources would be available to the interception commissioner. He also referred to the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nolan, in the 1997 report of the commissioner. (I am glad to see the noble and learned Lord in his place.) However, those remarks were concerned with the extent to which it was believed that the Secretary of State dealt with warrants properly. This amendment is not concerned with the Secretary of State; it is way downstream of the Minister.
	The noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, also said in his letter that,
	"Clause 54(1) imposes a duty on everyone involved in interception to disclose or provide to the Commissioner all such documents and information as he may require to carry out his functions. This means, for example, that expert technical staff in the agencies would be obliged, at the request of the Commissioner or his staff, to explain how any particular system worked".
	I do not believe that that is remotely good enough. The commissioner will require his own bespoke staff and not be reliant upon calling in experts or staff from other agencies who may already be heavily involved in important work.
	The Minister also said it was expected that the commissioner would have a staff of four:
	"one grade 7, one higher executive officer, one administrative officer and a personal secretary".
	I do not believe that they will be remotely adequate to do the job thoroughly in a way that puts the fear of god into those with these great powers that, if they do not exercise them properly and with due diligence, they are likely to be caught out. Unless that happens the people of this country will not be satisfied with the powers provided under the Bill. I am sorry to detain the Committee at this time of night, but I believe that this is a very important point. I beg to move.

Lord Nolan: For one of Her Majesty's judges, I have been silent for what must be a record time. I rise to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. As I am sure the Minister accepts, this is a very important point. During the six years that I held the post of commissioner up until April of this year, year after year I was able to assure the public in my reports not only about the remarkable efficiency of the system but of its integrity. I was able to say, as I firmly believed, that the possibility of the system being abused by government or government agencies was remote, almost inconceivable. That was due to the very high quality of the individuals in the agencies, the government departments concerned--the Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Northern Ireland Office and Scottish Office (now the Scottish Executive--the Secretaries of State of this and the previous administration, who have been most conscientious, and the individual employees of the telephone companies and the GPO. They are very carefully picked and have proved themselves totally trustworthy in operating the system.
	The integrity of the system is paramount and, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, said, will become of even greater importance under the enormously increased scope of the commissioner's job as provided for under the Bill. The burden on the commissioner has already greatly increased under the present system, as is well known to the Home Office and to Ministers.
	When I sat as a judge full-time in this House I spent about six weeks a year simply on the work of the commissioner. I did not find it a terrible imposition, but it was a burden on my fellow Law Lords who had to work that much harder. I believe that that point must be addressed in future. In the past 18 months or so the work has taken me, on an annual basis, at least eight weeks. Clearly, given the increased responsibilities the staff available to the commissioner must be substantially increased. I know that a good deal of thought has been given to the matter, and I look forward to hearing in more detail precisely what stage the preparations have reached. Knowing how well the problem is understood, I hope also that the points raised have been anticipated. I shall take a close interest in the matter and will be prepared to raise it in this Chamber should the need arise. The crucial factor is that the public should be able to feel that the commissioner has the knowledge and resources to carry out his functions.
	We may be reaching the position where it is beyond the scope of one man or woman even if he or she is a retired judge. It may become necessary to consider, as it has with the chief surveillance commissioner, the appointment of a deputy to work in harness with the interception of communications commissioner. I am prepared to wait with interest to see what is proposed. I trust that it will be--in line with what has already been said to me privately-- adequate for the purpose. I look forward to hearing the Minister.

Lord Bach: The noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, is very fortunate indeed in the support he has for the principle underlying the amendment. As we have all noted, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nolan, has sat with incredible patience for hour after hour through the late afternoon, the early evening and into the small watches of the night before speaking. The fact that he has spoken on this issue shows how deeply he feels about it. The Government are very sympathetic, of course.
	In responding to an earlier amendment, we indicated that we have great sympathy with the suggestion that there should be a facility in the order made under Clause 12 to require that any capability developed should provide the commissioner with the wherewithal to fulfil his duties in the face of rapid technological development. We shall return to that question on Report.
	The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, referred to Clause 53(7). That is a helpful subsection. There is further reassurance in Clause 54(1), which imposes a duty on everyone involved in interception,
	"to disclose or provide to the ... Commissioner all such documents and information as he may require ... to carry out his functions".
	That means, for example, that expert technical staff in the agencies would be obliged at the request of the commissioner or his staff to explain how any particular system worked and to show them the information stored on it.
	The practice of successive commissioners--as the Committee knows, the current commissioner is the very distinguished judge Lord Justice Swinton Thomas--has been to make regular visits to the intercepting agencies and to inspect the warrant-issuing units of the four central government departments. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nolan, noted in his report for the year 1995 that he had extended his study so as to include the safeguards operated by the public telecommunications operators.
	It has always been government practice (whichever government are in power), as was said by the noble and learned Lord, to provide the commissioner and his staff with the necessary office accommodation and equipment to do their job properly and effectively. I assure the Committee that that practice will continue under the new regime.
	I can confirm the contents of the letter that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, received recently from my noble friend about the kind of thinking at the Home Office on how best to ensure that the interception commissioner has the support and staff necessary to carry out his new functions. The Government are thinking carefully about the best way to pursue that. I do not think that there should be any question about our motives. We agree entirely with both speakers about how important that is. It would be useful if the noble Lord withdrew his amendment today. It is not an issue that is dead.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I am grateful to the noble Lord. I shall withdraw the amendment. I am grateful for what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nolan, said.
	The Minister referred to Clause 53(7). At present, subsection (7) provides for such resources as the Secretary of State considers necessary, as opposed to the objective test of the amendment--that the commissioner would be provided with such resources as may be requisite. I hope that when the Government return to the issue they will agree with that.

Lord Bach: Someone has to make the decision. I should have thought the Secretary of State was as good a person to make that objective decision as anybody. I am not sure there is much difference in the distinction between the subsection referred to and the wording of the amendment.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I beg to differ and it may be that I shall have a discussion with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nolan, afterwards and we will come banging on the noble Lord's door. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 53 agreed to.
	Clause 54 [Co-operation with and reports by new Commissioner]:
	[Amendments Nos. 189B to 189G not moved.]

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 190:
	Page 58, line 42, at end insert ("seriously").

Lord Lucas: My interest here is merely to raise the test which the Prime Minister has to set himself in deciding whether to cut parts out of the commissioner's report.
	The action will not be subject to any oversight or supervision whatever. In fact no one will know it has happened, except the commissioner who will presumably keep "mum" about it. It is a decision for the Prime Minister to make himself, and I believe it would be helpful in that context if there were some wording to indicate that it is not a test of whether it might cause some slight damage here or there. Either it is phrased in the way I have suggested, that it is serious, or we include a phrase such as "balance" to indicate that taking parts out of the report is only to be embarked upon when the consequences would be notably bad for any of the causes mentioned in that part of the Bill and that it should not be done lightly or at a whim. I am sure it would not be, but I believe that the wording of the Bill should reflect what we hope should happen. I beg to move.

Lord Nolan: In my experience there has never been any difference between the commissioner and the Prime Minister, or a previous Prime Minister, as to what should or should not stay in.
	The matters which have been omitted are matters which really could not be disclosed without great prejudice to national security or for the other purposes of the Bill. That may not be an answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, but, for what it is worth, my experience would not lead me to regard it as essential.

Lord Bach: I may be fortunate enough to have an ally in the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nolan, in what I am about to say. Amendment No. 190 proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, would require that material only be excluded from any annual report where it was seriously prejudicial to national security or one of the other grounds as set out in paragraphs (a) to (d).
	The Government believe it is difficult to place a specific meaning on the term "seriously" in that context. For example, if the term means "a lot" or "a great deal" it would mean that information which is damaging to a lesser extent, for example, some lesser prejudice, must be disclosed with no need to show that the public interest requires that such damage be caused. We do not believe that that would lead to a proper balance. It would mean that information damaging, for example, to the prevention or detection of serious crime would have to be published. Finally, we must not forget that the interception commissioner must be consulted on the exclusion of any matter from the annual report as laid before each House of Parliament. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is somewhat reassured by that explanation.

Lord Lucas: I am certainly reassured; I would expect nothing to happen other than what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nolan, indicated has happened in the past. The Minister used the word "balance", but, as yet, there is no requirement for balance in this part of the Bill. Perhaps we should examine that issue at Report stage. In the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 54 agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 190A and 190B:
	After Clause 54, insert the following new clause--
	:TITLE3:THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES COMMISSIONER
	(" .--(1) The Prime Minister shall appoint a Commissioner to be known as the Intelligence Services Commissioner.
	(2) Subject to subsection (4), the Intelligence Services Commissioner shall keep under review, so far as they are not required to be kept under review by the Interception of Communications Commissioner--
	(a) the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers under sections 5 to 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (warrants for interference with wireless telegraphy, entry and interference with property etc.);
	(b) the exercise and performance by the Secretary of State, in connection with or in relation to--
	(i) the activities of the intelligence services, and
	(ii) the activities in places other than Northern Ireland of the officials of the Ministry of Defence and of members of Her Majesty's forces,
	of the powers and duties conferred or imposed on him by Parts II and III of this Act;
	(c) the exercise and performance by members of the intelligence services of the powers and duties conferred or imposed on them by or under Parts II and III of this Act;
	(d) the exercise and performance in places other than Northern Ireland, by officials of the Ministry of Defence and by members of Her Majesty's forces, of the powers and duties conferred or imposed on such officials or members of Her Majesty's forces by or under Parts II and III; and
	(e) the adequacy of the arrangements by virtue of which the duty imposed by section 51 is sought to be discharged--
	(i) in relation to the members of the intelligence services; and
	(ii) in connection with any of their activities in places other than Northern Ireland, in relation to officials of the Ministry of Defence and members of Her Majesty's forces.
	(3) The Intelligence Services Commissioner shall give the Tribunal all such assistance (including his opinion as to any issue falling to be determined by the Tribunal) as the Tribunal may require--
	(a) in connection with the investigation of any matter by the Tribunal; or
	(b) otherwise for the purposes of the Tribunal's consideration or determination of any matter.
	(4) It shall not be the function of the Intelligence Services Commissioner to keep under review the exercise of any power of the Secretary of State to make, amend or revoke any subordinate legislation.
	(5) A person shall not be appointed under this section as the Intelligence Services Commissioner unless he holds or has held a high judicial office (within the meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876).
	(6) The Intelligence Services Commissioner shall hold office in accordance with the terms of his appointment; and there shall be paid to him out of money provided by Parliament such allowances as the Treasury may determine.
	(7) The Secretary of State shall, after consultation with the Intelligence Services Commissioner and subject to the approval of the Treasury as to numbers, provide him with such staff as the Secretary of State considers necessary for the carrying out of the Commissioner's functions.
	(8) Section 4 of the Security Service Act 1989 and section 8 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (Commissioners for the purposes of those Acts) shall cease to have effect.
	(9) On the coming into force of this section the Commissioner holding office as the Commissioner under section 8 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 shall take and hold office as the Intelligence Services Commissioner as if appointed under this Act--
	(a) for the unexpired period of his term of office under that Act; and
	(b) otherwise, on the terms of his appointment under that Act.
	(10) Subsection (7) of section 39 shall apply for the purposes of this section as it applies for the purposes of that section.").
	After Clause 54, insert the following new clause--
	:TITLE3:CO-OPERATION WITH AND REPORTS BY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES COMMISSIONER
	(" .--(1) It shall be the duty of--
	(a) every member of an intelligence service,
	(b) every official of the department of the Secretary of State, and
	(c) every member of Her Majesty's forces,
	to disclose or provide to the Intelligence Services Commissioner all such documents and information as he may require for the purpose of enabling him to carry out his functions under section (The Intelligence Services Commissioner).
	(2) As soon as practicable after the end of each calendar year, the Intelligence Services Commissioner shall make a report to the Prime Minister with respect to the carrying out of that Commissioner's functions.
	(3) The Prime Minister shall lay before each House of Parliament a copy of every annual report made by the Intelligence Services Commissioner under subsection (2), together with a statement as to whether any matter has been excluded from that copy in pursuance of subsection (4).
	(4) If it appears to the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Intelligence Services Commissioner, that the publication of any matter in an annual report would be contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to--
	(a) national security,
	(b) the prevention or detection of serious crime,
	(c) the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, or
	(d) the continued discharge of the functions of any public authority whose activities include activities that are subject to review by that Commissioner,
	the Prime Minister may exclude that matter from the copy of the report as laid before each House of Parliament.
	(5) Subsection (7) of section 39 shall apply for the purposes of this section as it applies for the purposes of that section.").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 190C:
	After Clause 54, insert the following new clause--
	:TITLE3:INVESTIGATORY POWERS COMMISSIONER FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
	(" .--(1) The Prime Minister, after consultation with the First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland, shall appoint a Commissioner to be known as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland.
	(2) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland shall keep under review the exercise and performance in Northern Ireland, by the persons on whom they are conferred or imposed, of any powers or duties under Part II which are conferred or imposed by virtue of an order under section 29 made by the First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland acting jointly.
	(3) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland shall give the Tribunal all such assistance (including his opinion as to any issue falling to be determined by the Tribunal) as the Tribunal may require--
	(a) in connection with the investigation of any matter by the Tribunal; or
	(b) otherwise for the purposes of the Tribunal's consideration or determination of any matter.
	(4) It shall be the duty of--
	(a) every person by whom, or on whose application, there has been given or granted any authorisation the function of giving or granting which is subject to review by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland,
	(b) every person who has engaged in conduct with the authority of such an authorisation,
	(c) every person who holds or has held any office, rank or position with the same public authority as a person falling within paragraph (a), and
	(d) every person who holds or has held any office, rank or position with any public authority for whose benefit (within the meaning of Part II) activities which are or may be subject to any such review have been or may be carried out,
	to disclose or provide to that Commissioner all such documents and information as he may require for the purpose of enabling him to carry out his functions.
	(5) As soon as practicable after the end of each calendar year, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland shall make a report to the First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland with respect to the carrying out of that Commissioner's functions.
	(6) The First Minister and deputy First Minister Ireland shall lay before the Northern Ireland Assembly a copy of every annual report made by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland under subsection (5), together with a statement as to whether any matter has been excluded from that copy in pursuance of subsection (7).
	(7) If it appears to the First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland, after consultation with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland, that the publication of any matter in an annual report would be contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to--
	(a) the prevention or detection of serious crime, or
	(b) the continued discharge of the functions of any public authority whose activities include activities that are subject to review by that Commissioner,
	they may exclude that matter from the copy of the report as laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly.
	(8) A person shall not be appointed under this section as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland unless he holds or has held office as a county court judge in Northern Ireland.
	(9) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland shall hold office in accordance with the terms of his appointment; and there shall be paid to him out of the Consolidated Fund of Northern Ireland such allowances as the Department of Finance and Personnel may determine.
	(10) The First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland, after consultation with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland, provide him with such staff as they consider necessary for the carrying out of his functions.").

Lord Bassam of Brighton: This group of amendments introduces a new role for an investigatory powers commissioner for Northern Ireland. The new commissioner has a clearly circumscribed role--one which is circumscribed in three ways. First, it is limited to Northern Ireland. Secondly, it is limited to actions under Part II of the Bill; that is, to direct surveillance and covert sources. Thirdly, the role of the commissioner is limited to the actions of public authorities, the responsibility for which is transferred to the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Assembly.
	When the Bill was introduced in another place, it contained a role of the covert investigations commissioner. The role of that covert investigations commissioner was to oversee the actions of public authorities, other than the police and Customs, and the intelligence agencies under Part II of the Bill. Representations were received to the effect that the role could usefully be bound up within that of the chief surveillance and surveillance commissioners, already established under the Police Act 1997. That change was made by amendment in another place.
	It is a simple creation and I hope that I have given adequate information on the purpose and effect of the provision. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 55 [Additional functions of other Commissioners]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 190D to 191B:
	Page 59, line 6, leave out subsections (1) and (2).
	Page 60, line 2, leave out from first ("the") to end of line 3 and insert ("Intelligence Services Commissioner").
	Page 60, line 3, at end insert ("or the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland").
	Page 60, line 14, leave out subsection (4).
	Page 60, line 21, leave out ("any") and insert ("the Chief Surveillance").
	Page 60, line 33, leave out subsection (7).
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 55, as amended, agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 192:
	After Clause 55, insert the following new clause--
	:TITLE3:ASSISTANT SURVEILLANCE COMMISSIONERS
	(".--(1) The Prime Minister may, after consultation with the Chief Surveillance Commissioner as to numbers, appoint as Assistant Surveillance Commissioners such number of persons as the Prime Minister considers necessary (in addition to the ordinary Surveillance Commissioners) for the purpose of providing the Chief Surveillance Commissioner with assistance under this section.
	(2) A person shall not be appointed as an Assistant Surveillance Commissioner unless he holds or has held office as--
	(a) a judge of the Crown Court or a Circuit judge;
	(b) a sheriff in Scotland; or
	(c) a county court judge in Northern Ireland.
	(3) The Chief Surveillance Commissioner may require any ordinary Surveillance Commissioner or any Assistant Surveillance Commissioner to provide him with assistance in carrying out his functions under section 55(3).
	(4) The assistance that may be provided under this section includes--
	(a) the conduct on behalf of the Chief Surveillance Commissioner of the review of any matter; and
	(b) the making of a report to the Chief Surveillance Commissioner about the matter reviewed.
	(5) Subsections (3) to (8) of section 91 of the Police Act 1997 (Commissioners) apply in relation to a person appointed under this section as they apply in relation to a person appointed under that section.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 56 [Delegation of Commissioners' functions]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 192A to 193:
	Page 60, line 40, leave out from first ("the") to ("or") in line 41 and insert ("Intelligence Services Commissioner").
	Page 60, line 41, after first ("Commissioner") insert (", the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland").
	Page 60, line 41, at end insert ("or Assistant Surveillance Commissioner").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 56, as amended, agreed to.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 194:
	After Clause 56, insert the following new clause--
	:TITLE3:INVESTIGATORY POWERS COMMISSION
	(" .--(1) There shall be an Investigatory Powers Commission consisting of--
	(a) the Commissioner under section 8 of the Interception of Communications Act,
	(b) the Security Service Act Commissioner,
	(c) the Intelligence Services Act Commission,
	(d) the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, and
	(e) such additional Commissioners as the Secretary of State shall appoint by order.
	(2) The Secretary of State shall by order provide for the discharge under the general direction of the Commission of any of the functions of each of the Commissioners.
	(3) The Secretary of State shall appoint one of the Commissioners to be chairman of the Commission.
	(4) Schedule (Investigatory Powers Commission) shall have effect with respect to the Commission.
	(5) No order shall be made under this section unless a draft of it has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.").

Lord Cope of Berkeley: In view of our previous discussions, I do not wish to pursue this matter. Therefore, I do not propose to move Amendment No. 194.

[Amendment No. 194 not moved.]
	Clause 57 [The Tribunal]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 194A to 195B:
	Page 61, line 41, leave out paragraph (e).
	Page 62, line 2, leave out (", (e)").
	Page 62, line 25, at end insert ("or under any enactment contained in or made under an Act of the Scottish Parliament which makes provision equivalent to that made by that Part").
	Page 62, line 33, leave out subsection (10).
	Page 62, line 45, leave out from ("making") to end of line 47 and insert ("of any disclosure in an intelligible form (within the meaning of section 52) of protected information by a person who is or has been in possession of the key to that information").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 57, as amended, agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 196 not moved.]
	Schedule 2 [The Tribunal]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 197:
	Page 85, line 26, at end insert--
	("(6) If the Scottish Parliament passes a resolution calling for the removal of a member of the Tribunal, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to secure that a motion for the presentation of an Address to Her Majesty for the removal of that member, and the resolution of the Scottish Parliament, are considered by each House of Parliament.").

Lord Bach: In moving Amendment No. 197, I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 198 and 200. I referred earlier to the decision of the Scottish Executive and Parliament to use the commissioners established under this Bill for oversight of the authorisations permitted under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Bill. I applaud their decision to introduce such consistency across the UK. We believe that it is important, notwithstanding the move to devolution, that the use of such powers is used consistently across the Scottish Border as far as possible. After all, our shared objective is compatibility with convention rights.
	The Scottish Executive has also elected to use the tribunal established under this Bill to provide the means of redress in instances where individuals may feel that it is owed to them after the use of the powers in this Bill. Again, we applaud that decision. Amendments Nos. 197, 198 and 200, tabled in the Government's name, are consequential on the decision of the Scottish Executive to use the tribunal in that way. The amendments in question grant a direct involvement for the Scottish Parliament or Ministers in key decisions which affect the operation of the tribunal. Those are, first, the removal of a member of the tribunal; secondly, the making of an order setting out the remedies available from the tribunal; and, thirdly, the making of rules for the tribunal.
	Those three aspects are important to the operation of the tribunal. The Scottish Ministers and Parliament have a key interest in the operation of the tribunal and the amendments reflect that interest and give them significant impact into key decisions made. I hope that the amendments are welcome to the Committee. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 59 [Exercise of the Tribunal's jurisdiction]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 198:
	Page 64, line 47, at end insert--
	("(12) The Secretary of State shall consult the Scottish Ministers before making any order under subsection (8); and any such order shall be laid before the Scottish Parliament.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 59, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 60 [Tribunal procedure]

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 198A to 199:
	Page 66, line 24, leave out from first ("the") to ("or") in line 25 and insert ("Intelligence Services Commissioner").
	Page 66, line 25, after first ("Commissioner") insert (", the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland").
	Page 66, line 25, at end insert ("or Assistant Surveillance Commissioner").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 60, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 61 [Tribunal rules]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 200:
	Page 68, line 43, at end insert--
	("(12) The Secretary of State shall consult the Scottish Ministers before making any rules under this section; and any rules so made shall be laid before the Scottish Parliament.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 61, as amended, agreed to.
	Clauses 62 and 63 agreed to.
	Clause 64 [Effect of codes of practice]:

Lord Cope of Berkeley: moved Amendment No. 200ZA:
	Page 70, line 8, leave out subsection (2).

Lord Cope of Berkeley: The Law Society of Scotland drew my attention to this point. The issue is what effect the codes of practice--about which we have heard a good deal and been promised even more--will have if a failure to comply with them will not render a person liable to criminal or civil proceedings. They seem to be rather toothless. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: Our purpose is to draw a clear distinction between the duties imposed by the Bill and those imposed by codes of practice. The Bill sets out fundamental legal obligations, such as the safeguards that must be applied to intercepted material, which are set out in Clauses 14 and 15.
	Codes of practice, on the other hand, exist primarily to provide guidance. There is an obligation in Clause 64(1) on any person exercising or performing a relevant power or duty to have regard to the provision of every code of practice in force, in so far as they are applicable.
	Many other Acts contain an identical provision, such as Section 101(9) of the Police Act 1997. The issue in that case and this is to strike a balance between ensuring that codes are taken seriously and are not toothless and avoiding a person being penalised for not following the exact letter of a code for reasons such as an operational emergency that the code's author could not have foreseen. The lack of a liability also means that codes can be drafted in plain English, without the need for more complicated legal jargon which affords lots of opportunities to imagine things that the words were never intended to say.
	I am sure that the noble Lord appreciates that codes of practice exist to illuminate and illustrate. No doubt he has been involved on many occasions with legislation providing for codes of practice that could be accused of being toothless, but their purpose is to explain matters and make them clear and to enable courts to interpret.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: I am all in favour of plain English and the Minister has said enough to make me want to think about this matter a little further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 200A to 201B:
	Page 70, line 18, leave out from first ("Act") to ("or") in line 19.
	Page 70, line 21, at end insert ("or
	(e) any Assistant Surveillance Commissioner carrying out any functions of his under section (Assistant Surveillance Commissioners) of this Act,").
	Page 70, line 27, leave out from ("the") to end of line 28 and insert ("Intelligence Services Commissioner").
	Page 70, line 28, at end insert ("or the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 64, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 65 [Conduct in relation to wireless telegraphy]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 202 and 203:
	Page 72, line 18, at end insert--
	("(8A) No regulations shall be made under subsection (4)(g) unless a draft of them has first been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.").
	Page 72, line 38, at end insert--
	("(4) In section 16(2) of that Act (regulations and orders), after "the said powers" there shall be inserted ", other than one containing regulations a draft of which has been approved for the purposes of section 5(8A),".").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 65, as amended, agreed to.
	Clauses 66 and 67 agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 203A:
	After Clause 67, insert the following new clause--
	:TITLE3:SURVEILLANCE ETC OPERATIONS BEGINNING IN SCOTLAND
	(" .--(1) Subject to subsection (2) where--
	(a) an authorisation under the relevant Scottish legislation has the effect of authorising the carrying out in Scotland of the conduct described in the authorisation,
	(b) the conduct so described is or includes conduct to which Part II of this Act applies, and
	(c) circumstances arise by virtue of which some or all of the conduct so described can for the time being be carried out only outwith Scotland,
	section 26 of this Act shall have effect for the purpose of making lawful the carrying out outwith Scotland of the conduct so described as if the authorisation, so far as is it relates to conduct to which that Part applies, were an authorisation duly granted under that Part.
	(2) Where any such circumstances as are mentioned in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) so arise as to give effect outwith Scotland to any authorisation granted under the relevant Scottish legislation, that authorisation shall not authorise any conduct outwith Scotland at any time after the end of the period of three weeks beginning with the time when the circumstances arose.
	(3) Subsection (2) is without prejudice to the operation of subsection (1) in relation to any authorisation on the second or any subsequent occasion on which any such circumstances as are mentioned in subsection (1)(c) arise while the authorisation remains in force.
	(4) In this section "the relevant Scottish legislation" means an enactment contained in or made under an Act of the Scottish Parliament which makes provision, corresponding to that made by Part II, for the authorisation of conduct to which that Part applies.").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 68 agreed to.
	Clause 69 [Orders, regulations and rules]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 203B to 207:
	Page 75, line 20, leave out from ("instrument") to end of line 22 and insert ("which contains any order made in exercise of a power to which this section applies (other than the power to appoint a day under section 74(2)) but which contains neither").
	Page 75, line 24, after ("12(7),") insert (" 21(9),").
	Page 75, line 24, after ("12(7),") insert (" 27(5),").
	Page 75, line 24, after ("12(7),") insert (" 28(5A),").
	Page 75, line 24 after ("12(7),") insert (" 29(4B),").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: moved Amendment No. 208:
	Page 75, line 24, after ("12(7),") insert ("24(5)").

Lord Cope of Berkeley: Having been rejected all evening, nevertheless, I am encouraged to try Amendment No. 208. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 208A to 208C:
	Page 75, line 24, at end insert ("nor").
	Page 75, line 25, leave out from ("applies") to end of line 26.
	Page 75, line 28, at end insert--
	("( ) A statutory instrument containing any regulations made in exercise of a power to which this section applies shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 69, as amended, agreed to.
	Clauses 70 and 71 agreed to.
	Clause 72 [General interpretation]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 209:
	Page 76, line 29, at end insert--
	(""Assistant Surveillance Commissioner" means any person holding office under section (Assistant Surveillance Commissioners);").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 210:
	Page 76, leave out lines 33 to 39 and insert ("anything which serves to transmit information").

Lord Lucas: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 211. I am always slightly disturbed by those rather jumbled and rambling definitions. For example, the definition of "communication" in paragraph (b) refers to "anything comprising speech" and so on and then paragraph (c) states:
	"signals serving ... for the impartation of anything between persons".
	If that is not speech, I do not know what it is, so why is "speech" in there if it is already covered in sub-paragraph (c)? I suppose there may be some cases of speeches in this Chamber that do not impart information, but thankfully they are rare and I am not sure that we need worry about them in this Bill.
	I have attempted to produce something wider and simpler. When complicated definitions have to be construed in court, the question arises of whether they will start to compare some particular form of communication with the examples in the Bill, decide it does not fit and say that it is not communication, when for the sake of this Bill it ought to be. The same argument applies to the definition of "document", which seems to be quite limited. It includes a number of illustrations which may, in the event, limit the interpretation put on the word. When you look at how it is used in the Bill it ought to be quite broad. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: Definitions are always difficult. We have had many arguments about definitions during the course of this Bill. The noble Lord has said that he wants to make the definition wider and, therefore, simpler. I usually believe that when a definition is made wider it becomes more complex. The definition of "communication" is based upon wording taken from Section 4 of the Telecommunications Act 1984. We are trying to achieve consistency across legislation and that is the reasoning behind it.
	Communication service providers are familiar with that legislation and we have no wish to confuse the way in which the word "communication" is read in the Bill by introducing a different wording. The courts would be obliged to take account of the different definitions and I believe that that would add to the complexity. In two Acts we would have to read the word differently when we mean the same. I do not believe that making the definition wider makes it simpler; I believe it makes it more complex for the courts.
	The definition of "document" is taken from Section 14(1) of the Electronic Communications Act 2000. I am sure that the noble Lord is familiar with that. Again, it is used in this piece of legislation in a way that we believe achieves consistency. We are keen that the two pieces of legislation should be compatible. The word "document" occurs in the Bill only within the phrase "document or other information", or variations of that phrase. As a consequence, we believe that the amendment is unnecessary. I trust that the noble Lord will, in the interests of efficiency and consistency, feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Lucas: It is wonderful to know that there is some part of this great planet where the definition of "communication" has not changed since 1984. That fact had passed me by. For the sake of consistency and understanding, I at least should read the Act and ensure that I am happy with the dual context. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 211 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 211A and 211B:
	Page 77, leave out lines 10 and 11.
	Page 77, line 23, leave out ("(subject to section 45(7))").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 212 not moved.]

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 212A:
	Page 77, leave out lines 44 and 45.
	On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 213:
	Page 78, line 2, at end insert ("or a member of the Senior Management Structure of Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service").

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 216 and 217. Amendments Nos. 213 and 217 are government amendments and Amendment No. 216, which we intend to resist, stands in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cope.
	Amendments Nos. 213 and 217 between them are necessary to take account of the slightly different terminology used in the Diplomatic Service to describe a person of equivalent seniority to a member of the senior Civil Service. The Foreign Secretary may sign interception warrants, and it is necessary that the Bill treat his officials in the same way as it treats those of any other Secretary of State.
	Amendment No. 216 would remove from the Secretary of State the power to amend the definition of "senior official" contained in Clause 72(1). The sole purpose of that power is to cater for the eventuality that a change to the structure or grading of the Civil Service might render the Bill's definition of a "senior official" obsolete--obviously we cannot allow such a thing to happen. Were such a change to be made in a non-statutory way, there would be no means of updating the definition short of primary legislation, which we do not believe would be appropriate.
	I should add that this subsection does not permit the definition of a senior official to be devalued, because it obliges the Secretary of State to ensure that his amendment preserves, so far as practicable, the effect of the existing definition. Hence it would be incumbent upon him to choose that level or designation which best mirrored the current seniority of members of the senior Civil Service. I beg to move.

Viscount Astor: Perhaps I may speak briefly to Amendment No. 216.
	The Minister has largely answered the points which were the reason we tabled this amendment. However, it would be interesting to know whether or not the Government have any plans to change the definition. Does it happen regularly within the Civil Service? Has it happened recently? Do they expect any changes to take place? It seemed to us that, while we accept that the provision contains a caveat that the Secretary of State has to keep, so far as practicable, the present definition, it is unlikely that the definitions of senior officials change that often.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I believe I dealt with that point. We do not have any immediate plans to change the entire structure of the Civil Service. We are trying to ensure that we have the balance right for the purposes of this Bill and ensure that it works for different departments in different ways. I cannot usefully add anything more.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 214 not moved.]

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 215:
	Page 78, line 47, at end insert--
	("(4A) For the purposes of this Act detecting crime shall be taken to include--
	(a) establishing by whom, for what purpose, by what means and generally in what circumstances any crime was committed; and
	(b) the apprehension of the person by whom any crime was committed;
	and any reference in this Act to preventing or detecting serious crime shall be construed accordingly, except that, in Chapter I of Part I, it shall not include a reference to gathering evidence for use in any legal proceedings.").

Lord Bassam of Brighton: Each of the six investigatory powers in this Bill can be used for specific purposes enshrined in the Bill. All include the purpose,
	"for the prevention and detection of crime".
	In some cases that is further qualified by the stipulation that the purpose can only be used for serious crime. Precisely what is covered by the term "detection" of crime has never been defined in statute. Operationally, it has generally been taken to mean that powers can be used up to the point of charge. And this interpretation is currently the one adopted, for example, by the surveillance commissioners when giving prior approval to applications for intrusive surveillance made under the Police Act 1997.
	However, in the case of Preston in 1994, the House of Lords considered whether there was a prohibition on the use of intercept material in evidence. That was Section 9 of the Interception of Communications Act. We had a stimulating debate on those provisions--now included in Clauses 16 and 17 of this Bill--last week. In the case of Preston the Judicial Committee reflected on the fact that interception has never been intended to play a part in the prosecution process. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mustill, when delivering the leading judgment, rejected the view that the prevention and detection of serious crime went beyond,
	"the forestalling of future crimes and the discovery that crimes had been committed in the past, and by whom and in what manner".
	He particularly rejected the view that the detection of crime extended to the,
	"amassing of evidence ... with a view to the prosecution of offenders".
	This was not a surprising assessment.
	In the case of Morgans on 17th February of this year, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, summarised the case law. In respect of the Interception of Communications Act, he clearly stated that the effect of Preston was that,
	"the purposes of preventing or detecting serious crime did not include the purpose of gathering evidence of criminal proceedings in respect of such crime".
	That case provides us with a difficulty in respect of this Bill. A narrow definition of "detection" is satisfactory in the case of interception, though we have tried to ensure even here that the law is as clear as possible. But the same formulation of "prevention and detection" exists in each of the five other powers of the Bill where we most certainly do want the phase to have a wider meaning and to include gathering evidence. Therefore, we believe that we must say what we intend the phrase to mean in each of the places where we use it. That is the purpose of these amendments.
	We have deliberated long and hard over this matter. The result of our deliberations are now tabled before the Committee as Amendments Nos. 215, 222A, 224A and 226. Noble Lords will see from Amendment No. 215 that, across the generality of the Bill, we clarify that detection of crime includes,
	"establishing by whom, for what purpose, by what means and generally in what circumstances any crime is committed; and the apprehension of the person by whom any crime was committed".
	I believe that this clarification should be welcomed. It means that it is possible to use the powers in Chapter II of Part I and in Parts II and III of the Bill for the purpose spelled out in Amendment No. 215.
	I believe that I have dealt with the uncertain areas and the inconsistencies in the expression of "detecting crime" across a number of existing statutes. We have tabled amendments to clarify the meaning in respect of this Bill and related legislation. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 216 not moved.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 217:
	Page 79, line 12, leave out ("civil") insert ("home civil service or diplomatic").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 218 not moved.]
	Clause 72, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 73 agreed to.
	Schedule 3 [Consequential amendments]:

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 219:
	Page 87, line 7, leave out ("(within the meaning of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000)").

Lord Bassam of Brighton: The effect of this group of amendments would allow government bodies to continue to use their statutory powers to obtain communications data without committing an offence under the Telecommunications Act 1984--something with which, no doubt, all Members of the Committee will be familiar. Amendment No. 220 is the key amendment in the group, while the remaining amendments are consequential. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 220, 220A, 221 and 222:
	Page 87, line 11, after ("2000;") insert--
	("( ) in compliance with any requirement imposed (apart from that Act) in consequence of the exercise by any person of any statutory power exercisable by him for the purpose of obtaining any document or other information;").
	Page 87, line 12, leave out from second ("under") to end of line 13.
	Page 87, line 15, leave out ("any Commissioner appointed under that Act of 2000") and insert ("the Interception of Communications Commissioner").
	Page 87, line 16, at end insert--
	("(3) In subsection (2) above 'criminal proceedings' and 'statutory power' have the same meanings as in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000."").
	On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: moved Amendment No. 222ZA:
	Page 87, line 16, at end insert--
	:TITLE3:("The Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 (c. 47)
	. At the end of paragraph 1 of Part I of Schedule 2 there shall be inserted--
	"in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Tribunal."").

Lord Cope of Berkeley: This is a very simple amendment, but one which has some consequences. The Bill provides for a regulation of investigatory powers tribunal. However, the Law Society of Scotland has pointed out to me that the relevant people will not be able to get legal aid as the Bill stands, should they appear before it. The society has suggested that that matter should be considered. I beg to move.

Lord Bach: This amendment would provide for legal aid to be available in Scotland to applicants to the tribunal. However, the convention is that this Parliament does not legislate on devolved matters. Legal aid is a devolved matter, and the responsibility of the Scottish Executive. As such, it is not possible for the Government to accept the amendment, and I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw it.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: In the light of that response, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 222A and 222B:
	Page 87, line 17, at end insert--
	(" .--(1) In section 1 of the Security Service Act 1989 (functions of the Security Service), after subsection (4) there shall be inserted--
	"(5) Section 72(4A) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (meaning of 'prevention' and 'detection'), so far as it relates to serious crime, shall apply for the purposes of this Act as it applies for the purposes of the provisions of that Act not contained in Chapter I of Part I."
	(2) In section 2(2)(a) of that Act (duty of Director General to secure that information not disclosed except for authorised purposes), for "preventing or detecting" there shall be substituted "the prevention or detection of".").
	Page 87, line 18, leave out paragraph 4.

Lord Bach: These amendments have already been spoken to. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 223 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 223A:
	Page 87, line 35, leave out paragraph 6.
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 224 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 224A to 226:
	Page 87, line 45, at end insert--
	(". In section 11 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (interpretation), after subsection (1) there shall be inserted--
	"(1A) Section 72(4A) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (meaning of 'prevention' and 'detection'), so far as it relates to serious crime, shall apply for the purposes of this Act as it applies for the purposes of Chapter I of Part I of that Act." ").
	Page 88, line 14, at end insert ("and after "Commissioners" there shall be inserted "and any Assistant Surveillance Commissioners holding office under section (Assistant Surveillance Commissioners) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000"").
	Page 90, line 15, leave out ("requiring a key to protected information)") and insert ("imposing a disclosure requirement in respect of information protected by a key)").
	Page 90, line 33, at end insert--
	("(13) In Part VII of that Act, before section 134 there shall be inserted--
	"Meaning of 'prevention' and 'detection'.
	133A. Section 72(4A) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (meaning of 'prevention' and 'detection') shall apply for the purposes of this Act as it applies for the purposes of the provisions of that Act not contained in Chapter I of Part I." ").

Lord Bach: These amendments have already been spoken to. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 226A:
	Page 90, line 45, at end insert--
	("The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c. 8)
	. In section 394(7) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (exclusion of material from material of the Authority to which a person must be allowed access), for paragraphs (a) and (b) there shall be substituted--
	"(a) is material the disclosure of which for the purposes of or in connection with any legal proceedings is prohibited by section 16 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000; or"").

Lord Bassam of Brighton: Amendment No. 226A would amend the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, updating its provisions to ensure that intercept material and related sensitive information is protected from disclosure under the new interception regime. It is a technical amendment and it merely updates the language used in that Act. I beg to move.

Lord Lucas: It appears to me that the Financial Services and Markets Act has hardly reached the statute book before we are seeking to amend it. I am sure that if the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, had intended that the wording should be included in that Act he would have included it while the Bill was progressing through the Chamber under his tutelage. I am surprised that the noble Lord has the temerity to contradict such an experienced parliamentarian.

The Earl of Northesk: Following the intervention of my noble friend Lord Lucas, I simply say to the noble Lords, Lord McIntosh and Lord Bach, "Hurrah! No. 1,470." I hope that I have my arithmetic correct.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 227:
	Page 90, leave out lines 47 to 50 and insert--
	("11.--(1) In section 9(2)(d) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (proceedings under the Human Rights Act 1998), for "8" there shall be substituted "7".
	(2) In each of paragraphs 6(3) and 7(5) of Schedule 3 to that Act (references to an organisation and representative in paragraphs 5 and 8 of that Schedule), for "paragraphs 5 and 8" there shall be substituted "paragraph 5".").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
	Schedule 4 [Repeals]:

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 228:
	Page 91, line 35, column 3, leave out ("11(2)") and insert ("11(3)").

Lord Bassam of Brighton: In moving Amendment No. 228, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 229. I have a long and complicated speech. I am sure that the Committee will wish to hear the whole of my lengthy explanation. Amendment No. 228 corrects an oversight in paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 and amends Section 58(1) of the Post Office Act 1953--I remember it well!--taking account of the amendment previously made to that subsection by Section 11(2) of the Interception of Communications Act 1985. We therefore do not wish to repeal Section 11(2).
	Amendment No. 229 would repeal paragraph 8 of Schedule 3 to the Terrorism Act, currently before Parliament as a Bill. This repeal is consequential to Amendment No. 69, which the Government moved during the first sitting of this Committee. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach: moved Amendments Nos. 228A to 229:
	Page 91, column 3, leave out line 37 and insert--
	
		
			   ("Sections 4 and 5.") 
		
	
	Page 91, column 3, leave out line 47 and insert--
	
		
			   ("Sections 8 and 9.") 
		
	
	Page 92, line 45, at end insert--
	
		
			 ("2000 c. 00. The Terrorism Act 2000. In Schedule 3, paragraph 8.")

Lord Bach: These amendments have already been spoken to. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 74 [Short title, commencement and extent]:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 230:
	Page 80, line 1, leave out subsections (3) to (5).
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 74, as amended, agreed to.
	In the Title:

Lord Bach: moved Amendment No. 231:
	Line 6, leave out ("the establishment of a tribunal with") and insert ("Commissioners and a tribunal with functions and").
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Title, as amended, agreed to.
	House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.

Lord Carter: My Lords, in moving that the House do now adjourn, perhaps I may say that I hope that the Terrorism Bill receives Royal Assent and becomes an Act.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
	House adjourned at twenty-eight minutes before one o'clock.